Appendix II

Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 – 1995: The role of the intelligence and security services

... intelligence should say, then you are a menace to the country's security'.[1] Woolsey's successor was John Deutch, and in 1997 Clinton appointed Lake as Deutch's successor. However, according to a prominent French military officer, the Senate, was to oppose Lake's appointment as CIA director, partly because of the Croatian pipeline.[2]

A second tendency in the autumn of 1994 was that Clinton came under increasing pressure from the prospective Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. Dole described the embargo as outrageous and indefensible.[3] It must not be forgotten that Dole had a former Croatian as political adviser, and that the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia almost automatically also meant lifting the same embargo against Croatia. Croatia would after all have to forward the arms in transit to Bosnia. For the Croatian government it was therefore absolutely unacceptable to lift the arms embargo for Bosnia only.[4] The American government had to do something to respond to this pressure, and on 28 October Albright submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council for lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. This was more of a political gesture, because the implication of accepting this resolution would be that UNPROFOR would have to withdraw from Bosnia,[5] which the Americans definitely did not want.

In November a law drafted by the Democratic senators Sam Nunn (Georgia) and George Mitchell (Maine) came into force banning the use of government funds for the support of, or assistance in enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia. This law was incorporated in the Defense Budget Authorization Bill. The consequence was that American vessels that took part in Operation Sharp Guard no longer 'diverted or delayed vessels that contained arms or other cargo for the purpose of enforcing the arms embargo' against Bosnia. This would also mean that the exchange of intelligence on arms supplies would be stopped.[6] This put the commander of the southern NATO command (CinCSouth), Admiral Leighton Smith, in a curious position relative to Force Commander Janvier and the new BHC Commander Rupert Smith,[7] and the overall efficiency of the operation consequently suffered.[8] Lake himself described this as an 'uneasy compromise with Congress'.[9]

Senator Dole also remained active on lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia; with this goal in mind he introduced Bill S.21 on 4 January 1995. According to Dole the bill also had an ulterior motive: '[A] decision to arm the Bosnians would reduce the potential influence and role of radical extremist states like Iran' in Bosnia. It was clear that Iran had meanwhile started to be an important political factor in Bosnia. On 7 June 1995 Dole stated:

'When those of us who advocate lifting the arms embargo point out that other countries would also participate in arming the Bosnians, we are told that this would allow Iran to arm the Bosnians. Well, the fact is that the arms embargo has guaranteed that Iran is a key supplier of arms to Bosnia and administration officials have actually used that fact to argue that there is no need to lift the arms embargo. From statements made by State Department officials to the press, one gets the impression that Iran is the Clinton Administration's preferred provider of weapons to the Bosnians. If the Administration has a problem with Iran arming Bosnia, it should be prepared to do something about it'.[10]

Dole therefore appears to have been aware of the Croatian pipeline, and of Iran's involvement in secretly providing Bosnia with arms. The fact that he was aware of the supply of arms was denied by the Republican party. On the other hand, Senator Lieberman (Connecticut) pointed out that Dole could not have failed to notice the article in the Washington Times of 24 June 1994 regarding the Iranian supplies; Dole said nothing then and he did not demand that Clinton do something.[11]

Clinton remained set against lifting the arms embargo, but openly stated that he was no longer prepared 'to enforce the arms ban'. Washington itself would supply no arms, but neither would it intervene if other countries were to do so.[12] Dole was not the only important politician who supported lifting the arms embargo. For example, in August 1995 he quoted from a letter from the former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, who said the following to Dole:

'I am writing to express my very strong support for your attempt to have the arms embargo against Bosnia lifted (...) The safe havens were never safe; now they are falling to Serb assault. Murder, ethnic cleansing, mass rape and torture are the legacy of the policy of the last three years to the people of Bosnia. It has failed utterly'.

With this attitude she was (not for the first time) publicly turning against the British Conservative government's national security policy.[13]

The Croatian pipeline after 1994

Meanwhile, arms flowed liberally through the Croatian pipeline. In early 1995, Iranian cargo aircraft landed in Zagreb three times a week. The CIA and the White House and State Department continued to have different opinions, this time regarding the scale of the military support via the Croatian pipeline: the CIA settled on 14,000 tons between May 1994 and December 1996. According to the State Department from May 1994 to January 1996 Iran delivered a total of 5000 tons of arms and ammunition via the Croatian pipeline to Bosnia. The clandestine Iranian arms supplies were to stop only in January 1996, after American ground forces were stationed in the region.[14]

Sarajevo would nevertheless have felt uncomfortable at the time. The fact is that the ABiH was completely dependent on Zagreb's cooperation. Croatia could stop or reduce the transit at any moment. The Bosnian government will also have been disturbed by Croatia's 'skimming' of the supplies that were destined for it. According to Lord Owen, the percentage of arms that Croatia confiscated was fifty per cent or more.[15] Turkey and Saudi Arabia possibly exerted pressure in the background to allow fewer arms to flow via the Iranian connection. These two countries had in the past already indicated that they were not happy with the situation. Izetbegovic appeared as a clever politician to be playing all parties off against each other, and so held the different movements (a Western oriented one and a more Islamic-fundamentalist one) within his political party in balance.[16]

For this reason, it was decided at the highest level to seek out opportunities for the ABiH to acquire arms and ammunition without the intervention of Zagreb. This meant direct supplies, but this was impossible via Sarajevo because the airfield was frequently under fire. Therefore Tuzla Air Base, in East Bosnia was decided upon.