Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy
February, 1998

SECTION: TERRORISM AND THE BALKANS; Pg. 9

Italy Becomes Iran's New Base For Terrorist Operations

Iranian Islamists have established an effective terrorist infrastructure in the Balkans region. Its axis runs from Albania, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Italy. There, a forward operations centre in Milan is preparing to export terror into Western Europe. Senior Editor Yossef Bodansky uncovers this clandestine web which has already attempted the assassination of Pope John Paul II.

AT THE INTERNATIONAL conference on Bosnia in Bonn on December 10, 1997, the US made a strenuous effort to expand the definition of the "Bosnian problem" to include all Muslim "causes" in the Balkans. Indeed, the Conference's final declaration included a US-inspired warning about the dire effect of the "escalating ethnic tensions" in Kosovo: a province of Yugoslavia which has nothing to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) or the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

A leader of the Bosnian Serb delegation, Momcilo Krajisnik, observed that by
riding on the sympathy to the Bosnian Muslims, the conference "tried to sneak the Kosovo issue through the back door" into the centre-stage of international politics. Indeed, populated with an ethnic Muslim Albanian majority, Kosovo is fast becoming the new "darling" of the US Clinton Administration's Balkans policy.

Moreover, the White House's recent discovery of the Kosovo issue as a political priority comes at the time when terrorism and subversion inspired by Islamists are spreading and escalating among Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia (FYROM), and Albania itself. This recent escalation is the most visible component of the first phase of Tehran's long-term plan, currently being implemented. This plan includes intense preparations for the eruption of hostilities in Kosovo. Moreover, these activities could not have taken place but for the consolidation of Iranian presence in Albania. Another significant aspect of this effort is Iran's maintenance of a command structure in Italy run by a veteran terrorist now serving as a senior Iranian diplomat.

THE CURRENT ESCALATION of sectarian violence in Kosovo is not a sudden event, but a result of thorough preparations in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as throughout the Muslim World. [Outside the scope of this article, these activities are described in great detail in the author's book Some Call It Peace, pp. 155-160.]

The significance of the Iranian activities in Albania and Kosovo is in their  larger context: the growing importance of both the Balkans-based infrastructure as the Islamists' primary entry point into Europe, as well as the establishment of an Iranian intelligence, command and control centre in Italy. There has been an overall increase in significance of the Italy-Balkans infrastructure since the Spring of 1997, because tensions between Iran and West European states grew in the aftermath of the verdict in the Mykonos trial, and local security forces now pay more attention to Iranian activities. Meanwhile, the dynamics in B-H compels Iran and the Izetbegovic Administration to keep a low profile in order not to alienate the Europeans to the point of refusing to go along with the US-imposed policies.

The first demonstration of the capabilities of the Italy-Balkans system, its
sophistication and resilience, was an attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II
in the Spring of 1997. In March, Ayatollah Khamene'i chaired a special meeting of the Special Operations Committee which scrutinised the details of the proposed operation and assessed its importance. Significantly, despite the backlash throughout Western Europe of the early-April Mykonos verdict, Tehran determined that the operation was too important to be called off. Indeed, teams of the Special Missions Division continued to inspect and activate Lebanese, Turkish, Algerian and Moroccan squads and teams in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.

Significantly, the operation was conducted even though the new "nerve centre" of Iranian intelligence, located in Milan, was not yet ready and thus not used in support of the operation. Several elements of the Mahdi Chamran's External Intelligence took part in the operation. Most important were: clandestine elements of the al-Quds forces "that take care of [terrorist] attacks and military operations abroad"; special units of the Internal Security Department; and the rear/safe-haven logistical base in Sarajevo from where the foreign terrorists began their operations. An Islamist terrorist, presently held in Western Europe, identified Mahdi Chamran operating with the nom de guerre Mehid Sharam, as the head of this structure.

The operation which prompted Tehran to activate the fledgling European operations centre was the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. This operation was launched after a detailed pre-mission briefing had taken place in the Hammamet Hilton in Tunisia. Working with an unusually precise intelligence warning, the Italian security forces had been searching for Islamist terrorists, both agents already in-country and agents known to have been arriving since early Spring. This force, in excess of 20 or 30 expert terrorists identified as "close to the Iranian HizbAllah", was known to be plotting bomb attacks against Pope John Paul II as well as at airports.

At its core was a "suicide commando group trained in Bosnia" comprised of 18 terrorists. They arrived in Italy via Rome's Fiumicino airport after travelling through several third countries. The key terrorists were from Turkey (including  Islamist Kurds), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iran. Some of them arrived in Italy by air from Turkey and elsewhere, while others arrived by ship from Tunisia. The detonators were smuggled from Germany, both commercially and in Iranian diplomatic mail.

The main mission of this terrorist force was to assassinate the Pope by exploding a car bomb along a route he was to take in Rome. The car, with stolen diplomatic license plates, was to be parked under the colonnade in St. Peter's square at a point along the itinerary habitually used by the Pope. The car bomb could be exploded by both a martyr inside and by remote control from a nearby observation post.

Tehran planned on the attack on the Pope being the curtain-raiser for a campaign of terror throughout Western Europe. Several Iran-sponsored Islamist terrorist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italy, France and Germany were known to be planning attacks in Europe. The forward operational base of the entire campaign was in Milan, from where communications with the rear headquarters in Bosnia were maintained.

Ultimately, the high-level, country-wide security alert and manhunt, which was later extended to Western Europe, deterred the terrorists and prevented the assassination. Yet, as a testimony to the efficacy of the Iran-sponsored  terrorist system, all the terrorists known to have been involved in Italy escaped. If the counter-terrorist operations had successfully prevented the attack on the Pope, they had failed to unearth and destroy the Iran-sponsored terrorist infrastructure in Italy. The entire network simply went underground.

In late September 1997, Tehran's Italian network was ready to make another
attempt on the Pope's life. A network of some 20 terrorists -- Croats, Bosnians,
Tunisians, Algerians, and Moroccans -- was organised in Bologna. The key members
of this network were former mujahedin who had fought in Bosnia. The network's
commander, a Moroccan citizen, arrived from Spain on the eve of the operation
with up-to-date instructions. The network enjoyed logistical support from local
networks affiliated with Algeria's Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA). The operational plan called for repeated attempts to hit the Pope between his
arrival at Bologna airport and the cathedral where he was to attend the congress
of the Congregation of the Holy Sacrament. The Italian security forces located
and arrested 14 members of the network just a few hours before Pope John Paul
II's arrival at Bologna.

MEANWHILE, PROFOUND changes had affected the functioning of Iranian
intelligence, and the terrorism system it sponsors, in Italy. The chief of
Iranian Intelligence in Italy, Hamid Parandeh, had by now not only been exposed
as a spy by the Italian security services, but was directly implicated in
several terrorist operations and plans. Hamid Parandeh had been in Italy for
several years undercover as an Iranian diplomat. He first served with the
Iranian Embassy in Rome and later transferred to the Embassy to the Vatican.
There, he served as a Press Attache from August 22, 1995, to January 25, 1996,
before his stay in Rome became untenable.

By early 1997, Italy had emerged as the centre of regional and European
operations. During a visit to Italy, mainly Rome and Milan, in March 1997,
Mohsein Rafiq-Dost purchased a building in Milan that was expected to become a
new clandestine HQ for the Iranian intelligence and terrorism network.
Meanwhile, the support system in B-H had been expanded and made more resilient.

Another Iranian diplomat, Mahmud Nurani, has now emerged as the Rome-based
chief of Iranian intelligence. Nurani is a senior terrorist-diplomat who served
in Beirut in the early 1980s as the forward representative of Mohtashemi-Pur. In
this capacity, he was instrumental in the organisation of the HizbAllah and in
its launching of a series of bombing operations in Beirut, as well as the
launching of the hostage-taking campaign. Nurani's appointment highlights the
network's priorities. The entire Iranian and terrorism establishment was jolted
into action in the Fall of 1997 after the nomination of Qorban Ali Najaf-Abadi,
a confidant of Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamene'i, as Minister of
Intelligence.

PRESENTLY, NURANI's most important mission is overseeing the expansion of the
Iranian intelligence hub in Albania, consolidating a Muslim Axis into Bosnia,
Italy and northwards into Austria-Germany; the source of hi-tech and strategic
materials for Iran's strategic industries.

Albania became ripe for Iranian penetration and subversion in the mid-1990s.
Albania emerged after the Cold War as a European country with a Third World
economy. The collapse of its all-embracing communism, along with its first
exposure to Western media images and its proximity to wealthy Italy, resulted
in an overwhelming desire to attain Western standards of living.

Organised crime, initially by Albanians and Italians, later joined by a host
of mafias from China to Russia to the Middle East, became the primary
exploiting element of Albania's plight. Albania became a primary artery
for the flow of arms, drugs, counterfeit and other goods controlled by Italian
and international organised crime entities.

This surge of criminality also created a backlash in Albania's simple, rural
and morally straightforward society. The "solution" to social ills which
promises salvation from both criminality and present day chaos and poverty:
Islam.

After months of tumultuous social breakdown and populist revolt, Tirane is so
desperate for socio-economic aid from any quarter, that it does not regulate
these activities. Furthermore, large segments of the population are amenable to
doing just about anything, particularly if their activities are coated with
religious-moralistic slogans.

These two factors facilitate Iranian deep penetration of Albania. Tehran's
penetration is conducted on two levels. Overtly, the Iranians and their Islamist
counterparts have built up a comprehensive financial support network: from banks
and institutions to run the formal economy to a web of humanitarian
organisations offering all types of social services. Beneath this, a clandestine web forms an operational intelligence base for all of Europe.

There have been several clear indications of the importance of the Albanian
initiative. A recent meeting of Iran's Supreme Economic Council of Iran was
devoted to the situation in Albania. Vice-President Behezad Navabi, now
entrusted with the task of coordinating the overt socio-economic initiatives in
Albania, summoned to this meeting such senior officials as Mohsen Nourbakhsh,
the Governor of Iran's Central Bank, and top officials from the relevant
ministries. Moreover, Navabi is instructed to coordinate his activities with
Iran's intelligence system. Navabi instructed the officials to draw up and begin
implementing a long-term plan aimed to expedite the realisation of Tehran's
three main long-term objectives in Albania: (1) To set up a commercial
bridgehead not too far from the heart of Europe; (2) To consolidate a strategic
axis along the Sarajevo-to-Tirane line by expanding subversive and
Islamist-political presence; and (3) To organise a forward base for Iranian
intelligence from where it would be possible to launch infiltration missions
into Italy, Austria, Greece, and onward into the heart of Western Europe.

Implementation of Tehran's designs is already set in motion. Working through
Iran's various semi-official foundations and funds, Iranian intelligence has
already established "contacts" with the numerous Iranian and Islamist trading
initiatives in the main cities of Albania, as well as channelled funds for
the launching of many more such initiatives. Meanwhile, Tehran is making an
all-out effort to economically bolster, and boost ties with, the Albanian
Arab-Islamic Bank (AAIB). By making the AAIB the primary instrument for the flow
of foreign currency into Albania, while placing several loyalists of Tehran at
the top, Tehran transformed the bank into an institution which makes every
effort to smooth the economic and legal path for Iranian penetration. Indeed,
the AAIB has already established formal ties with a series of Iranian banks.
Mohsen Nourbakhsh has instructed these banks to set up operations in Albania
irrespective of the economic viability and risks of these ventures. Tehran's own
economic intelligence functionaries are deployed throughout the Iranian
financial institutions in Albania. Taken together, these activities put Iran
in a unique position of near dominance over the Albanian financial system.

Concurrently, Iranian intelligence is stepping up its involvement with the
activities of organised crime in and out of Albania. Since the early 1990s,
these ports have been used by Iranian intelligence and its allies for the
smuggling of drugs and weapons for B-H, as well as a point of transfer of
counterfeit funds and drugs from the Middle East to the Italian mafia. As a
rule, the large-volume logistics operations have been conducted through the
Albanian port of Durres, while smaller but more sensitive cargoes were shipped
via Sendein (north of Durres).

However, by mid-1997, Albania has become the centre of the primary illicit
traffic routes which cross the Balkans: arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina, drugs from
the Middle East and Colombia for Western Europe, and funds from Russia for
laundering in the West. The Italian mafia is a dominant force. The geographical
proximity of southern Italy has created a dangerous link between the Mafia
networks of southern Italy and the Albanians. Together, they orchestrate the
role of the foreigners who become increasingly active on the Albanian scene:
the Russian mafiya; the fledgling Montenegrin organised crime groups; as well as
the fully integrated drug trafficking mafias and terrorist organisations from
Kosovo and from the Middle East, particularly Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran,
Syria-Lebanon and Turkey.

On the Italian side of the Adriatic, the Apulian mafia has been described as
"the top dog" of the illegal traffic system between Europe and Asia via the
Brindisi-Tirane link. The new Sacra Corona Unita [United Sacred Crown], that is
also known as "the fourth mafia", is a well organised and structured top-down
decision-making mafia that presently exercises undisputed reign over the
provinces of Brindisi, Lecce, and Taranto. The Apulian mafia has transformed
Italy's southern ports into a primary venue for the entry of illegal goods and
people into Italy and onward into the rest of Europe. On the criminal front, the
most active sectors are the trafficking in arms, drugs, prostitution, and usury.
On top, there is a rapidly expanding flow of illegal immigrants of every nationality, a phenomenon now exploited by Iranian intelligence to insert agents
and terrorists into Europe.

Meanwhile, the wars throughout the former Yugoslavia have revived the
traditional arms trafficking across the Adriatic. The Russian mafiyas and their
Albanian counterparts still dominate this trade in the Balkans. On the Italian
side, virtually the entire Italian criminal organisations with access to the
Adriatic coast now take part in illegal weapons trafficking. The Italian mafia
cells prefer to operate out of the Emilia-Romagna region because of the
money-laundering possibilities offered by the Romagna riviera's tourist
industry. The Italian mafias buy everything -- weapons of all kinds, as well as
chemical and bacteriological substances and strategic nuclear materials. Most of
these weapons are resold to governments and terrorist entities they run or
sponsor. The radioactive materials are rerouted to the Middle East, often in
exchange for drugs. The main shipping routes for this trade passes through
Albania and Apulia.

The historic route of illegal immigrants entering Europe from the East passes
through Trieste or the Apulian ports. Presently, Albania has become a staging
area for immigrants from most Asian states, including China. They arrive at
Italian shores via Durresi. Dominating the traffic between Durresi and Brindisi,
the mafia has also organised the traffic of illegal immigrants. People are inserted by small very fast and powerful motorboats that land entire families of
illegal immigrants on the Apulian shores in the space of two to three hours.
Upon arrival in Italy, they are picked up by special "taxi services" that bring
them to mafia-run "camps" further inland where a sorting-out process takes place
and where often the immigrants' ultimate future is decided. The vast majority
are smuggled onward toward Italy's and Europe's northern regions. Iranian
intelligence is exploiting this massive illegal flow of humanity in order to
clandestinely infiltrate and insert its own terrorists and operatives into
Europe. If any of these individuals is caught, he will be considered yet another
illegal migrant, rather than the spy or terrorist that he is, and be treated
accordingly.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to expand their training and recruitment in
Albania, preparing more and better operatives for infiltration into both
Kosovo and Western Europe.

The recruitment process is based on the outreach to the impoverished population
in Albania. The Iranians have established a number of foundations alongside
their banks that are engaged in humanitarian services and charities. Most
important is the "construction Jihad" which is directly affiliated with
Iranian intelligence via Tehran's semi-officials founds. In Albania, the
Jihad operates as a highly-motivated organisation with ample funding. It is
involved in encouraging small trade, in setting up small factories, and
generally, in creating jobs in urban and other impoverished areas. Through
its social and economic work, the Jihad has become a formidable instrument,
making it very easy for the Iranians to conquer the peoples' hearts as well
as gain popularity and consensus in a wide social context. This kind of a
social environment creates favourable conditions for recruitment of
individuals and the solicitation of active support from institutions -- be
they port facilities, factories, or financial entities.

Moreover, the key Sunni Islamist associations, such as Al-Haramain and
Al-Muwafaq, which concentrate on proselytising for Islam, constitute another
instrument for extending Iranian influence. Relying on donations from the
Persian Gulf states and the possibility of high-paying jobs in these oil states,
these institutions represent an attraction for a wide segment of the young
population. In reality, these associations are mainly used to recruit and to
train Albanian mujahedin. Their recruitment methods are those perfected in
Afghanistan and Bosnia.

Under the guise of diversified Islamic educational institutions and rural
area development projects, the Iranians and their Arab Islamist allies have
established training camps in a variety of remote areas in Albania. In order
to run these camps, Tehran transferred numerous groups of Arab and Albanian mujahedin from Bosnia. After a brief stay in these Albanian special training
camps, special teams made of either veteran mujahedin or recently trained
Albanians are sent out of the country. A large number cross into Kosovo either
directly or via Macedonia. The high-quality assets are sent into Western Europe
mixed in with the large groups of desperate refugees that cross the Straits of
Otranto every night.

Meanwhile, by late 1997, the Tehran-sponsored training and preparations of
the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK -- Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves -- in
Albanian, OVK in Serbian), as well as the transfer of weapons and experts via
Albania, were being increased. Significantly, Tehran's primary objective in
Kosovo has evolved from merely assisting a Muslim minority in distress to
furthering the consolidation of the Islamic strategic axis along the
Sarajevo-to-Tirane line. And only by expanding and escalating subversive and
Islamist-political presence can this objective be attained.

In the Fall of 1997, the uppermost leadership in Tehran ordered the IRGC High
Command to launch a major program for shipping large quantities of weapons and
other military supplies to the Albanian clandestine organisations in Kosovo.
Khamene'i's instructions specifically stipulated that the comprehensive military
assistance was aimed to enable the Muslims "to achieve the independence" of the
province of Kosovo. This Iranian decision constitutes a change in policy.

Until recently, Tehran restricted direct funding on the territory of Yugoslavia
to such programmes as funding of educational programmes of the separatist groups
and their Islamic indoctrination, as well as the financing of mosques and
related religious and social-humanitarian activities. The funding of terrorist
and subversive activities was limited to preparatory and support activities
outside Yugoslavia: in B-H, Albania, Iran, Afghanistan-Pakistan, etc.

Now, the IRGC was ordered to eliminate even this thin distinction. Indeed, by
early December 1997, Iranian intelligence had already delivered the first
shipments of hand grenades, machine-guns, assault rifles, night vision
equipment, and communications gear from stockpiles in Albania into Kosovo. The
mere fact that the Iranians could despatch the first supplies within a few days
and in absolute secrecy reflect extensive advance preparations made in Albania
in anticipation for such instructions from Tehran. Moreover, the Iranians began
sending promising Albanian and UCK commanders for advanced military training
in al-Quds forces and IRGC camps in Iran. Meanwhile, weapons shipments continue.
Thus, Tehran is well on its way to establishing a bridgehead in Kosovo.

While the UCK is the primary beneficiary of Iranian military support, in
determining the extent of the effort to be made Tehran is working with estimates
made back in the mid-1990s by followers of Dr Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the
Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK], on the requirements for an armed struggle in Kosovo. The study was prepared by Zaim Berisha, a former lieutenant-colonel
in the Yugoslav People's Army, with the assistance of Ejup Dragaj. (Both were
sentenced to six and a half years in gaol in Yugoslavia for subversive
activities.)

Berisha and Dragaj developed the administrative and structural organisation
of the army of the Kosovo republic. By their calculations, Kosovo would need a
liberation army of 40,000 men equipped with 288,000 items of weaponry: including
26,250 automatic assault rifles, 2,250 machine guns, 5,500 revolvers, 10,450
submachine guns, 850 mortars of various calibres, 182,750 hand grenades, as well
as other various lethal devices, and ammunition. The calculations made by
Berisha and Dragaj do not include the weapons which the Kosovo Albanians
already possess clandestinely.

Berisha and Dragaj envisage the Kosovo armed forces to be comprised of 18
brigades (three for Pristina, two each for Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica, and
one each for Vucitrn, Glogovac, Pec, Prizren, Gnjilane, Urosevac, Kacanik,
Djakovica, Decane, Klina, and the area in and around Drenic). Each brigade is
supposed to consist of 2,000-2,500 men. The brigades will be grouped into three
corps (Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica, and Urosevac) with 12,000 to 15,000 men
each, as well as a number of special purpose units answering directly to the
high command. For the initial stage of the liberation struggle, the army would need two sets of infantry munitions rations for each unit. This amounts to
around 86-million rounds of ammunition and mortar shells, plus permanent stocks
of ammunition for reserves.

The liberation army was to be only the first phase in building military
power. Ultimately, the Kosovo Albanians must field such heavy weapons as
tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, and rocket launchers, if they
hope to evict the Serbian forces from Kosovo. The force planning of Berisha and
Dragaj envisages that their forces will be supplied with these weapons by the
Muslim world and the West through Albania, very much along the same principles
of weapons supplies to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s.

In early December 1997, Fazli Veliu, chairman of the People's Movement of
Kosova Party [LPK] branch for the diaspora, noted a similar trend in the
long-term development plans of the UCK. "The creation of [the UCK] begins with
guerilla groups, platoons, and then reaches a point where it becomes a people's
army. Indications that it [the UCK] is a disciplined and properly led army have
already been given." Indeed, the growing Iranian involvement in Albania -Kosovo
has an immediate impact on the operational structure and organisation of the
UCK. The recent reorganisation of UCK is strongly influenced by the approach of
Berisha and Dragaj to building a national liberation army. The UCK is presently
divided into four theatres of operations. The possible locations of these theatres are:

* Theatre of operation no. 1 -- Pristina and Podujevo;

* Theatre of operation no. 2 -- Kosovska Mitrovica and Vucitrn;

* Theatre of operation no. 3 -- Pec and Decani [Prizren]; and

* Theatre of operation no. 4 -- Urosevac and Gnjilane.

Meanwhile, there is growing grassroots support and acceptability to the UCK
and the policies it represents -- militancy and radicalism -- throughout Kosovo.
The spate of UCK terrorism during the Fall of 1997, particularly the attacks in
the Srbica Municipality and the village of Vojnik, as well as the kidnapping of
Bozidar Spasic, the Obilic police chief, in the middle of Pristina should be
considered intentional provocations against the Serbian police aimed to elicit a
massive retaliation that would in turn lead to a popular uprising. Thus, the
ongoing terrorism campaign in Kosovo should be considered the initial phases in
implementing the call for an uprising.

Iran-sponsored activists have already spread the word through Kosovo that the
liberation war has already broken out. If current trends prevail, the increasingly Islamist UCK will soon become the main factor in overturning the
long-term status quo in the region. Concurrently, the terrorist activities have
become part of everyday life throughout Kosovo. Given the extent of the
propaganda campaign and the assistance provided by Iran, the spread of terrorism
should indeed be considered the beginning of an armed rebellion that threatens a
major escalation.

Tehran's greatest achievement is in its ability to consolidate a genuine
Kosovo- Albanian political alliance behind the UCK and its campaign of
terrorism. The UCK can thus claim, and not without justification, to be
implementing the policy of a genuine political bloc. This newly formed political
bloc is comprised of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo led by Adem Demaci, the
Democratic Christian Party of Kosovo led by academician Redzep Qosja, and the
Union of Independent Trade Unions led by Hajrulahu Gorani. Moreover, Demaci has
already made a deal with the prime minister in exile, Bujar Bukoshi according to
which Demaci would be "President of the Republic of Kosovo" while Bukoshi would
remain the "Prime Minister" beyond his current term.

Concurrently, Veliu stated that the UCK is neither "some part of the LPK's
body", nor "the armed wing of the LPK, but [is using the LPK's organ] to make
the public at home and abroad clear about its existence and its liberation
activity, about the victories and the relevant responsibilities. The liberation army undoubtedly has the overall support of the LPK, but it is not
part of this party and does not belong only to this party. The army enjoys the
support of the people of Kosova and belongs to them." Veliu stressed that no
Kosovo- Albanian political party controls the UCK. "The fact that this army is
autochthonous [ie: originating from that land] is indisputable."

Ultimately, however, these politicians are trying to place themselves in
relation to the only force in Kosovo generating genuine public support: the
Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK). By late 1997, public opinion polls throughout
Kosovo ascertained that the UCK enjoys the support of over 65 percent of the
population, that is, nearly twice as much as all the other political parties
combined. Furthermore, the support for the UCK and its radical violent policies
is overwhelming among the young people who also expect that the UCK will be
institutionalised as a leading force of the political separatist movement.
Little wonder, therefore, that most Kosovo- Albanian politicians strive to
associate themselves with the UCK in one form or another.

The primary obstacle to the rise of the radical camp is Dr Ibrahim Rugova,
and the mainstream LDK. Demaci, Bukoshi, and Qosja are convinced that Rugova's
policies are too moderate and that he should therefore be discredited and
removed. Demaci even claims he has already obtained support for Rugova's ouster
from more than half the members of the "Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo". However, given Rugova's international standing and position vis-a-vis the US and
the West as a whole, his ouster is bound to harm the Kosovo "cause". On the
other hand, Rugova's assassination, "by the Serbs" of course, will
simultaneously make him a most popular martyr and remove him from active
politics. Indeed, there are indications that the UCK's radical wing is
considering the assassination of both Rugova and Fehmi Agani, the LDK deputy
chairman, and blaming Belgrade for the killings.

The assassination of Rugova would also be bound to push a large segment of
the Albanian population in Kosovo into active participation in an armed
struggle. Meanwhile, numerous Kosovo- Albanian leaders openly anticipate the
imminent outbreak of a popular armed struggle. For example, Mahmut Bakali,
Demaci's advisor on political strategy, has been giving statements and
assessments anticipating such a development with a growing frequency. Similarly,
both Gorani and his Union of Independent Trade Unions now declare themselves in
favour of a more aggressive and violent policy.

Veliu concurs with this approach. He points out that taken together, the
UCK's operations of late November 1997 should be considered a liberation war.
"The attacks simultaneously launched in 14 centres controlled by the occupier
and those that occurred in the Drenice area in recent days to defend our people
and to carry out the liberation step by step, have drawn the attention of the establishment centres, the state, and military experts. We no longer need to
persuade through words, when shooting is heard, when we liberate areas, and when
there is optimism to continue, the fight grows." Thus, by late November, the
armed struggle, that is, terrorism and subversion, had become the primary
instrument in the Kosovo- Albanian struggle for the liberation of Kosovo.

In December, there was a concurrent and noticeable expansion in the petty
violent and terrorist activities of small detachments of the UCK. These were
aimed primarily to demonstrate the UCK's presence in, and create popular
awareness of centrality to the struggle for, Kosovo. Adopting IRA-style tactics,
masked and armed representatives of the UCK have begun showing up at funerals.
Such an appearance in the village of Lausa by three members of UCK at the
funeral of an Albanian killed during the latest incidents in Kosovo in the
Srbica region was openly interpreted as an unequivocal message that the patience
of the Kosovo- Albanian is running out. Meanwhile, local "political" activists
point out to the intensified activities and preparations at UCK training centres
in Donji Prekaz as proof that the Kosovo- Albanians have already started an
armed struggle and a terrorism campaign for their independence.

By mid-December 1997, several Albanian leaders in Kosovo were alarmed by
the long-term ramifications of the radicalisation and Islamicisation of their
struggle for independence. Most eloquent is Bajram Kosumi, the Chairman of the Kosova Parliamentary Party.

Kosumi believes that "the great majority of the Albanian people" supports
the UCK. "The Albanians are interested because they have lost the faith that
they can liberate themselves from Serbia through peaceful resistance. . . . The
interest of the Albanians in the UCK comes after waiting for seven years for
the international community to support the peaceful formation of the state of
Kosovo." Kosumi attributes this failed policy to "a narrow circle in the LDK led
by Dr. Rugova." Furthermore, since "the LDK, with its structural organisations
and its own political philosophy, is unable to make a fast or radical move,"
Kosumi observes, "the LDK as it appears today in fact does not exist. It will
survive a little longer in its present moribund state."

The grave ramifications of the "collapse of the LDK" are that this event
"casts doubt on the philosophy of peaceful resistance as an effective means of
solving the issue of Kosovo, which has been personified by the LDK". In itself,
Kosumi argues, this development constitutes a major crisis to the Kosovo
movement. "For seven years, the LDK, with its delusions of grandeur, has fought
against and destroyed any alternative or even the very idea of any active form
of peaceful resistance." The only successful struggle of the LDK has been
against the ideas of Demaci, Qosja, and other leaders.

Therefore, the LDK has created the circumstances for the rise of a radical
and drastic challenge as the sole viable alternative to its domination. "The UCK
with its military methods has been put forward as the alternative. A people that
is enslaved, as the [Kosovo] Albanians are, have the right to use all
effective methods for their own liberation." Kosumi warns that this
radicalisation of the struggle for Kosovo is playing into the hands of Belgrade
because "it is the lack of any concept of how to solve the Kosovo issue that is
pushing Serbian political circles toward war. . . . There is also the
possibility that through war they [the Serbs] might win a portion of Kosovo
forever."

Kosumi is grim about the prospects of his people. "Is there any chance of
preventing war in Kosovo? Is there any chance of a fair solution to the Kosovo
issue, barring the use of war? A war to solve this issue would be a triumph of
Serbian militarist policy over the Albanian policy of peace and over the
peaceful policy of the international community, which, despite is hesitations,
has invested something in a peaceful solution of the issue." Kosumi urges that
"the possibility of preventing war must therefore be the main subject of debate
for every Albanian political party. Now that the UCK has appeared on the
scene, it is not only the LDK, but all the other political parties that find
themselves on a knife edge. . . . The Albanian political parties now face the
question of 'tobe or not to be.'"

The main question to be resolved, Kosumi argues, is "what will happen to the
political parties if they are not in a situation to activate peaceful
resistance? They will either be destroyed or will move over to collaboration
with Belgrade." Kosumi believes that the LDK is already well on its way to
establish a certain form of collaboration with Belgrade. Thus, the key to saving
Kosovo from war and destruction lies in the hands of the other opposition
parties. "If the[se] parties do not succeed in activating [peaceful political]
resistance, war in Kosovo is almost unavoidable," Kosumi concludes.

Fazli Veliu takes the question of the centrality of the UCK-led armed
struggle even further. He stresses that in performing the "essential and
indispensable" mission, the UCK "makes serious efforts to liberate the country
from the southern Slavs and defends people who face a serious danger of
extermination according to the Serbian fascist plans." Thus, Veliu also sees no
alternative to an escalating armed struggle led by the UCK in Kosovo. "The only
solution [to the Kosovo problem] is the liberation of areas occupied by the
southern Slavs. The UCK, the LPK, and our people will achieve this through pain,
sacrifice, and continuous effort until the final war." Furthermore, Veliu
explains, the armed struggle is the only viable instrument for nation-building
and the sole catalyst for the political dynamics required to achieve victory. An
independent Kosovo, he stresses, "will be achieved through our unity and the
creation of a joint military and political front that includes the relevant authorities who would play a lawmaking role pending the liberation of the entire
country. Meanwhile, the basic institutions of the state will also be
established. After liberation, the UCK will play its role to defend our state.
Now and in the future, the education in the field of military matters should
continue to improve and progress, in order to be able to challenge those armies
that aim at endangering the overall Albanian autochthonous status."

WASHINGTON'S growing interest in the Kosovo problem should be examined in
view of Kosovo's seemingly inevitable slide to an armed conflict led and
dominated by the Iran-sponsored UCK. For the Clinton Administration, Kosovo is
the next point of pressure on Belgrade, as demonstrated in the sudden and
unwarranted inclusion of the subject in the Dayton II conference on B-H. Given
the concurrent Iranian dominance over the rising Islamist subversive and
terrorist movement in Kosovo and Albania, is this a mere coincidence or is
there another round of tacit cooperation between Washington and Tehran?

There are striking and dangerous parallels between the rise of the
Iran-sponsored Islamists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in Albania and Kosovo. In
both cases, the Iranians succeeded to infiltrate an essentially secular and
Westernised Muslim community and, by capitalising on what started as a national
liberation struggle, subvert it from within into becoming a bulwark of Islamist
terrorism and radicalism. That the Iranians and their allies enjoyed the support of loyal followers within the ranks of aspirant leaders of both
movements need not detract from the extent of Tehran's achievement in Sarajevo,
the dire ramifications for Europe's stability of this achievement, and the dire
ramifications of a virtually inevitable triumph in Albania/ Kosovo/Macedonia
unless the international community steps in to actively prevent it.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, goaded by a zealous and activist Clinton
Administration, the West and the UN actively supported and facilitated the rise
of the Bosnian Muslim Administration. Officially, the Clinton Administration
decided to "look the other way" as Iran and its Islamist allies delivered
weapons and volunteers to the Bosnian Muslim forces in violation of the UN
embargo. The recent discovery of Sarajevo-supported plots against the Pope and
sponsorship of Islamist terrorism in the heart of Western Europe has led several
European governments to rethink the wisdom of their Bosnian policies.

Hence, why must the West repeat its mistakes in Kosovo? If in B-H, the
Clinton Administration could claim that faced with the plight of the Bosnian
Muslim civilian population (in itself a fallacy) the US had no alternative but
to tacitly permit the flow of Iran-dominated Islamist aid to B-H, there are no
comparable circumstances concerning Kosovo. Yet, with the ramifications of
Iran's lingering hold over Sarajevo clear, the Clinton White House is actively
encouraging the surge of a "Kosovo crisis" while knowing full well that the
main local Muslim forces are dominated by Islamist terrorist forces and
sponsored by Iran.

There is neither a humanitarian crisis in progress, nor a reason for not
knowing the outcome of the rise of militant Islamism, to warrant such a policy.