1. The present report is submitted
to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution
752 (1992), in which the Council demanded that all
units of the Yugoslav's Peoples' Army (JNA) and elements of Croatian Army
now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must withdraw or
be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons under effective international
monitoring, and requested the Secretary-General to consider without delay
what international assistance could be provided in this connection.
I.
BACKGROUND
2. On
26 April 1992, President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina met at Skopje
with General Blagoje Adzic, Chief of Staff of JNA [Yugoslav Federal Army]
and Acting Federal Secretary of Defence, and Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President
of the Federal Presidency in Belgrade, to define the role of JNA in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and its eventual withdrawal. This meeting did not produce
a definitive agreement and the Belgrade authorities
on May 4th announced their decision to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina
by 18 May all JNA personnel who were not CITIZENS of that Republic. On
13 May, Vice-President Kostic proposed to President Izetbegovic that the
talks be resumed with the participation of the representatives of the Bosnian
Serb and Croat communities. On the same day, authorities of the so-called
"Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina"announced their decision to
form their own army, which would be composed of units of former JNA based
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and appointed General Ratko Mladic as Commander
of that army.
3. On
17 May, I received a letter from Admiral Miroslav Simic, Chief of General
Staff of JNA, requesting assistance in the safe withdrawal of JNA troops
from Bosnia and Herzegovina and particularly from Sarajevo, Pazaric and
Zenica. The letter referred, inter alia, to an agreement signed on May
1992 at the premises of the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR) at Sarajevo by representatives of Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
JNA, the European Community Monitoring Mission and the personal envoy of
Lord Carrington, Mr. Colm Doyle. On 21 May, Vice-President Kostic again
wrote to ask me to request President Izetbegovic to order the deblocking
of the JNA garrisons at Sarajevo. On 25 May 1992, I received a letter from
President Izetbegovic in which, inter alia, he requested that UNPROFOR
should supervise the withdrawal of part of the JNA personel and weapons,
in accordance with the agreement of 10 May 1992.
4. I
have sought, through UNPROFOR, information about the present status of
JNA units and personnel in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the considerable
restriction on UNPROFOR freedom of movement in Sarajevo and elsewhere in
the Republic, and the considerable lack of an independent information gathering
capacity, it is not been possible to obtain completely authenticated information,
but the situation seem to be as described in the following two paragraphs.
5. The
bulk of the JNA personnell who were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina
were citizens of that Republic and were not therefore covered by the Belgrade
authorities decision of 4 May to withdraw JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Most of them appear to have joined the army of so called "Serbian Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Others have joined the Territorial Defence
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the political control of the
Presidency of that Republic. Others may have joined various irregular forces
operating there.
6. Those
who are not citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina are said by the Belgrade
authorities to number barely 20 per cent of the total. Most
of these are believed to have withdrawn already into Serbia and Montenegro,
6some of them having been subjected to attack
during their withdrawal. Others however remain at various garrisons in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in Serb-controlled areas, including
two installations on the outscirts of sarajevo. A further category consists
of personnel who have been blockaded in their barracks by the Territorial
Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or hostile irregular forces. These are
mostly in Sarajevo area, where the latest developments have been as follows:
a) Some
600 to 1,000 [Yugoslav Federal] soldiers are blocked in the Marshal Tito
Barracks at Sarajevo, with nearly 200 vehicles. Negotiation on the evacuationof
these barracks continued until 27 May 1992, when they broke down following
a mortar attack which killed some 16 civilians in central Sarajevo. On
30 May 1992, the barracks came under attack from rocket-propelled grenades
and flame-throwers fired by [Muslim] Territorial Defence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
b) Several
hundred JNA personnel from Jusuf Dzonic barracks, a logistic base at Sarajevo,
and Victor Bubanj Barracks were in the process of withdrawing from Sarajevo
during the night of 27/28 May 1992. The convoy, which has been accompanied
by UNPROFOR was attacked by Serb irregulars opposed to terms of their withdrawal
and by units of Territorial Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and lost
its way. Some elements became separated from the rest; 30 JNA vehicles
and their drivers went missing and at least 1 soldier was killed;
7. It
will aparent from the foregoing that the issue of the blocking and safe
withdrawal of the remaining JNA troops from their barracks at Bosnia and
Herzegovina has become linked to other problems which have caused continuing
conflict in that Republic and has in particular been complicated by problems
relating to the withdrawal of heavy weapons from those barracks and from
Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNPROFOR have received indications that JNA leadership
in Belgrade is willing to leave the bulk of its weapons behind upon withdrawal,
but the leadership of the army of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina"
is unwilling to permit this.
8. Uncertainty
about who exercises political control over the Serb forces in Bosnia Herzegovina
has further complicated the situation. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency
had initially been reluctant to engage in talks on these and other issues
with the leadership of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina"
and insisted upon direct talks with Belgrade authorities instead. A senior
JNA representative from Belgrade, General Nedeljko Boskovic, has conducted
discussions with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, but it has become
clear that his word is not binding on the commander of the army of the
"Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina", General Mladic. Indeed, as
indicated in paragraph 6 (b) above, Serb irregulars attacked a JNA convoy
withdrawing from barracks at Sarajevo on 28 May under arrangement negotioation
by General Boskovic. It also appears that the heavy shelling of Sarajevo
on the night of 28/29 May took place on the orders of General Mladic in
direct contravention of instructions issued by General Boskovic and the
JNA leadership in Belgrade.
9. Given
the doubts that now exist about the ability of the authorities in Belgrade
to influence General Mladic, who has left JNA, efforts have been made by
UNPROFOR to appeal to him directly as well as through the political leadership
of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". As result of these
efforts General Mladic agreed on 30 May to stop the bombardment of Sarajevo.
While it is my hope that the shelling of the city will not be resumed,
it is also clear that the emergence of General Mladic and the forces under
his command as independent actors apparently beyond the control of JNA
greatly complicates the issues raised in paragraph 4 of Security Council
resolution 752 (1992). President Izetbegovic has recently indicated to
senior UNPROFOR officers at Sarajevo his willingness to deal with General
Mladic but not with the political leadership of the "Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina".
10.
As regards the withdrawal of the elements
of the Croatian Army now
in Bosnia, information currently available in the New York suggest that
no such withdrawal
has occured. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian Army personnel,
in uniform, operating within, and as part of, military formation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities
have consistently taken position that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia and
Herzegovina have left the Croatian Army and are not subject to this authority.
International observers do not, however, doubt that portions of Bosnia
and Herzegovina are under control of Croatian military units, whether belonging
to the local Territorial Defence, to paramilitary groups or to the Croatian
Army. It is unclear in the circumstances how their withdrawal or disbandment,
as required by the Council, can be achieved.
II.
POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
11.
Resolution 752 (1992) describes three possible alternatives for units of
JNA [Yugoslav Federal Army] and elements of Croatian Army which are now
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They can either be withdrawn or be subject to
the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded
with their weapons under effective international monitoring.
12.
International assistence could play a role in implementing each of these
alternatives. However, the provision of such assistance would presuppose
that the necessary agreements had been made concluded that they would be
respected by all parts, aspecially of course the commanders of the units
and elements concerned. Such agreements would need to specify clearly exactly
which military personnel were deemed to be "units of JNA" or "elements
of the Croatian Army". This could present difficulties, given both the
Croatian position mentioned above and, especially, the
Belgrade authorities' position that their decision to withdraw JNA personnel
from Bosnia and Herzegovina does not relate to JNA personnel who are citizens
of that Republic and over whom Belgrade no longer exercises constitutional
authority. Those providing international assistence
would also need to be given details, accepted by the principal parties,
of the numbers, locations and armament of all troops to which agreements
applied.
13.
The anomalous position of General Mladic and
the forces under his command who are subject neither to the authority of
Belgrade nor to that of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, will
also need to be clarified in relation to any agreement. It is considered
unrealistic to expect that the "Army of Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina" would be willing to place itself under the authority of the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreement would instead need to be
feasable only in the context of an overall
political agreement on constitutional arrangements
for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14.
Provided that the necessary agreements were in place, international assistence
could take various forms. It could, for instance, consist of monitoring
and verifying implementations of such agreements as have been achieved.
International military personnel could also be deployed to help build confidence
as the troops concerned were assembled and then moved out of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or to the locations where they would pass under the Government's
authority or be disbanded. This sort of assistence has been provided by
the United Nations military observers in the number of recent peace-keeping
operations. It has, however, to be repeated that recent experience has
indicated that less respect is shown for such an international presence
in former Yugoslavia than in other situations where international observers
have recently played the rule.
15.
In the case of the third option, disbanding and disarming, international
assistence could extend beyond monitoring and verification. It could include
a role in ensuring the security of arms laid down by the disbanded units
or elements, e.g., through a double lock system, with one lock being controlled
by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (which would, of course, have
to be agreed by all the parties) and the other by the international organizations
concerned. Although it is not specifically mentioned in resolution 752
(1992), another possibility would be for international troops to undertake
the immobilization and/or destruction of some or all of the weapons of
the disbanded units or elements.
III.
OBSERVATIONS
The
above is a brief survey of how international assistance could be provided
to the various processes envisaged in paragraph 4 of the resolution 752
(1992). It assumes that those processes would be agreed voluntarily by
those in political and operational control of the troops concerned and
that the latter would carry out the orders they received. Otherwise, it
is difficult to see how the solutions demanded by the Security Council
could be achieved.