Appendix II

Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 – 1995: The role of the intelligence and security services

3. Secret arms supplies to the ABiH: the Black Flights to Tuzla

At 17.45 on 10 February 1995, the Norwegian Captain Ivan Moldestad, a Norwegian helicopter detachment (NorAir) pilot, stood in the doorway of his temporary accommodation just outside Tuzla. It was dark, and suddenly he heard the sound of the propellers of an approaching transport aircraft; it was unmistakably a four engine Hercules C-130. Moldestad noticed that the Hercules was being escorted by two jet fighters, but could not tell their precise type in the darkness.

There were other sightings of this secretive night-time flight to Tuzla Air Base (TAB). A sentry who was on guard duty outside the Norwegian medical UN unit in Tuzla also heard and saw the lights of the Hercules and the accompanying jet fighters. Other UN observers, making use of night vision equipment, also saw the cargo aircraft and the fighter planes concerned. The reports were immediately forwarded to the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza and the UNPF Deny Flight Cell in Naples. When Moldestad phoned Vicenza, he was told that there was nothing in the air that night, and that he must be mistaken. When Moldestad persisted, the connection was broken.

The secretive C-130 cargo aircraft flights and night-time arms drops on Tuzla caused great agitation within UNPROFOR and the international community in February and March 1995. When asked, a British general responded with great certainty to the question of the origin of the secret supplies via TAB: 'They were American arms deliveries. No doubt about that. And American private companies were involved in these deliveries.'[1] This was no surprising answer, because this general had access to intelligence gathered by a unit of the British Special Air Services (SAS) in Tuzla. The aircraft had come within range of this unit's special night vision equipment, and the British saw them land.[2] It was a confirmation that a clandestine American operation had taken place in which arms, ammunition and military communication equipment were supplied to the ABiH. These night-time operations led to much consternation within the UN and NATO, and were the subject of countless speculations. The question is whether the British general was right in his allegation that these were American consignments, and who was involved in these supplies on the Bosnian side.

The Bosnian connection: the Cengic family

It would seem likely that Bosnian intelligence services played a role in such supplies. They were closely connected with the Cengic family, who were described by Western intelligence services as 'Mafia'. The family was based in Visoko.[3] It controlled this region entirely through its own militias. Before the war, the Cengic family already had connections in Europe and the Middle East, and owned countless companies in Turkey and Croatia. When the war broke out, the Cengic family proved capable of sidestepping the international embargo and of equipping the ABiH with arms and ammunition. Because of the logistical usefulness of the family Cengic, it was logical that a family member, Hasan Cengic, was involved in the arms supplies.

Hasan Cengic's family was devoutly Islamic. His father Halid was appointed in 1990 as an SDA member of the Foca town council, and after the outbreak of the hostilities he organized the defence of Foca. When the town fell in 1992, the Cengic family moved to Visoko and later to Zenica. Halid Cengic was the most important person responsible for ABiH logistics from Visoko.[4] All donations and the acquisition of arms and military technology ran via him. This made him one of the wealthiest Muslims. Halid Cengic also controlled the Bosnian intelligence service.

Of his two sons, the best known in intelligence circles was Hasan. The other son, Muhammed Cengic, had an important position within the SDA. As deputy prime minister he concluded a military collaboration agreement with Turkey in March 1992 under the pretence of assuring Bosnia of Turkish purchases from Bosnian arms manufacturers who were no longer able to supply to the Yugoslav army, the JNA.[5] It is reasonable to assume that the Turkish-Bosnian arms traffic in reality went in the opposite direction.

Hasan Cengic studied at the faculty of theology at Sarajevo university, and his studies meant that he spent some time in Teheran. Izetbegovic was his great example and mentor. After completing his studies, the friendship persisted. From 1977 the Yugoslav state security service kept an eye on him. In 1982, the Iranian consulate in Vienna organized an 'educational trip' to Teheran, in which Cengic participated. After his return from Iran he was convicted together with thirteen other Muslim intellectuals of 'activities directed against the state'; Izetbegovic was one of the other accused. From 1983 to 1986 he served his sentence in Zenica.

Cengic moved to Zagreb in 1989, where he worked as an Islamic cleric. He was also active outside the religious community and organized countless symposia and lectures. At the same time, he intensified the contacts with Izetbegovic. On the foundation of the SDA, Cengic fulfilled a main role in the area of organization, party rules and statutes. He also organized the party's financial affairs. In 1990, he became secretary of the SDA. After the outbreak of the hostilities that marked the start of the war, Cengic was instructed to organize Muslim combat units. He succeeded in collecting Muslim officers from the Yugoslav army, he organized a General Staff and was involved in founding the 'Patriotic League', which was later integrated into the territorial defence from which the ABiH was formed.

Cengic carried out his activities partly from Zagreb, where he collaborated with staff of the Croatian Ministry of Defence. From 1992, he worked for the Bosnian army, especially in the area of arms procurement. He was responsible for contacts with Iran and Islamic fundamentalist organizations, which contributed to the Bosnian war effort with arms, money and people. Because he worked from Zagreb, transactions could therefore only take place with the assent of the Croatian authorities.

Cengic was also closely involved in executing the agreement that Izetbegovic had concluded in October 1992 on a visit to Teheran, according to which Iran was to supply military goods via the Croatian pipeline.[6] In exchange for this, between twenty per cent and fifty per cent of the arms and equipment accrued to the Croats.

Slovenia was also involved in the arms trade; for instance, in the event of transport problems, goods could be stored temporarily at Maribor airport. This led on 21 March 1993 to the 'airport affair', when large quantities of arms and ammunition were discovered. After the outbreak of the hostilities between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, Cengic left Zagreb and sought refuge in Turkey, where he held the position of military attaché at the Bosnian embassy.[7] He remained in Ankara until early 1996, when he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence and acquired a large amount of influence over the ABiH and the military intelligence services. Cengic's appointment in January 1996 was intended to allow him (as one of the SDA confidants) to keep an eye on Vladimir Soljic (Croat and Minister of Defence). The Americans (and Croats) agitated against the lack of cooperation in the creation of a Federal Army and Cengic's contacts with Islamic countries. In protest, Washington refused to continue arms supplies and demanded his resignation.[8] He was dismissed on 6 November 1996 and was given another post.

Cengic was a personal confidant of Izetbegovic and had fairly radical views. For instance, he stated that a Muslim may never receive blood from a non-Muslim and that a Muslim may also never give blood for a non-Muslim. He was also said to have insisted on striking a deal between the Bosnian Muslims on the one hand and the Serbs and Bosnian Serbs on the other, and fighting out the war with the Croats. This was consistent with the prevailing view of the rulers in Teheran. It was in the joint interest of Islam and the orthodox faith to fight the Catholics together.

In September 1997, it was reported that Cengic had been involved since 1993 in building an airfield in Visoko, which was intended for arms supplies. He was said to have invested a total of $ 5 million in this project. According to British sources, this airfield was built by the Americans. It was situated in a valley to the northwest of Sarajevo. The runway was long enough to handle C-130s or larger transport aircraft. However, Visoko was within VRS artillery range. The airfield was managed in 1995 by Hasan’s father, Halid Cengic; many arms were said to have been brought via Visoko, and the flights would not be observed by NATO and UNPROFOR. This was because the arms flights would always arrive in Visoko when there were no NATO AWACS aircraft in the air, or only AWACS with a purely American crew.[9]

These assertions are incorrect, however. UNPROFOR certainly did report on flights to Visoko. For instance, in March 1995, Force Commander Janvier reported to Kofi Annan that Visoko was in use.[10] Bosnian intelligence officers, incidentally, dispute that Visoko was important for arms supplies; according to them, arms arrived via convoys from Croatia, and not via Visoko. The airfield was allegedly never finished and the meteorological conditions were said to be too poor; the reason for its existence was simply that the SDA wanted to build an airfield no matter what.[11]

Hasan Cengic also dominated the Bosnian military intelligence services, which were closely involved in the arms supplies. In 1995 there were two military intelligence and security services, the VOS and Vojna KOS. The Vojna KOS was the counterespionage service of the Ministry of Defence, which collaborated closely with the military police. In December 1996, the former Chief of Staff of the ABiH, Safet Halilovic, was head of the Vojna KOS. The Vojna Obavjestajna Sluzba (VOS) was the intelligence service of the ABiH. This was led by Brigadier Mustafa Hajrulahovic, alias Talijan (the Italian). He had worked for a long time for the pre war Yugoslav secret service, the KOS, and had been stationed in Italy. The most important task of the VOS in other countries was to arrange logistics for the ABiH. The service occupied itself with arms deals and raising funds. This was carried out via umbrella firms and Islamic humanitarian organizations. The Cengic family was involved in many of these logistics activities: for instance, the arms imports from Iran ran mainly via the Cengic family's logistics network. Iran supported the ABiH not only with arms, but also with advisers, though there were never very many of them. In addition, the ABiH obtained its arms via the VOS from Austria, Germany, Turkey, Argentina and Czechoslovakia.[12] British services also came into the possession of evidence that Iran supplied military equipment and arms directly to the ABiH. The supplies consisted of anti-tank weapons of the Red Arrow type (a Chinese variant of the Russian AT-3 Sagger) and detonators for artillery and mortar ammunition.[13]

An Islamic humanitarian organization that the Cengic family made much use of, was the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA). It was led by the Sudanese diplomat Elfatih Hassanein, and arms transactions were carried out, funds were collected, and intelligence gathered under its cover. It was said to have amounted to $ 350 million. TWRA had offices in Sarajevo, Budapest, Moscow and Istanbul. They had direct links with the Bosnian government: in October 1992, the Bosnian minister of foreign affairs, Haris Silajdzic, visited the First Austrian Bank in Vienna and issued a bank guarantee for Hassanein, and in 1993 Izetbegovic sent a letter to this bank to the effect that this Sudanese official had the complete confidence of his government.

Later, in 1994, incriminating material was found at the Third World Relief Agency office in Vienna during a police raid. Cengic was a member of the supervisory board of this organization, and was said to have used it in 1992 to smuggle arms from Sudan to Bosnia. The arms were collected in Khartoum and delivered to Maribor, Slovenia. Chartered helicopters from an American-Russian company continued the transport of the arms, with Croatian permission, to Tuzla and Zenica. The funds were also used to bribe Croatian officials after the conflict between Croatia and Bosnia had flared up again. Cengic also used the Slovenian company Smelt International to have 120 tons of arms and ammunition flown in from Libya using Slovenian cargo aircraft to Maribor in July 1993.[14] TWRA was used by the military intelligence service, not by the Bosnian intelligence service, AID, which used the Cenex company for arms transactions. The then Bosnian Minister of the Interior, Deli Mustafic, was involved in 1991 in smuggling Kalashnikovs and ammunition from Vienna to Sarajevo.[15]

Even UNPROFOR was covered by Cengic's network: his TWRA was also involved in smuggling light arms worth $ 15 million with the involvement of Turkish and Malaysian UNPROFOR troops.[16] Not only Turkish or Malaysian, but also other UNPROFOR detachments brought more arms than they needed for themselves. For example, soldiers from Bangladesh sold ammunition on a large scale to the ABiH, which was officially to have been used during exercises,[17] and the battalion from Malta ordered four thousand mortar-shells while they only had four mortars.[18] In other words: in spite of the international arms embargo, Bosnia was to receive arms through a variety of channels. The ABiH even bought arms and ammunition in Serbia. In November 1993, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) already reported the possibility that Arab donations were being used to purchase arms in Serbia. These arms transactions ignored the political differences in the Balkans. The Bosnian minister Muratovic, frankly admitted to the European negotiator, the Swede Carl Bildt, that the ABiH had crossed the Drina in the vicinity of Zepa to buy arms in Serbia. Bildt apparently responded with surprise, to which Muratovic answered: 'This is the Balkans. Things sometimes work rather differently.'[19] A former VRS officer confirmed that the ABiH in Zepa received many goods from Serbia for it was situated on the Drina. This took place both with convoys and by means of smuggling.[20]

The choice of Tuzla

Various European countries meanwhile became increasingly suspicious concerning the expanding arms supplies to Croatia and Bosnia. Little credence was attached to the assertions that Washington had nothing to do with them. There was a suspicion that one of the US intelligence services had received the green light to set up an operation for which assent was probably sought and obtained in from the Republicans.[21] Tuzla was chosen for the supplies to East Bosnia. This was logical. Dubrava airport had been in use as a Yugoslav Army military airfield until 18 May 1992. The airfield had better facilities than Sarajevo, it was at a lower altitude (237 metres) and climatologically it was a better location, which assured the pilots of better visibility during takeoff and landing.

Tuzla Air Base (TAB) was one of the largest airfields and the most important airfield in East Bosnia. It was said to have been used by the ABiH for covert operations with helicopters around Srebrenica.[22] Another reason for using Tuzla was probably that the transit of arms to the ABiH in East Bosnia, which were delivered via Croatia or to Visoko airfield, presented too many problems. TAB was leased by UNPROFOR from the Bosnian government on 7 March 1994. Akashi opened it on 22 March, but after 39 flights the airfield was closed again on 31 May 1994 because the VRS were unwilling to guarantee the safety of the aircraft.[23]

The UN controlled the largest runway (Tuzla Main) which was 2300 metres long and 8 km to the southeast of Tuzla, but exercised no control over the other three runways, which were not close to each other. The most important of them was without doubt the Tuzla Highway Strip, approximately 6 km to the south of Tuzla Main. This runway was approximately 1800 metres long. Tuzla East was approximately 1.5 km further to the east of the Highway Strip, and was a grass track approximately 1100 metres long. Finally, there was Tuzla West with a runway of approximately 2 km, but, to all appearances, this could not be used because there were large piles of earth on it. As it happens, an UNPROFOR worker stated that Tuzla West certainly could be used: according to him the piles of earth were removed after dark, so that small aircraft could land and the arms could be transported further.[24] The advantage of using the three runways other than Tuzla Main was that they were out of sight of the VRS, and also outside VRS artillery range.[25]

The equipment that was delivered in Tuzla consisted mainly of quick-firing weapons, ammunition, uniforms, helmets, new anti-tank weapons and Stingers. The archive of the 281st ABiH Brigade in Zepa reveals that much military equipment was delivered from Tuzla by helicopter for Zepa, largely to be forwarded in transit from there to Srebrenica. The ABiH commander of Zepa reported, for example, that on 14 February 1995, a few days after the first observations of the Black Flights, forty machine guns were transported by air, some of which were to be brought to Srebrenica. The VRS did fire on the helicopter, but without result. At the same time, the flight delivered DM 308,000. The commander of Zepa did not know what he was supposed to do with this money, but he assumed that it was destined for the 28th Division in Srebrenica.

Two days later, on 16 February, an ABiH helicopter was hit by VRS anti-aircraft fire.[26] The increasing number of helicopter flights with military equipment not only to Zepa, but also directly to Srebrenica, led to an order from the Drina Corps to various VRS units to shoot down these aircraft.[27] In mid April, the ABiH commander of Zepa gave a summary of what he had received by air and what had been forwarded in transit to Srebrenica. Zepa had received the following items: 23,500 7.62 mm calibre cartridges, 15 mines (82 mm), 25 mines (60 mm), 4 TF-8 rockets, 34 B.R. M-93 machine guns and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8 rocket. The total forwarded in transit to Srebrenica was 50,000 7.62 mm calibre cartridges, 35 mines (82 mm), 75 mines (60 mm), 90 B.R. M-93 machine guns, 123 uniforms and 124 pairs of shoes. A computer and a printer were also delivered to Srebrenica.[28]

Evidence of flights to Tuzla Air Base

Nothing was done with Moldestad's report on 10 February 1995 that he had heard a Hercules C-130 on Tuzla Air Base. The Norwegian logistics battalion (known as NorLogBat), 4 kilometres from Tuzla West, also reported observing three unidentified aircraft: one cargo aircraft and two jet fighters. The cargo aircraft was described as a four-engine Hercules; the two fighters each flew close to either of the wing tips of the C-130 and left the area immediately after the Hercules has started the final approach. This was a familiar flying trick, because it created the impression on the radar screen that only one aircraft was in the air. Independently of this, Norwegian medical personnel (of NorMedCoy) reported seeing the same C-130. Shortly afterwards, observers heard how the jet fighters skimmed over Tuzla. At 18.45 hours a report arrived that all the aircraft had left again. These events were repeated on 12 February.[29] After these observations, the Norwegian commander drafted an official report (Vakrapport), which summarized all the reports of NorLogBat and NorMedCoy, including the observations of 10 and 12 February. The NorMedCoy observer was extremely emphatic: he had seen the Hercules.[30]

Not only did the Norwegians draft a report, but the headquarters of Sector North East also immediately sent a report to Bosnia-Hercegovina Command in Sarajevo. The author was Lieutenant Colonel C.A. Le Hardy. It started with: 'this is a sensitive report.' The report set out the events: immediately after the first reports, a patrol was sent to investigate. It arrived on the spot one and a half hours later. This patrol was fired on near the Tuzla Highway Strip, and then surrounded by thirty ABiH soldiers. The patrol saw five trucks near a few old hangars,[31] but were forced to leave without being able to observe an aircraft or inspect any possible military cargo. There was nothing strange about the fact that the patrol did not see a Hercules: the aircraft left again within barely one hour at 18.45 hours, while the patrol only arrived at 19.30 hours. The ABiH had sufficient time to hide, camouflage, or remove in trucks the delivered arms and military goods.

In fact, the Hercules would not actually have had to land: according to Le Hardy, it was possible that a 'para-extraction delivery method' was used, which is a way of performing 'low-altitude extraction of cargo airdrops'. In this method, 'kickers' at the ends of the cargo holds push the load out of the aircraft at extremely low altitude. Le Hardy was otherwise unable to confirm this. Tuzla Main was certainly not used in this operation.[32] Le Hardy considered the risks attached to the operation to be relatively high, and therefore the value of the load was probably considerable. There was a suspicion that what was delivered was not so much heavy arms but rather communication equipment.[33] Heavy arms may well have been urgently needed, but this risk, in view of the limited quantity that a Hercules was able to transport, would not have been justified. Furthermore Le Hardy pointed out that Moldestad's and the Norwegian sentry's statements were made in quick succession, so that there could be no question that they were both mistaken.

The Norwegian sentry, Lieutenant Saeterdal, was an observer with a great deal of experience, which he had gained with UNIFIL in Lebanon.[34] The staff temporarily attached to the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force in Tuzla were unaware of any flight, and they were 'as mystified as the rest of us. There is apparently a high level of consternation at the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force because of this incident', according to Le Hardy. According to him, it was still possible that an aircraft had landed on the Tuzla Highway Strip, without being noticed by nearby OPs, but it was deemed impossible for a Hercules to leave without the OPs noticing. The noise produced by the jet fighters could well have drowned out that of the C-130.[35]

This assessment was adopted by the French Force Commander, General De Lapresle. He reported to Annan that on both 10 and 12 February, a Hercules, escorted by two fighter aircraft, had made a landing. De Lapresle had NATO aircraft sent to Tuzla, which were able to find nothing above Tuzla, however, but then they did arrive three hours later. According to De Lapresle, their departure was repeatedly postponed, but in principle the aircraft could have been flying above Tuzla within 10 to 30 minutes. De Lapresle's conclusion was very plain: according to him it involved 'two clandestine resupplies' probably with 'high value/high technology such as new generation anti-tank guided missiles or perhaps surface-to-air-missiles'. Because, however, two deliveries would have been insufficient, from a military point of view, substantially to strengthen the ABiH, the French general expected more supplies by secret flights to be on the cards.[36]

On 16 February, another C-130 was observed, and in the following days two more. A British daily newspaper even made a connection with a visit by Holbrooke to Turkey in mid February.[37] This was not the end of the matter, because a further four flights were observed, where one aircraft was seen by a British UNMO using night vision binoculars.[38] On 17 and 19 February, UN personnel made sixteen reports of helicopters that landed on Tuzla Air Base. Yet another cargo aircraft was said to have landed, or to have ejected its load at low altitude. Norwegian UNPROFOR patrols were consistently hindered by the ABiH. They did observe a few days later that the ABiH were wearing new American-manufactured uniforms.[39] UNPROFOR soldiers established that a convoy of approximately 75 trucks left the airfield in the evening.

Furthermore UNPROFOR observers saw how on 17 February, late in the evening, the head of the Bosnian Air Force suddenly showed up at Tuzla Air Base. No explanation was forthcoming from the Bosnian side. NATO deployed aircraft on that day, but they lost radar contact.[40] It was still remarkable that the Black Flights were able to enter Bosnian air space and not be detected by the NATO AWACS over the Adriatic Sea. Le Hardy paid no attention to this: according to his report, no AWACS aircraft of NATO member states other than the United States were flying on that night. According to him there were two possible explanations: 'Either the mission was carried out by powers capable of neutralizing the radar surveillance or it was made with the consent and support of the authorities commanding the assets in the area at the time.'[41] The clandestine flights almost always seem to have taken place on nights either when no AWACS were in the air, or AWACS aircraft with US crews. On the night in question, there were only US aircraft (Grumman E-2c Hawkeye Radar and F/A-18C Hornets), which have a much smaller radar range. This allowed the Black Flights to fly to Tuzla unhindered. 'It is like Nelson putting the telescope to his blind eye and saying: "I see no ships"', according to a British researcher.[42]

On Friday 13 February, the daily overview report of UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo stated that there was 'continued evidence of [A]BiH arms re-supply activity'. Since early January 1995, the convoys from Croatia with arms and ammunition had increased considerably, and in other parts of Bosnia the same observations were made.[43] In the spring, Dutchbat would also establish that the ABiH received new arms from Tuzla and that training was being stepped up.[44] This news spread rapidly, and in due course this could only have negative consequences for the clandestine arms supplies to the ABiH. The American pressure on Le Hardy was apparently increased, because he 'became involved in an acrimonious exchange with Americans on this subject'.[45] Under apparent American pressure (see below in this chapter) he produced a second report on 18 February in which he stated that his earlier report was incorrect and he made recommendations for achieving more accurate reporting from then on. According to him, no one had seen the aircraft - which was not true - but only heard it. He also made a number of suggestions so that the Norwegians could report better.[46] This second report is remarkable: on the one hand Le Hardy states that all alleged observations of the Hercules were wrong, but at the same time he makes a wide variety of recommendations, including stationing a Danish tank on Tuzla Air Base, to control the Highway Strip and to occupy more favourable positions, to improve the chance of actual 'hard' observations.

On the question regarding Black Flights, the commander of the Norwegian battalion, Colonel G. Arlefalk, stated that his soldiers sometimes reported six to eight aircraft to him, approaching from the direction of Brcko. The aircraft flew low and mostly without lights. One night, Arlefalk himself saw a Hercules approximately at 100 metres above his head at 03.00 hours. Arlefalk himself had flown in a C-130 on several occasions, and its sound and silhouette were unmistakable according to him. A temporary observation post was set up to gain a better view of these flights. In response to one of his reports, he was told that they had been AWACS, and moreover that they had been much further to the east: 'all the soldiers...