CHIEF OF STAFF'S NOTE: All wars by their nature "kill the
truth," and the current war in the Balkans must rank with the
others of this century in the damage that has been done to the
facts. The Task Force reports on the Balkans have been among the
most contentious for our membership because we have been
perceived to have taken sides. Indeed, the combatants on all
sides of the Balkan conflict have accused the Task Force of
supporting their opponents.
I take this as a compliment to the professionalism and
objectivity of our staff. Our task has been to discover the
truth wherever it leads in order to give our membership a basis
for informed and independent decision making in the face of
disinformation especially when American lives may be on the
line. Given that fact, this report will be seen as no less
contentious by those who have themselves chosen sides.
- Vaughn S. Forrest
In recent weeks, the small industrial town of Gorazde in Bosnia-
Hercegovina has come to symbolize in the eyes of tne Western
media the brutality of the latest Balkan war. The siege of
Gorazde has been portrayed as a ruthless act of aggression
against Bosnia's Muslim population and has become the focal point
of Western efforts to put an end to the bloodshed. However,
while Bosnian Serb aggressiveness has undoubtedly played a large
part in the Gorazde tragedy, what is less known is the role
played by the Bosnian government and military in instigating the
conflict and in effort to draw the West, particularly the United
States, into the war generally.
The roots of this situation derive from the events of the Fall of
1992 at a relatively early stage of the war in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. At that time, the Gorazde area was one of the first
places where Islamist guerrillas -- a combined force of 'Afghan'
volunteers (mainly Arab 'Afghans') and Bosnian Islamists - had
embarked on a systematic campaign against the local Christian
population in order to secure a predominant military position.
The Islamists operated in detachments of some 15-20 highly
trained and well equipped men and conducted repeated attacks
along various roads, including the road to Gorazde, between
Sarajevo and Muslim strongholds near the Serbian border. The
growing frequency of these ambushes, many committed against Serb
civilians, made them a dominant feature of the civil war in
Bosnia-Hercegovina (It is noteworthy that these Bosnian
detachments were following exactly the principles of "the war of
the weak" as outlined by the Hizballah's Ayatollah Fadlallah.)
As a direct outcome of this campaign, the Bosnian Muslims were
able to expand and consolidate their hold over the Gorazde
enclave, allowing them to use it as a staging point, for future
military actions. It was at this point, in early 1993, that the
Bosnian Muslims began rebuilding Gorazde as a military center
Thus, beginning in March 1993, and more so in the first half of
April, Sarajevo succeeded in completing the deployment of large
Muslim reinforcements into Gorazde. Indeed, many of the Bosnian
Muslim forces traveled into the pocket in the wake of UN relief
and humanitarian assistance convoys. This was possible because
UNHCR demanded that the Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from the
immediate road between Sarajevo and Gorazde in order to assure
that there would be no interference with its humanitarian work.
Consequently, the flow of Bosnian Muslim military supplies
increased to the point that, by the end of April 1993, the Muslim
forces had effectively relieved the siege of Gorazde.
As it turned out, the Bosnian Muslims' success was shortlived.
For later in the Summer, Bosnian Serb pressure on Sarajevo, as
well as on the Gorazde corridor itself, resulted in the
resumption of the siege. Nonetheless, for the high command in
Sarajevo, the critical lesson of Gorazde was that it was possible
to rely on the UN "facilitate" active support to its military
operations against the Bosnian Serbs.
Indeed, during 1993, the Bosnian Muslims continued to smuggle
items of military importance into Gorazde through UN-related0
channels. Most important was the delivery of tools, spare parts
and even expert personnel to repair the Pobjeda Ammunition
Factory and Gorazde's chemical factory. (The latter was
reportedly in the process of being converted into a chemical
weapons factory.) The assistance for the ammunition factory was
"justified" on the grounds that it's water storage system was
being used as a resource for the city, and that for the chemical
factory was "justified" on the basis of the fact that it was
capable of producing fertilizers needed for the locally grown
crops.
In light of these developments, by the Fall of 1993, the Bosnian
Serb High Command in Pale had concluded that it was only a matter
of time before the Bosnian Muslims would attempt a military
offensive from Gorazde. Since the main military build-up was in
the city itself, especially in the eastern part of the enclave,
it was assumed that the main thrust of such an offensive would be
eastward, in the direction of Serbia.
* * *
The Winter of 1993-94 was harsh in eastern Bosnia, and
the shipment of goods into the besieged Muslim pockets, including
Gorazde, remained difficult until mid-March. Nonetheless, there
were reports of Bosnian Muslim military activity in the Gorazde
area as early as the first couple of weeks of February 1994.
These reports were given sufficient credence to warrant a
decision by Pale to begin moving Bosnian Serb reinforcements into
eastern Bosnia. However, even as late as mid-March 1994 most
Bosnian Serb forces were still concentrated in central
Bosnia - away from the Gorazde pocket.
In the meantime, in March 1994, there was a significant
reorganization of the Bosnian Muslim armed forces in anticipation
of the last phase of Sarajevo's preparations for the 1994 Spring/
Summer offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. Sarajevo considered
the offensive to be the key to its efforts to draw the West into
the Balkan War on the side of the Muslims, and in this connection
the battle in Gorazde was be the opening salvo for the offensive.
Indeed, the chain of command of the Bosnian Muslim forces in
Gorazde clearly demonstrates the significance that Sarajevo
attached to the city. The main Bosnian Muslim unit in Gorazde was
the 2nd Brigade (over 2,000 troops), answering directly to the
1st Corps, also known as the East Bosnian Operations Group, in
Sarajevo. Sarajevo also deployed to Gorazde a number of
Mujahideen and Islamist Commandoes operating under the 1st
Tactical Group. In addition, deployed to Gorazde were several
Special Forces teems comprised of the best formations of the
'Delta' and 'Laste' units. This entire force was rounded out by
units drawn from the local population and organized by the
Interior Ministry and was, in turn, augmented by Troops of the
Interior Ministry who were highly trained and politically
dedicated.
Further, in early April 1994, as the fighting around Gorazde
developed into a Bosnian Serb attack on two main axes (south and
east) with an additional thrust from the north, the main Muslim
forces were reorganized into the 2nd Brigade (eastern approaches)
and the 31st Brigade (southern approaches), as well as the
Special Forces under centralized command. Later still, a third
"Brigade" was established on an ad hoc basis to meet the northern
thrust. Altogether, the Bosnian Muslims had in Gorazde at the
beginning of the siege around 5,000 regular troops and over 5,000
militia and Interior Ministry troops. In addition there was an
undetermined number of armed volunteers for the defense of
various buildings. Taken together, the Bosnian Muslim command had
a total of 12,000 to 15,000 armed men in Gorazde, with 8,000
troops in three organized Brigade-type units.
Against this backdrop, in the first two weeks of March, the
Gorazde front was unusually quiet, with Bosnian Muslim forces
remaining uncharacteristically passive even as fighting erupted
elsewhere in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Yet, even still, there were
indications that preparations were being made for major actions
in the Gorazde pocket. As before, such preparations would not
have been possible without the acquiescence of the UN.
Indeed, there is evidence that humaanitariarn aid convoys,
sanctioned by the UN, assisted in the transfer of equipment and
goods to Gorazde. For example, on 14 March, Bosnian Serb
inspection teams in the Sokolac heliport discovered an attempt to
smuggle electronic equipment, hard currency and Bosnian
Government documents into Gorazde. (Since Gorazde is surrounded,
the money may have been intended for use in cross-front line
special operations and smuggling.)
* * *
In any case, as of mid March 1994 there was a significant
increase in forward reconnaissance patrols by Bosnian Muslim
Special Force. Many of these patrols were armed reconnaissance
missions prodding the Bosnian Serb defenses through localized
attacks. As it turned out, these attacks on the Bosnian Serb
positions were the prelude for a full fledged assault. Thus, on
20 March 1994, the Bosnian Muslims opened artillery fire from the
Gorazde pocket on Bosnian Serb positions between Foca and
Cajnice, shattering a previously negotiated ceasefire.
Over the next few days there was an escalation in the Bosnian
Muslim attacks, including major attacks by infantry assault
groupings with fire support from mortars and small caliber
automatic guns. By the 25th, the Bosnian Muslim activities had
become a major region-wide offensive. As already noted, the main
thrust of this offensive was aimed at a gap between Foca and
Cajnice, merely 17-15 kms from the center of Gorazde which, if
secured, would serve as an ideal invasion route into Montenegro.
(Both Belgrade and Pale insist that the strategic aim of the
Muslim offensive was to cross the Serb border in order to involve
Serbia in the war in Bosnia-Hercegovira, thus creating a
justification for Western military action against Belgrade.)
In any case, the Bosnian Serbs were caught unprepared and it was
not until 28 and 29 March that their reinforcements reached the
Foca and Cajnice area. By that point, the Bosnian Muslim forces
had penetrated 5-7 kms into the Serb lines, a thin Special Forces
spearhead reaching as deep as 10 kms. Subsequently, the Bosnian
Serbs deployed their artillery and began shelling the rear area
of the Muslim forces, mainly in the southern outskirts of Gorazde
along the Drina river. Initially short of ground forces, the
Bosnian Serbs were able to block the Muslims' advance with heavy
artillery fire. Furthermore, the Bosnian Serb High Command
decided to conserve its arriving infantry forces for a
counteroffensive, and instead concentrated on inflicting
attrition on the Bosnian Muslim units.
Meanwhile, on March 28, sensing that a Bosnian Serb counter-offensive
was imminent, Sarajevo began a propaganda campaign
focused or Bosnian Serb artillery attacks against civilians in
Gorazde. It was the first time the Bosnian Muslims had raised
issue of the humanitarian situation in Gorazde, and it would,
time, come to represent a pattern.
Subsequently, or 29 March, the Bosnian Serb forces launched a
major counteroffensive on the right bank of the Drina river,
between Osanica and Ustipraca in the general direction of
Cajnice. The Bosnian Serbs used artillery, tanks, and infantry
and soon breached the Muslim lines. Muslim sources claimed that
Serb reinforcements were arriving from across the Serb border,
but this could not be independently confirmed and both Pale and
Zagreb vehemently denied the allegation.
In point of fact, there were troop movements in Montenegro
because Belgrade had ordered the reinforcement of its forces in
the Montenegro-Bosnia border area. However, there is no
independent evidence that any of these forces actually crossed
the border into Bosnia, or that they had participated in the
fighting in any other form up to that date.
On 30 March, the Bosnian Serbs began their counteroffense with
infantry and tank attacks supported by massive artillery fire
from both small caliber automatic guns and howitzers. The main
accomplishment of this operation was the containment of the
Bosnian Muslim advance. However, soon afterward, the Bosnian Serb
forces began themselves moving toward Gorazde along the Praca
valley, slowly pushing back the Bosnian Muslim bulge.
Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb reinforcements deployed all around the
Gorazde pocket, especially from the north and south-east, and
began preparations for a major assault in the hopes of seizing at
least one of the main roads leading from east of the Drina River
to the Adriatic. For its part, Sarajevo propaganda alleged that
sizable reinforcements from Serbia proper were being deployed
for the conduct of this offensive.
In any case, at about the time when it was clear to Sarajevo that
its forces would not be able to maintain their offensive, a
propaganda blitz about the fate of the civilians in Gorazde
began. The campaign was not without effect, for the plight of
the civilians in Gorazde, especially the children, rapidly became
a major issue in the international media.
Indeed, or 30 March, the US Ambassador to the United Nations
Organization, Ms. Madeleine Albright, and Gen. John
Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, arrived in
Sarajevo for an unprecedented visit aimed at demonstrating US
support for the plight of the Bosnian Muslims. In the aftermath
of this visit, President Izetbegovic and his closest aides became
convinced that the US Government was determined to ensure a
Muslim victory in the war even if that meant American
participation in the fighting.
Indeed, it has been reliably reported that the leaders in
Sarajevo concluded that what was needed to get America involved
in the war on its side was a major traumatic event that would
galvanize American public opinion and drive Washington to
intervene militarily in the Balkans. Thus, over the next few
weeks, Sarajevo would use the fighting in Gorazde in an attempt
to instigate such a US intervention.
In the meantime, on the morning of 31 March, in order to reduce
the Bosnian Serb pressure, the Bosnian Muslims attempted a
counter-offensive of their own in the direction of Cajnice.
Special reinforcements of Bosnian Muslim infantry were rushed
overnight to the front to support this action which it was hoped,
if successful, would put the Bosnian Muslim forces once more on
the short road into Serbia proper.
Sarajevo assumed, correctly as it turned out, that under such
circumstances the Bosnian Serbs would divert forces to block the
Muslims before they reached the border and crossed into Serbia.
For its part, Sarajevo hoped that it would be sufficient for its
forces merely to reach, without actually crossing, the border to
provoke the Serbian Army to enter the fighting. In the event, the
Bosnian Muslim forces failed to breach the Bosnian Serb lines and
began to retreat. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs shelled the
Bosnian Muslim reinforcements throughout their withdrawal into
Gorazde.
Meanwhile, the main Bosnian Serb counteroffensive began on 31st
March. Newly arrived forces, still haphazardly organized, began
advancing toward the Gorazde pocket from several directions. The
Bosnian Serbs used artillery fire both to cover the advance
of their infantry and to shell the Muslim rear, including the
town itself. Because of the small size of Gorazde, the
Bosnian Muslim Army began using the tallest buildings in town,
especially the roof of the hospital, as observation posts and
command centers for directing their artillery against the
advancing Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Serb artillery sought to
silence these facilities and therefore fired upon the hospital
despite the propaganda ramifications that such an action
entailed. In any case, by the end of 31 March, the arriving
Bosnian Serb forces, although still unorganized, had completed
the encirclement of the Gorazde pocket
On April 1, the better organized Bosnian Serb forces began
rolling back the Bosnian Muslim bulge, capturing most of the
territory gained in the Muslim offensive. The containment of this
offensive convinced Sarajevo that its strategic gambit in the
Gorazde area was already doomed from the military point of view.
Therefore, Sarajevo shifted its emphasis in this crisis from a
mission to secure a strategic-military objective (getting Serbia
involved in the Bosnian war) to the more explicitly
political-military objective of getting the U.S involved.
Indeed, on 1 April, the Bosnian Prime Minister, Harris Silajdzic,
began urging Western/US/UN active intervention against the
Bosnian Serbs in order to prevent a "humanitarian tragedy" in
Gorazde.
In the meantime, on 2 April, the Bosnian Serb forces continued to
push back the Bosnian Muslim bulge. With a growing number of
senior officers in the area, the Bosnian Serb forces were
becoming better organized and therefore more effective.
Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs began gravitating toward two main
axes of advance on Gorazde, from the east and from the south.
On 3 and 4 April, the Bosnian Muslims decided to exploit this
concentration of the Bosnian Serb forces by trying to disrupt
their balance through attacks from other directions. Therefore, a
series of hastily organized offensives was launched from inside
the Gorazde pocket. The first offensive was westward in the
direction of the road to Sarajevo. This maneuver was launched not
in the slim hope of breaking the siege, but mainly in order to
draw Bosnian Serb forces away from their advance on Gorazde. (It
was assumed in Sarajevo that the UN would soon break the siege
even though the Bosnian Serbs would not permit humanitarian aid
convoys to reach Gorazde.)
The other Muslim offensive moved northward, toward Zepa, in
tandem with the Bosnian Serb southward offensive. Here the idea
was for the Muslim force to encircle the Bosnian Serb spearhead
that had just begun advancing toward the Pobjeda ammunition
factory. If successful, the Bosnian Muslim Special Forces would
be in a position to hit the Bosnian Serb forces from the flanks
and rear. As it was, the Bosnian Muslims committed a force that
was too small to accomplish its intended objectives and its
success was therefore negligible. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs
continued to push reinforcements of infantry and trucks into what
was rapidly escalating into a major battle.
Meanwhile, in late March, on the order of the Sarajevo High
Command, Special Forces (reconnaissance-intelligence units) of
the East Bosnian Operations Group -- components of the Delta and
Laste Special Forces units -- were deployed to Gorazde by
infiltrating them on foot through Serb-held territory.
Subsequently, the Bosnian Muslim Special Forces in Gorazde were
regrouped into detachments, including a mix of both Bosnian
Muslims and 'Afghan' Mujahideen.
By the first days of April these forces began operating against
the Bosnian Serb columns advancing from the Foca area. In one of
their first operations they attacked a convoy of 30 trucks
carrying -- according to Sarajevo -- Russian and Romanian
mercenaries arriving from Serbia. Meanwhile, the Bosnians
continued to blame the Bosnian Serbs for indiscriminately bombing
Gorazde.
On April 4, emboldened by the early success of their special
operations, Sarajevo decided to use irregular warfare in a
strategic attempt to reverse the collapse of the Bosnian Muslim
offensive. Detachments of Bosnian Muslim Special Forces (both
Bosnian Muslims and 'Afghan' Mujahideen) advanced from Podkozare,
Paljike and Oglecevo in the direction of the Foca-Cajnice
salient. Their mission was to attack Bosnian Serb forces in
rear in order to slow their pressure on the remnants of the
original bulge. When clashes erupted, the Bosnian Muslim units
provided their Special Forces with fire cover from light
artillery and mortars. Fierce but localized infantry and
artillery clashes ensued and the Special Forces were compelled to
withdraw to their start line.
It was only on the night of 4 April that the Muslims finally
abandoned their or final plan to advance toward Cajnice. That
evening they began pulling their forces back from the bulge and
into the confines of Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs were slow to
exploit this success, as well as reluctant to change the main
axis of their own advance which was from the east.
Meanwhile, also on 4 April, the Bosnian Serb forces began
advancing westward toward the east bank of the Drina, capturing
several villages and turning them into fortified areas. For their
part, the Bosnian Muslims evacuated all civilians except for
those capable of rendering service to the military and interior
ministry forces. In the meantime, the Bosnian Serb forces --
infantry escorted by a few tanks - continued their slow but
steady advance under intense fire support (artillery and MBRL)
barrages. At this point the Bosnian Muslim defense lines began to
crumble. (The Bosnian Serb assault forces, according to Sarajevo,
was composed of 50 tanks. This suggests a reinforcement of under
15 tanks, taking the Serb losses into consideration.)
Despite the active resistance of the Bosnian Muslims all around
Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs continued their own renewed offensive
on the night of 4 and 5 April. On the road to Sarajevo, the local
Bosnian Serb forces were able to contain and then defeat the
Bosnian Muslim assault after a brief yet fierce clash. The
Bosnian Muslim detachments then withdrew back behind their lines,
but the Bosnian Serb forces were too small to give chase and the
action was broken off.
In the meantime, in the northern corridor, Bosnian Serb Special
Forces began moving against their Muslim counte-parts. The Serbs
ambushed the Muslims, neutralizing them to some degree, thereby
allowing the main Bosnian Serb advance toward the ammunition
factory to proceed. Additional reinforcements of tanks, artillery
and trucks were rushed by the Bosnian Serbs to support this
advance and soon the Serb heavy guns began destroying the Pobjeda
factory.
The 5th of April saw fierce infantry clashes on the eastern
approaches to Gorazde as the Bosnian Serbs continued breaking
through the Bosnian Muslim defense lines. In due course, the High
Command in Sarajevo conceded that the Bosnian Serbs had succeeded
in breaching the Bosnian Muslim defense lines to such an extent
that the whole front was in danger of collapse. (Most important
was the collapse o the Muslim defenses in the villages of
Vinkovici and Mravici.)
It was at this point, on 5 April, that Pale began considering
exploiting its counteroffensive in order to severely hit the
Gorazde pocket, if not destroy it Bosnian Serb forces could
reach at least one of the major strategic highways along the
Drina River, and Pale was now convinced that the Muslim offensive
was finally crushed. Thus, some of the Bosnian Serb truck-mounted
infantry was now diverted from facing the Muslim offensive and
was sent to complete a deep encirclement of the Bosnian Muslim
front lines. This maneuver brought the Bosnian Serb infantry to
the banks of the Drina river and signalled the beginning of yet
another advance on Gorazde. By the end of the day the Bosnian
Serb forces had reached between 3 and 10 kilometers from the
center of Gorazde, arriving from the east and south.
The strategic decisions of Pale were reflected in the final
organization of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. Pale now nominated
the Chief of Staff, General Manojlo Milovanovic, as the supreme
commander of the Gorazde front and immediately ordered the
rushing of additional reinforcements to the eastern approaches of
Gorazde in order to support and sustain the advance. By now, the
Bosnian Serbs had amassed a powerful force in the area with Gen.
Radovan Grubac, Commander of the Herzegovina Corps, as the senior
field commander.
The Bosnian Serb forces included most of the Hercegovina Corps
(which carried the main brunt of the first phase of the
fighting), components of the Uzice Corps (that would arrive in
early April) and the Sarajevo-Mt.Romanija corps (impacting on the
Gorazde pocket from the west but not involved in the main
action), as well as Special Forces from the Nis area. At the
beginning of the counteroffensive the Bosnian Serbs had around
5,000 high quality troops, and by mid-April this number had
reached some 7,000. The Bosnian Serb forces also had a few
thousand paramilitary and militia troops, organized in small
units, for auxiliary tasks.
Meanwhile, the Bosnian Muslim Special Forces and other elite
units began attempting to infiltrate the Bosnian Serb lines from
Sarajevo in order to link up with Gorazde. These attempts
developed into a hot pursuit operation and involved clashes with
Bosnian Serb forces in the mountains surrounding Sarajevo.
Subsequently, Sarajevo complained to the UN that the Bosnian
Serbs were violating the ceasefire and the NAT0 ultimatum.
On 6 April, large units of Bosnian Serb forces began their
advance from the Cajnice and Foca salient toward the Drina river.
Ultimately, the Serbs came within a half a kilometer of
Vitkovici. Meanwhile as the Bosnian Serbs were consolidating
their advance through the breaches of the Muslim lines, they
brought more artillery pieces - heavy and automatic small
caliber -- to forward positions and began hitting greater parts
of Gorazde.
All this time, Bosnian Serb infantry continued to mop up pockets
of resistance in the fortified areas captured from the Bosnian
Muslim forces. There was extremely bad weather that day,
including 10 hours of snowfall, which slowed down activity in the
northern approaches to Gorazde. Still, the shelling of Gorazde
persisted.
During the night of 6 April and early morning of 7 April, Bosnian
Serb forces continued their advance northward. By morning the
Serbs had consolidated positions on the banks of the Drina river
near Vitkovici, some 4 kilometers from Gorazde itself. Meanwhile,
the Bosnian Muslim defense lines in the Oglecevo zone collapsed
and the Gorazde command ordered the evacuation of its positions
in that area.
Also on 6 April the double character of Sarajevo's depiction of
events in Gorazde became clear. On the one hand, Sarajevo was
presenting an impression to the Western media that a near
defenseless Gorazde, full of civilians and innocents, was on the
brink of collapse. On the other hand, the government propaganda
depicted for domestic consumption a case of heroic and successful
combat by the Muslim troops defending Gorazde against a Serb
offensive. While admitting the collapse of certain defense lines,
Sarajevo nevertheless stressed that the Muslim defenders were
inflicting "heavy losses" on the Serbs.
Significantly, the Sarajevo propaganda also introduced, for the
first time, explicit demands that the West intervene militarily
to save the city. In fact, Sarajevo introduced the theme of
Western intervention because it already knew that the US,
UNPROFOR, and NATO, had decided to create in Gorazde
circumstances permitting NATO airstrikes within the confines of
the existing UN resolutions and guidelines.
Thus, on 7 April, the UN deployed 8 soldiers to Gorazde in order
to give itself a legal pretext for its planned airstrikes. (Under
the existing UN Resolutions, military action could only be
undertaken to defend UN personnel.) Furthermore, the troops
deployed by the UN belonged to the British elite SAS who were
qualified and specially equipped to call in and direct
airstrikes. In other words, UNPROFOR deployed at one stroke both
the excuse and the means to deliver airstrikes against the
Bosnian Serbs. In addition, 7 UN liaison officers were also
deployed to the Bosnian Muslim forces in Gorazde. No attempt was
made to deploy a comparable force of UN liaison officers with the
Bosnian Serbs.
Meanwhile, after hectic negotiations between UNPROFOR, Sarajevo
and Pale, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to a ceasefire. On the evening
of 5 April, the Bosnian Serbs ceased the shelling. "Gorazde is no
longer under attack since 1800 local time," UN spokesman Joe
Sills announced. However, the Bosnian Muslims complained that the
Bosnian Serb forces were continuing to advance, consolidate and
improve their positions virtually until the last moment of the
fighting.
Nonetheless, the next day even Radio Sarajevo admitted that the
Bosnian Serb shelling of Gorazde had "abated somewhat" even
though, the Muslims insisted, the Bosnian Serbs continued to
violate the ceasefire. Perhaps unsurprisingly, by nightfall the
ceasefire had all but collapsed with both Bosnian Serb and
Bosnian Muslim forces provoking each other into exchanges of
gunfire. At the same time, Sarajevo resumed its propaganda
accounts of intense Bosnian Serb shelling and mounting civilian
casualties. It was at this point that the saga of the Gorazde
hospital began.
The night of 7-8 April saw the first large scale use of Bosnian
Serb Special Forces. They crossed the Muslim defense lines from
south to east of Gorazde and began attacking the Muslims from the
rear. The Serbs created havoc and hastened the collapse of Muslim
defense positions in some areas. Later, on 8 April, the Bosnian
Serb infantry forces overwhelmed the defenders of Oglecevo after
a fierce battle and then proceeded to clear Vitkovici.
On 9 April, the Bosnian Serb forces advancing from the east were
finally able to reach and seize a strategic plateau overlooking
Gorazde called Mount Gradina. Although there are easy approach
routes from there into Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs did not show
any inclination to continue into the city itself. Instead, they
began to consolidate their position, organize fire observation
posts and prepare the area for the arrival of their artillery.
Indeed, UNPROFOR concluded that the Bosnian Serbs did not want to
take Gorazde and estimated that, in any case, the Serbs were
already holding 75% of the territory of the original Gorazde
pocket.
Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslim Special Forces raided Bosnian Serb
positions, instigating a Bosnian Serb shelling of Gorazde. This
incident was depicted by the Western media in Sarajevo as an
example of Bosnian Serb aggression against innocent civilians in
Gorazde. Indeed, special attention was paid to the frequent fire
aimed at the hospital -- which was also the main Muslim
observation and battle management post - to drum up support for
Western action against the Serbs. Subsequently, the UN and NATO
were asked to launch airstrikes in order to protect the UN troops
that had been inserted into Gorazde.
It is also noteworthy that on 9 April the Bosnian Serbs agreed
to a UNPROFOR initiative to begin ceasefire negotiations in the
Sarajevo airport. The Bosnian Muslims refused to attend this
meeting.
On 10 April, Bosnian Serb forces continued to advance slowly,
mainly consolidating positions and accomplishing tactical
improvements. These forces were also able to complete the capture
of a few Bosnian Serb villages on the approaches to Gorazde. The
Bosnian Serb forces were now only some 6 kms from Gorazde and were
increasing their effort to advance in the direction of Metvici
and the ammunition factory.
At this point, the road was opened for the Bosnian Serbs to
capture a major Muslim stronghold in Uhotici Brdo, some 700 m
from the Drina, a key to the defense of the southern approaches
to Gorazde. Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs destroyed the bridge
over the Drina at Sadba, complicating any effort to resupply
Gorazde. Another bridge, at Bacci, was damaged by Bosnian Serb
artillery and Bosnian Serb Special Forces crossed the Drina to
the west bank of the river for the first time on 10 April. All
this time the shelling of Gorazde itself continued.
The NATO bombing raids, carried out by US fighters, were
conducted on 10 and 11 April against Bosnian Serb positions in
the Gorazde area. The UK SAS FACs guiding the strike aircraft
were within visual range of the intended objectives and the
bombings were clearly aimed at stopping the Bosnian Serb advance
on Gorazde. Nevertheless, undaunted, the Bosnian Serbs continued
their shelling of Gorazde. Sarajevo used the Bosnian Serb
defiance to justify the second raid.
Significantly, even though the airstrikes were officially
launched in order to protect the lives of the UNPROFOR personnel
in Gorazde, there is some evidence of coordination with, or at
the least advance knowledge among the Bosnian Muslim forces that
these strikes were coming. For example, Bosnian Serb military
intelligence claims that the Muslim forces in Gorazde and
Sarajevo were discussing both air raids by radio about four hours
before the raids were actually launched. Indeed, Bosnian Muslim
Special Forces deployed to advanced positions in the areas to be
bombed in order to be ready to exploit the confusion caused to
the Serbs by the NATO attacks.
It was at this point that UNPROFOR arranged for another ceasefire
on 11 April. At first, the Bosnian Serb artillery honored the
ceasefire and UNPROFOR acknowledged that the Bosnian Serbs were
holding their fire. However, soon afterward, several Muslim raids
were finally answered by the Bosnian Serbs. A clash ensued and
quickly escalated into a firelight that included the use of
artillery and mortars on both sides. Frustrated and defiant, Pale
announced that it was no longer recognizing Gorazde as a safe
zone and proceeded to order the resumption of fighting and
shelling.
Thus, on 12 April, the Bosnian Serbs resumed their pressure on
Gorazde. At the same time, the Serb infantry was expediting
preparations for a major offensive. Indeed, the movement of fresh
forces toward, and the regrouping of, the locally deployed forces
suggested preparations for a major thrust into the Gorazde
pocket. In response, the Bosnian Muslim forces attempted a
localized counterattack southward along the Drina river but were
contained by the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Muslims also opened
artillery and mortar fire from inside Gorazde. Exchanges of fire
ensued and reports of civilian casualties inside Gorazde
increased.
Meanwhile, deep raids by Bosnian Serb Special Forces continued
increase both in number and in the depth of their penetration
major byproduct of these Serb efforts was that Gorazde had to
divert several of its own Special Forces to hunt their Bosnian
Serb counterparts inside the Muslim held area rather than raid
behind the Bosnian Serb lines. The aggregate impact of the
continued Bosnian Serb shelling and special operations brought
Gorazde near to collapse.
Thus, by 13 April, the fighting near Gorazde had become
completely politicized with a fundamental difference between the
objectives of UNPROFOR and those of the Bosnian Government
becoming manifest. The UN was determined to arrange a ceasefire
so that the killing of civilians inside Gorazde would be stopped.
By contrast, Sarajevo, with massive support from the US, was
adamant on reversing its military defeat -- itself a result of
the failure of the Bosnian Muslims' own offensive -- through
"diplomatic processes," namely, international pressure on the
Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, it was in Sarajevo's own interest to
ensure that the ceasefires collapsed as that would increase the
pressure on the Serbs to withdraw and on the West to launch
military action against the Serbs.
Indeed, a cyclic routine aimed at instigating a major Western
intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims now developed in
Gorazde. It went as follows: At first, the Bosnian Serbs declared
a unilateral ceasefire, negotiating details with UNPROFOR. The
Serb forces would then cease fire - more or less, given their
endemic problems with command control over the various militias.
Then the Bosnian Muslims would provoke the Bosnian Serbs with
mortar attacks, special raids, etc. Within a short time the
Bosnian Serb forces would respond, sending a massive barrage into
Gorazde. In due course, the Western media would then report
unprovoked Bosnian Serb shelling of the civilian population,
which would then prompt the US/UN/NATO to threaten military
action. The Bosnian Serbs would then agree to declare a new
unilateral ceasefire and the whole cycle would begin again.
At least initially, UNPROFOR seemed to recognize this pattern.
For example, Gen. Rose, the UN ground commander, asked the
Muslims "to stop their provocations in Gorazde." Indeed, in an
interview with French TV (TF-1) on April 12, Gen. Rose
acknowledged that the Muslims "shoot on the Serbs to step up the
pressure and to obtain a fresh intervention from NATO."
Nevertheless, faced with repeated threats of airstrikes, as well
as intense NATO air activities around Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb
High Command in Pale ordered that NATO aircraft involved in such
activities be considered as legitimate targets. By now, the NATO
aircraft, mainly US strike aircraft, were repeatedly conducting
"dry runs," that is simulated strikes, aimed at deterring and
stopping Bosnian Serb troop movements. Since no ordinance was
actually dropped, such "maneuvers" were permitted by the "letter"
of the UN/NATO mandate, although their clear objective to harass
the Bosnian Serbs was stretching it a bit.
Against this backdrop, on 13 April, fighting around Gorazde was
limited to localized infantry clashes, mainly attempts by both
sides to make tactical adjustments and prevent the other side
from doing the same. In this context, the Bosnian Serb shelling
of Gorazde was limited to brief but intense responses to Muslim
provocations. However, on 14 April, there was a major escalation
of the Bosnian Muslim provocation effort, as well as in the
Bosnian Serb response to it, that was both militarily futile and
politically disastrous.
What transpired went as follows: The Bosnian Muslim forces,
including a majority of their mortars and artillery, were
concentrated next to the facilities of the Red Cross - a clearly
marked building in the center of Gorazde. When the Muslim
infantry launched a series of coordinated localized attacks on
the Bosnian Serb forces advancing northward on both banks of the
Drina river, infantry fighting and clashes soon expanded along
the entire front line east of Gorazde. All this time, the
attacking Bosnian Muslim infantry were provided with intense fire
support from the mortars and small caliber automatic guns
deployed in the immediate vicinity of the Red Cross building.
Needless to say, it did not take long for the Bosnian Serbs to
reach to this action. In due course, the Bosnian Serb infantry,
with direct fire support from tanks and small caliber guns, after
hours of intense fighting, were able to block and reverse the
Bosnian Muslim attacks. Indeed, in some sectors, the local
Bosnian Serb commanders exploited the collapse of the Bosnian
Muslim attacks to make local advances with their own forces,
tightening the siege on Gorazde. An outgrowth of this was the
link-up of all Bosnian Serb forces advancing from the south and
southeast so that a unified thrust was formed.
Once that was done, the Bosnian Serbs directed their attention on
the source of the long-range fire being aimed at them from the
area of the Red Cross building. Thus, Bosnian Serb artillery
began intense counter-battery fire into the concentration of
Bosnian Muslim fire, hitting the Red Cross building in the
process. Other Bosnian Serb guns shelled Gorazde itself.
The moment Bosnian Serb shells began falling in the vicinity of
the Red Cross building, the Muslim propaganda machine went into
action. "Ham radio" reports out of Gorazde began giving accounts
of intentional Bosnian Serb shelling of the hospital and the Red
Cross building. These reports came in addition to the regular
reports of heavy casualties among the civilian population.
Needless to say, Sarajevo capitalized on these reports to coax
the UN/NATO into taking further military action against the
Bosnian Serb forces.
Or 15 April, realizing that the fighting in the Gorazde area was
only going to escalate, Pale ordered the Bosnian Serb forces to
resume their advance on the city. The primary objective was to
establish Bosnian Serb control over the eastern bank of the Drina
so that at least one of the highways to the Adriatic would remain
under Bosnian Serb control. Consequently, the Bosnian Serb forces
advancing from the east resumed their attack.
By the end of the next day (16 April) the Serbs had completed the
capture of two strategic peaks -- Gradina and Jartiste -- located
some 5 kms east of Gorazde. This area was the launching place for
the main Bosnian Muslim offensive in the direction of Cajnice and
also benefited from the fact that it was an ideal site for
launching long range artillery fire.
In mid April, with Gorazde seemingly on the verge of collapse,
NATO air operations and related military activities intensified.
The British SAS teams significantly expanded the zone of their
infiltratlon activities in order to identify, locate and mark
Bosnian Serb targets for subsequent air attacks. On 15 April, one
team operating in the Jabuka Sedlo mountain pass deep inside
Bosnian Serb territory clashed with a local Bosnian Serb unit.
One of the SAS troops was killed and another wounded in the
ensuing firefight.
Meanwhile, NATO aircraft also expanded their reconnaissance and
simulated strikes against Bosnian Serb forces in the Gorazde area
as the Bosnian Serbs, in turn, continued firing on NATO aircraft.
One 15 April, the Bosnian Serbs hit a French Super Etendard IV-P
on a reconnaissance mission. Or 16 April, a Sea Harrier from the
British aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal was shot down as it was
attempting, along with several U.S. A-lOs, to strike (still
conducting preparatory dry runs) Serb positions. The Sea Harrier
was shot down with an SA-7, and the pilot bailed out safely and
landed inside Gorazde.
Subsequently, the Bosnian Serbs denied shooting down the British
warplane. Indeed, the Bosnian Serb High Command insists that
Muslim forces shot down the Sea Harrier. They point out that the
aircraft was shot over Gorazde itself and that the the pilot landed in
the middle of the Muslim area. Furthermore, Bosnian Serb military
intelligence claims to have intercepted a message from the High
Command in Gorazde to the General Staff in Sarajevo informing
them of the successful completion of the order to shoot down a
NATO plane.
Whatever the truth of the matter was, soon afterward several US
and UK planes launched simulated bombing and strafing runs over
the Bosnian Serb forces around Gorazde that were so realistic
that even the UNPROFOR spokesman in Sarajevo first described them
as actual bombing raids in retaliation for the downing of the Sea
Harrier. It was only a few hours later that UNPROFOR rushed to
deny its own announcement, stressing that no ordinance was
actually dropped in the course of these airstrikes.
Meanwhile, UN observers were randomly deployed in the forward
Bosnian Muslim positions, at times only 500 meters from the front
line, without any advance warning to the Bosnian Serb side.
Consequently, UNPROFOR personnel would suddenly appear in a
Bosnian Muslim position in the middle of a firefight demanding
that the Bosnian Serbs hold their fire or else risk NATO
airstrikes. In other cases, the Muslims simulated a bogus
UNPROFOR presence, trying to affect a unilateral Bosnian Serb
cessation of fire the moment things went bad for themselves.
Against this backdrop, around 15 April, Sarajevo's propaganda
campaign began to significantly intensify. The leaders of
Sarajevo began complaining to the world media that the UN was not
protecting the innocent in Gorazde -- overlooking the fact that
such action was never contemplated in the UN mandate -- and began
urging resolute armed intervention against the Bosnian Serbs. At
the same time, reports of atrocities in Gorazde continued to flow
in along with calls for help from the city.
In the meantime, the Bosnian Serbs were firmly holding all the
strategic points surrounding Gorazde and their forces were ready
to launch an advance into the city proper if instructed to do so.
However, at this point, the Bosnian Serb leadership was still
against such a move. Instead, the local Serb forces were
instructed to send in patrols to map and test the defenses of
Gorazde.
Some of these Bosnian Serb patrols, usually comprising an
infantry platoon with 1 or 2 tanks, were able to enter the city
itself, though they normally withdrew after a short rime In
addition, Bosnian Serb Special Forces deployed in the immediate
vicinity of the town, directing sniper fire at Bosnian Muslim
military personnel in order to prevent the Muslims from directing
their forces. Even though the highest levels at Pale repeatedly
assured the UN that they had no intention of seizing Gorazde, the
Sarajevo propaganda machine continued to warn of the imminent
fall of the city.
In this context, on 17 April, in a passionate speech on radio
Sarajevo, Izetbegovic called on the defenders of Gorazde to hold
out despite the intense casualties they were suffering. At the
same time the Bosnian government continued to urge the
West/US/UN/NATO to launch airstrikes on the Bosnian Serbs near
Gorazde.
Meanwhile, by about this time, the Bosnian Serbs had developed a
routine for dealing with the Gorazde situation militarily. The
Bosnian Serb forces would conduct a combination of sporadic
shelling and prodding patrols in and out of Gorazde, at times
getting close to center of the city in order to demonstrate their
ability to take it at will. These operations were augmented in
raids by the Bosnian Serb Special Forces that would be undertaken
during the night. The aggregate impact of such tactics proved
highly effective at increasing the level of tension among the
Muslim forces in Gorazde while requiring only minimal effort by
the Bosnian Serbs themselves. The Bosnian Serbs also concentrated
or better dispersing and camouflaging their equipment in view of
the intensifying NAT0 air reconnaissance and simulated strikes.
Then, on 17 April, pursuant to their own unilateral ceasefire,
the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their main tanks and guns to a
distance of 3 kms from the hospital area. The Bosnian Muslim
forces exploited the absence of the heavy guns and opened fire on
the Bosnian Serb positions, and in two strategic sectors -- the
approaches to Ustiprica and Kopaci -- tried to launch infantry
attacks to seize the Bosnian Serb positions. The Bosnian Serbs
responded by shelling and deploying tanks back to their
positions, effectively negating their promise of a ceasefire and
unilateral disengagement.
However, in the aftermath of one Bosnian Muslim infantry attack,
Bosnian Serbs counterattacked and seized strategically
located Biserna Hill, thus assuring their control over the entire
east bank of the Drina all the way to the approaches to Gorazde
itself. The forward Bosnian Serb units established positions
virtually inside Gorazde, while in the north the withdrawal of
Bosnian Serb forces toward Kopaci was reversed and the tanks and
infantry stormed the Bosnian Muslim positions, penetrating deeply
through their defensive lines.
With the Bosnian Muslims complaining of ammunition shortages, the
Bosnian Serbs insisted on thorough inspection of humanitarian
convoys before they were allowed to go to Gorazde through the
Bosnian Serb lines. Considering that the UN had been instrumental
in building the Bosnian Muslim forces in Gorazde, it was not an
illogical demand. However, Sarajevo would hear nothing of it,
stressing that it would not permit convoys "to be tampered with"
by the Bosnian Serbs to enter Gorazde. An impasse developed and
the Bosnian propaganda machine intensified its outcries of a
humanitarian disaster in Gorazde, citing huge numbers of wounded
and fatalities.
Meanwhile, on 18 April, Karadzic promised to implement yet
another unilateral ceasefire and withdraw some of his heavy
weapons 3 kms away from the outskirts of Gorazde as the first
phase of a regional ceasefire. Once again, soon after the Bosnian
Serb withdrawal began, the Bosnian Muslim forces opened fire on
the Bosnian Serb positions, and again the Bosnian Serbs turned
around and resumed their shelling.
Also on 13 April, the Bosnian Muslims established a new
long-range fire position in a five story building that had been
used previously by UNPROFOR observers. Indeed, the UN was still
using the 5th floor facility while the Bosnian Muslims fortified
the 3rd and 4th floors. (The Bosnian Muslims established fire
positions for heavy machine guns on the 4th floor, and for
automatic small caliber guns on the 3rd. Ultimately, the Bosnian
Muslims would even go so far as to establish a fire control and
command post on the 5th floor.) Firing from this building enabled
the Bosnian Muslims to extend the range of their weapons. Not
surprisingly, it was not long before the Bosnian Serbs were
accused or deliberately attacking a UN facility.
Beginning on l9 April, the overall situation was further
complicated when the Bosnian Serbs yet again tried to implement a
unilateral ceasefire and withdraw 3 kms from the center of
Gorazde. Under extreme pressure from Pale, the local Bosnian Serb
commanders finally restrained their forces, gradually reducing
the level and intensity of their operations.
In this connection, a problem developed regarding the locally
recruited Bosnian Serb militias. Many of the troops in these
militias had been recruited from Gorazde and nearby villages that
had been overrun by Muslim forces in 1992. Now returning to their
destroyed villages, these troops were supposed to serve as a home
guard and police force for the Bosnian Serbian rear. However,
with the main Bosnian Serb forces being withdrawn, these
militiamen suddenly found themselves at the front where, needless
to say, they could not resist firing (mainly small arms) at their
Muslim adversaries.
These Serb militia were the source of numerous ceasefire
violations from the Bosnian Serb side as the Serb commanders had
difficulty controlling and restraining them. Thus, these
militiamen turned into a serious political problem for the
Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, the Pale command should have known better
than to deploying such units to the front, but senior officials
in Pale insisted that they had no choice.
In the meantime, on 20 April, Pale reiterated the Bosnian Serb
commitment to the conditions of the unilateral cease fire and
partial withdrawal, and agreed to the deployment of 100 UNPROFOR
personnel to observe the ceasefire. Nonetheless, reacting to
reports of widespread civil an casualties and damage, NATO
"considered in a favorable light" the request by Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, for wider airstrikes to
protect not just Sarajevo and Gorazde, but all six "safe areas"
declared by the UN.
In the meantime, on 20 April, the Bosnian Serbs continued to have
difficulties implementing their ceasefire due to Bosnian Muslim
provocations and their own uncontrollable militiamen. The Bosnian
Muslim forces fired intense but brief barrages from their
positions in the UN building, near the Red Cross building, and
similar sites, instigating the inevitable Bosnian Serb reaction.
At this time Sarajevo propaganda described the Bosnian Serb
withdrawals as the massing of Serb forces for a final assault on
Gorazde.
The reports of an all out Bosnian Serb offensive continued on 21
April, with the Bosnian Muslims reporting an avalanche of tanks
closing in on Gorazde. Sarajevo even insisted that surface to
surface missiles had been fired from inside Serbia into Gorazde.
Nevertheless, on the basis of political discussions with the US
and the West, Sarajevo was confident that NATO was about to bomb
the Bosnian Serbs yet once more.
Indeed, at the point when they expected further NATO action,
Muslim infantry assembled near the bridges in Gorazde and other
protected forward positions, ready to launch an attack that would
exploit the NATO bombings. When the Bosnian Muslims opened fire
on the northern front, the Bosnian Serbs capitalized on this and
launched an attack in the direction of the Pobjeda ammunition
factory - concentrating their artillery fire at the facility in
order to cause maximum damage before their forces were compelled
to withdraw beyond firing range.
By 22 April, the Bosnian Muslim military and propaganda strategy
seemed to have worked, especially since the Bosnian Serbs could
not hold their fire long enough for their efforts at
self-restraint to be verified. Consequently, NATO issued an
ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs, warning them that they would be
subjected to intense bombing if they did not implement their
unilateral plan for a ceasefire.
Thus, NATO demanded that all hostilities against Gorazde were to
cease immediately. The Bosnian Serb forces were to pull back 3
kms from the center of Gorazde, while pulling their heavy weapons
back 20 kms. In addition, the Bosnian Serbs were to permit UN and
other humanitarian convoys to travel into and out of Gorazde as
well as allow the evacuation of the wounded.
At the same time, Muslim propaganda intensified as the Bosnian
Serbs geared up to comply with the NATO ultimatum. Furthermore,
Washington was encouraged to expand NATO military intervention on
the side of the Bosnian Muslims, prompting Defense Secretary
William Perry to say that the US wanted NATO warplanes to launch
"vigorous raids" against Bosnian Serb targets if the Bosnian
Serbs did not stop shelling the Muslim safe havens. Ultimately,
by late evening of the next day, April 23, with the first UN
convoy about to arrive, Sarajevo acknowledged that Bosnian Serb
fire had "diminished" though it was not yet completely stopped.
Thus, or 24 April, UNPROFOR units began deploying along the
demarcation line between the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb
forces. The UN confirmed that the Bosnian Serb forces had
complied their withdrawal beyond the 3 km line, and a UNPROFOR
team began assessing the damage and preparing for the evacuation
of thousands of wounded civilians. For their part, the Bosnian
Muslims deployed Special Forces into the hills and began
ambushing the withdrawing Bosnian Serb forces. In response, the
Bosnian Serbs began blowing up those facilities that they
considered possible launching sites for such ambushes.
However, before withdrawing, the Bosnian Serbs also blew up
segments of the Pobjeda ammunition factory as well as the water
pumping and cooling system for the high explosives production
line. As long as the ammunition factory was not working, the
besieged pocket had used water from this system for drinking,
cooking and bathing. Thus, the Western media inaccurately
described the Bosnian Serb action as the intentional blowing up
of the water system of Gorazde.
In the meantime, due to the mountainous terrain and Muslim
attacks, the Bosnian Serb withdrawal was progressing slowly,
prompting NATO to request permission to launch airstrikes on the
withdrawing Bosnian Serb forces. UN representative Akashi vetoed
the request, stressing that the Bosnian Serbs were doing their
best to comply with the UN conditions.
Indeed, on 26 April, UNPROFOR expressed its satisfaction with the
Bosnian Serb compliance of the withdrawal from the Gorazde area.
Still Sarajevo continued to insist that the Bosnian Serbs were
violating the agreement and to demand NATO aerial bombing.
Meanwhile, ambushes by Bosnian Muslim Special Forces, as well as
sporadic artillery and mortar fire, continued - all in an effort
to provoke a Bosnian Serb response.
On the evening of 26 April, UNPROFOR confirmed the successful
completion of the pull back of the Bosnian Serb forces. The next
day, UNPROFOR teams began searching the exclusion zone for
concealed Bosnian Serb forces and weapons, but none were found.
Nevertheless, Harris Silajdzic continued to insist that Bosnian
Serb infantry forces were in Gorazde and to demand that NATO bomb
them.
* * *
That said, it was now possible to objectively asses the actual
situation in Gorazde. It soon became clear that the Bosnian
Muslims had overstated the plight of the city. The casualty
levels were far below initial reports, with UNHCR, the most
responsible among these reporting sources, having initially
alleged that there were 715 killed and 1970 wounded, over 600 of
them serious and requiring evacuation by air. Most of these
casualties, the UNHCR had stressed, were innocent civilians
However, post action inspection revealed that there were some 200
fatalities and some 200 seriously wounded, 70% of them Muslim
soldiers.
The extent of the damage to the hospital and other buildings, not
to speak of Gorazde overall, was far below what had been
anticipated on the basis of radio reports. Indeed, on 28 April,
General Rose went on an inspection tour of the Gorazde enclave.
He returned full of criticism of the Bosnian Muslims, adding that
they had exaggerated the number of wounded and the damage done to
the town in the Bosnian Serb offensive in order to instigate
NATO's military intervention. General Rose stated: "The situation
was a lot better than I had been led to believe. One can only be
pleased at that. There was obviously damage to the town and you
can't fight a battle around a town without there being damage to
the town. But the town had not been destroyed to the level which
I had expected."
In Sarajevo, a senior UN officer who visited Gorazde was more
explicit: "Reports of Gorazde were deliberately exaggerated in
order to shame the world into doing something," he told The New
York Times. "The attacks were not of the dimension suggested. A
false impression was given to the international community to help
stir the vision of the Bosnian Serbs as the enemy and,
unfortunately, all this very nearly went out of control."
The UN officer went on to warn that Gorazde would not be the last
case of Sarajevo's exploitation of a military engagement to
involve the West in the fighting. "The big problem is that the
Muslims believe they can bring the Americans into the war," the
officer said. "A dangerous overreaction was stirred up in
international capitals. The talk of wider use of NATO airpower,
hitting ammunition dumps and infrastructure went well across the
line that would have turned the UN forces here into combatants."
Unfortunately, the warnings of this senior UN officer appear to
have been all too accurate. Immediately after the publication of
his remarks, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright lodged a strong
complaint with the UN Secretary-General in which, the United
States Government accused "in the strongest possible terms" top
UN officials in the Balkans of, in the words of the New York
Times, "failing to support a more aggressive policy toward the
Serbs" in Bosnia. Washington, it seems, has not yet learned the
lessons of the battle of Gorazde.
by Yossef Bodansky
& Vaughn S. Forrest
END
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