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THE HAGUE AGAINST JUSTICE (Part III)
The Legal Basis for the Establishment
of the International Tribunal at The Hague
By Dr. Kosta Cavoski
Professor Kosta Cavoski, an eminent Yugoslav
law scholar, holds Ph.D. from Harvard University. He has taught at Theory
of Law at University of Belgrade.
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If the start or the
case of the Prosecutor vs. Djordje Djukic disgraced the International Criminal
Tribunal at The Hague, a more serious examination of the manner in which
the Tribunal was founded and its working Rules of Procedure and Evidence
would also convince us that the failure was not in the least accidental.
Moreover, it could have been expected when the Security Council Resolution
808 of 22 February 1993 was issued. In spite of the fact that the Resolution
expressed the intention to found an international tribunal for the prosecution
of persons responsible for committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991,
the Security Council did not feel the need to provide a legal basis for
its establishment.(10) The reason for this omission is simple: the existing
legal system of the UN does not provide a legal basis for it, nor can there
ever be one. Half a century has passed since the founding of the UN, and
its main political and executive body, the Security Council, has never
assumed the right to found a tribunal since court jurisdiction rests on
international treaties as a result of the absence of a universal legislative
organ. This was clearly stated by the UN Secretary General in his report
no. S/25704 (section 18) of 3 May 1993 when he said: "The approach which
in the normal course of events would be followed in establishing an international
tribunal would be the conclusion of a treaty by which the member states
would establish a tribunal and approve its statute. This treaty would be
drawn up and adopted by an appropriate international body (e.g. the General
Assembly or a specially convened conference), following which it would
be opened for signing and ratification. Such an approach would have the
advantage of allowing for a detailed examination and elaboration of all
issues pertaining to the establishment of the international tribunal. It
would also allow the states participating in the negotiation and conclusion
of the treaty to fully exercise their sovereign will in particular whether
they wish to become parties to the treaty or not".
The rule whereby court
jurisdiction is based on international treaties has, until now, been strictly
adhered to without exception. Then in Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, the
Security Council gave itself the right to establish ad hoc a tribunal whose
competence was limited in time (beginning on 1 January 1991) as well as
capacity (confined to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia). Since no such tribunal had ever been established before
by the Security Council (11), it would have been appropriate to find some
sort of legal basis in order to avoid the inference that "might is right".
A legal basis was "found" in a very loose interpretation of a clause in
Chapter VII of the UN Charter whereby the Security Council can take measures
to maintain or restore international peace and security following the requisite
establishment of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace or acts of aggression. In other words, the term "tribunal", as the
requisite institution, is taken to be a "measure". No doubt the members
of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, assumed that
"might was right", but also that certain terms can be instilled with certain
meanings that they never had before. Thus "measures" became synonymous
with "tribunal".
The Secretary General
was given the thankless task of justifying the international criminal tribunal
as an enforcement measure of the Security Council which Chapter VII of
the UN Charter grants it. As he was unable to refer to any valid legal
basis for this authority, he reverted to the principle of expediency. "This
approach," said the Secretary General "would have the advantage of being
expeditious and immediately effective as all states would be under a binding
obligation to take whatever action is required to carry out a decision
taken as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII" (12). Thus the principle
of political expediency took precedence over that of legality and legal
validity.
The Secretary General
knew of course, that the Security Council could not simply "create" a tribunal
nor did it have the legislative authority to allow it to "create" international
criminal law. He let this slip when he said that "in assigning to the International
Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be creating
or purporting to 'legislate' that law. Rather, the International Tribunal
would have the task of applying existing international humanitarian law."
(13) Unfortunately this is not true. With Resolution 827 of 25 May, the
Security Council implemented its nonexistent legislative powers. It suspended
the application of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 with additional
Protocols, as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, whereby prosecution is entrusted
to national courts. Thus, by awarding the International Tribunal primacy
over the prosecution of crimes committed on the territory of the former
SFR Yugoslavia, it annulled the competence of all national courts worldwide.
One has to ask in the name of what principle could the Security Council
suspend and then amend international treaties of a legislative nature.
Having assumed the
right to legislate, the Security Council ventured to take another step:
it delegated its nonexistent legislative competency to its creature - the
International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague. Under Article 15 of the Statute
of the International Tribunal it authorized its judges to adopt rules of
procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of proceedings,
trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims
and witnesses and other appropriate matters. In this way the Security Council
not only legislated, but also authorized the Tribunal to be its own legislator
with regard to criminal procedural law.
With no hesitation,
the International Tribunal accepted the authority to write its own laws,
i.e. to issue Rules of Procedure and Evidence that were to be applied to
the prosecution of subsequent cases. The Rules were adopted by February
1994, only to be amended six more times - in May and October of 1994, January
and June 1995, January and April 1996. In January 1995 alone, 41 of the
total 125 rules were amended, and almost half of the original rules were
further changed by other amendments. To make matters worse, the Tribunal
adjusted the Rules according to which it would pass judgment, having in
mind the practical problems that arose in the course of the implementation
of the Rules on pending cases.
Unfortunately, this
was in breach of its own Rule No. 6, paragraph (C) whereby amendments shall
not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case.
In this way certain amendments took on the character of ex post facto law.
Of special interest is the manner in which the Tribunal amended its rules.
Legislative bodies usually do this at public sessions, following long and
exhaustive debates over every proposed article or subsequent amendment.
The International Tribunal simplified this procedure. Its Rules are adopted
at plenary sessions after the decision of seven judges, and according to
Rule 6, paragraph (B) this can also be done otherwise, on condition the
judges accept the amendment unanimously. One asks oneself what "other way"
is there for an amendment to be adopted if not by debate at a plenary session.
The answer is simple: the president or some Tribunal official posed amendment
to all the judges world-wide; on the same day they fax back their approval.
This is the new way of creating laws by fax that could easily revolutionize
the old-fashioned procedure that is exercised by the British Parliament.
This was how the Tribunal
at The Hague used the legislative competence that was first usurped by
the Security Council and subsequently generously delegated to it. To make
for even greater paradox, the Tribunal took another step: having become
its own legislator it then passed part of its legislative power over to
the Prosecutor in order to allow him to draw up the rules he would work
by. Hence Rule 37, paragraph (A) stipulates that "the Prosecutor shall
perform all the functions provided by the Statute in accordance with the
Rules and such Regulations, consistent with the Statute and the Rules,
as may be framed by him".
Antonio Cassese, President
of the International Tribunal was well aware that never in the history
of a civilized country had individual court drawn up the rules by which
it would pass judgment. This would be a dangerous breach of the principle
of separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary which, according
to Montesquieu, is an essential guarantee of freedom. Thus it could be
said that the adoption of the Rules of the Tribunal in May 1995 represented
an enterprise "for which there is no precedent at the international level."(14)
Had he been less self-confident and egotistic in his unexpected role of
being his own legislator, he would have had to ask himself very seriously
if there could possibly be a valid reason for this unprecedented breach
of a practice inviolable in any civilized country.
There are, of course,
countries where judge made law is applied, e.g. common law in England.
However this law is not the fruit of a premeditated and momentary enterprise
by a single court but the product of all the courts as a unified system
and over a considerable period of time, lasting several centuries. This
is why English judges firmly believe that they are judging according to
a law that was created by others. They do not have the satisfaction that
was granted Antonio Cassese, of creating the general rules according to
which they will judge.
If the International
Tribunal is only partially responsible for its role as legislator with
regard to the adoption of its own Rules due to the fact that this "advantage"
vas delegated to it by the Security Council, it is generally responsible
for its further delegation to the Prosecutor. This is also an enterprise
unprecedented in recent history. Had the International Tribunal appreciated
the equality of both parties, it should have gone one step further and
authorized the defense counsel to prescribe its own general regulations
for the defense of its client. This would also have represented a significant
and unexpected innovation to modern criminal procedural law.
The Prosecutor as
Organ of the Tribunal and as Privileged Party
The next feature whereby
the Security Council and the International Tribunal "enriched" legal theory
and practice was the exceptional position that was bestowed on the Prosecutor.
In a well structured legal system, e.g. common law, the prosecutor is only
one of two equal parties in a court dispute, so that with regards to the
status of both sides - the prosecutor and the accused - and the possibility
of their reaching a settlement, a criminal dispute assumes some of the
aspects of a litigation. Under these circumstances the procedure becomes
truly contradictory in that the two sides contest each other on a completely
equal basis, whereas the court as a third, independent and unbiased party,
resolves the litigation and passes judgment.
The Security Council
and the International Tribunal discarded this concept of criminal litigation
and the total equality of each party in order to award the Prosecutor a
privileged position by making him a part of the court. In Article 11 of
the Statute of the International Tribunal it is explicitly stated that
the Prosecutor is an organ of the Tribunal. This is followed by a series
of regulations that confirm this exceptional and obviously privileged status
of the Prosecutor. Rule 33 stipulates that the registrar of the Tribunal
serves not only the chambers and plenum of the Tribunal but every judge
and the Prosecutor, meaning that the registrar is common to them all. Under
Rule 29 the Prosecutor is given the right to summon and question suspects,
victims and witnesses, record their statements, collect evidence and conduct
on-site investigations. Again, in a well organized judiciary system this
is done by the police up until an inquiry is instigated, whereupon it is
taken over by the investigating judge. This is the only way to ensure the
contradiction of procedure and the equality of both parties - the Prosecutor
and accused.
However, the creators
of the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal made an unforgivable
mistake. With one stroke they made the Prosecutor part of the Tribunal
as well as a party before justice. Rule 2 names the prosecutor and accused
as the parties, but then by virtue of a series of other regulations, their
equality in the court proceedings comes under serious doubt. Thus, for
instance, the Prosecutor, as a litigation party, may propose amendments
to the Rules (Rule 6), while the accused and his defense counsel may not.
Also, the Trial Chamber (Rule 46) may, after a warning, refuse audience
to counsel if, in its opinion, his conduct is offensive, abusive or otherwise
obstructive to the proper conduct of the proceedings. It occurred to none
of the makers of these Rules to allow for the possible removal of the Prosecutor
in the case of his behavior being offensive and abusive to the accused,
his defense counsel or indeed the judges themselves. According to Rule
66 paragraph (C) the Prosecutor may, with the approval of the Trial Chamber,
refuse the defense access to books, documents, photographs and tangible
objects in his custody if this is considered to be contrary to public interest
or affect the security interests of any state. The Trial Chamber debates
this request in camera (in the absence of either party or the public) and
the Prosecutor is obliged to give his reasons why this evidence (books,
documents, photographs and tangible objects) should be confidential only
to the Trial Chamber, meaning that the defense counsel does not have to
be present.
The creators of this
special position of the Prosecutor, who is at the same time part of the
court and one of the two contesting parties, probably consider themselves
to be very innovative. If they were better acquainted with the history
of the Ottoman Empire they would remember that this position was held by
Turkish Cadis (civil judges). That is why we have the saying: "the Cadi
prosecutes you, the Cadi sentences you".
The Secrecy of the
Indictment and Unauthorized Collection of Evidence
This exceptional and
in many ways unacceptable, position of the Prosecutor is just one of the
"innovations" by which the makers of the Statute and Rules of the International
Tribunal "enriched" criminal procedural law. Another was the possibility
of keeping secret the indictment trial and testimonies under conditions
that spawn arbitrariness and considerable departures from the usual standards
of modern procedural law. According to Rule 53 paragraph (B) the judges
or the Trial Chamber can, after consulting the Prosecutor, prohibit the
"disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, or of all or any part of
any particular document or information" if it is necessary "to protect
confidential information obtained by the Prosecutor or is otherwise in
the interests of justice". The Rule makers, however, did not deem it necessary
to further define "confidential information" or "interests of justice",
thereby leaving their interpretation open to the will or arbitrariness
of the Prosecutor, judges and Trial Chamber.
Apart from facts,
documents and information that can be concealed from the general public,
there is information that can be denied the defense. This is information
whose disclosure, for any reason "may be contrary to public interests or
affect the security interests of any state" (Rule 66 paragraph (C)). This
can be assumed to concern information collected by the CIA, and that is
why such information should be kept secret in order to hide its source,
and especially the manner in which it was collected. This involves unauthorized
bugging and the recording of telephone conversations, fax messages, wireless
messages, filming by satellites and pilotless aircraft unauthorized to
overfly the war zones in the former Yugoslavia, as well as data and information
collected by secret agents disguised as humanitarian workers or employees
of the UN, Red Cross and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.
There is nothing unusual
in the illegal collection of information by the US, British or Russian
secret services. The trouble lies in the penchant of the Prosecutor and
Hague Tribunal not only to use illegally obtained information, but also
by denying the public knowledge of the indictment and, trial to conceal
the source of the information on which the indictment, evidence and subsequent
verdict rest. With the excuse of protecting public interest and/or the
security interests of a state, they are no doubt capable of going so far
as to refuse the defense counsel the right to study the evidence, data,
documents, photographs and tangible objects on whose existence an indictment
rests. Were a prosecutor in the US to try to use unauthorized recorded
telephone calls against an accused, this would be momentarily rejected
by the court. Unlike this civilized practice, everything was permitted
to The Hague Tribunal including the use of illegally obtained intelligence
data and the concealment of its source.
--- REFERENCES: ---
(10) This was noted
by the UN Secretary General in his report S/25704 (section 18) of 3 May
1993.
(11)The Statute of
the International Court of Justice at The Hague is incorporated into the
UN Charter and accepted as such by the member states
(12)Report of the
Secretary General S/25704 (see 23) of 3 May 1993
(13) Ibid, sec 29
(14)Preface to a book
publishing all the more important document of the International Criminal
Tribunal at The Hague.
Next:
[ PART IV: The Witch-hunt ]
Back to:
[ Part II ]
[ Part I ]
[ The Hague "Tribunal" ]
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