James Hill's Weekly, 3/13/98
By Srdja Trifkovic
Srdja Trifkovic is executive director of the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies
We've seen this all before
Attacks by armed Albanian separatists on policemen in the Serbian province of Kosovo, a
regular feature of daily life in that unhappy corner of the Balkans for years, escalated
recently to the point where the regime of Slobodan Milosevic felt compelled to respond
with a show of force. This was unsurprisingly met with the familiar media barrage against
the cruelty of "the Serbs" and bellicose statements by U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright, who pushed through the Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia this
week new sanctions against Federal Yugoslavia.
America's current strategy is to force Mr. Milosevic into elevating Kosovo to the status
of a constituent federal republic in the rump Yugoslavia, which consists of Serbia and
Montenegro. The province would thus be detached from Serbia, of which it is the oldest and
emotionally most treasured part: Serbian medieval kings have all left magnificent
monasteries and castles as evidence that this was indeed the cradle not only of the
Serbian state, but also of its neo-Byzantine culture.
This is the untold reason for the insistence of the State Department that the problem of
Kosovo be resolved "within Yugoslavia," with no mention of Serbia. The rationale
is the spurious claim that, although always a part of Serbia, Kosovo was also represented
at the federal level under Tito's Communist constitution of 1974. Why a dead Red
dictator's arrangements -- never freely negotiated, or voted upon by the people concerned
-- should be accepted as inviolable principles a quarter of a century later, is left
unexplained.
Should Kosovo become a federal republic, the Croatian/Bosnian scenario for secession would
be duly applied: the assembly in Pristina will call a referendum on independence, with the
result a foregone conclusion. The proceedings will be eagerly ratified by the assorted
worthies from "The International Community," and presto! -- another slice will
be cut from the Serbian salami, with the façade of legality maintained by the
powers-that-be inside the Beltway. If the Serbs try to resist, they will be branded, yet
again, "aggressors" against a new U.N. member. A greater Albania will come into
being without a single editorial writer ever using the phrase, let alone considering its
implications.
Mr. Milosevic is on board, as usual; he will agree to anything as long as his power in the
remnant of Serbia is guaranteed by the United States, which it will be. In the first phase
he will present defeat to his long-suffering people as a victory, because the leader of
the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, will temporarily muzzle his uncompromising demand
for full independence in favor of the federal status within Yugoslavia. But when a few
months later Mr. Rugova follows the example of Croatia's Franjo Tudjman in 1991, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina's Alija Izetbegovic in 1992, Mr. Milosevic's acceptance of the fait
accompli will be justified by foreign pressure. He and Ms. Albright need each other.
This apparently clever ploy made in Foggy Bottom may cause a destabilizing chain reaction
throughout the Balkans. Its main victim will be the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia,
where the restive Albanian minority comprises a third of total population (as opposed to
only one fifth in Serbia). Oddly enough, the U.S. supports Skopje's policy of
centralization, and does not object to the refusal of the government of Kiro Gligorov to
grant autonomous status to its Albanians. But by encouraging their cousins next door in
Serbia to strive for full autonomy, and paving the way for independence, the U.S. will
unleash a revolution of rising expectations among Macedonia's Albanians that will be
impossible to contain.
Quite apart from practical policy considerations, U.S. encouragement of Albanian
intransigence in Serbia is flawed in principle. If the Albanians are allowed full autonomy
leading to secession on grounds of their numbers (90 percent in Kosovo), will the same
apply if the Latinos in New Mexico or Texas eventually outnumber their Anglo neighbors and
start demanding full autonomy, or even secession?
If the principle of full territorial autonomy for minorities is imposed on Serbia, will it
not be demanded by the Hungarians in Romania (more numerous than Serbia's Albanians), the
Russians in the Ukraine, or the Kurds in Turkey? And finally, if action by Serbian police
against armed terrorists is condemned by Washington in the name of human rights and moral
principles, presumably the same will be done when the next Kurdish village is razed by the
Turkish army and the next Palestinian terrorist's home blown up by the Israeli Defense
Force.
|