
Appendix II
Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 –
1995: The role of the intelligence and security services
Chapter 4
Secret arms supplies and
other covert actions
... follows: 'Who else has the skill and
expertise to carry out such a swift, delicate mission covertly? The Saudis? The
Turks? The Iranians?' The specialized crews and the types of aircraft for these
night-time operations indeed appeared to point in only one direction: that of
the United States.
Nonetheless, it is improbable that US
aircraft were involved, but this does then raise the question of who had
organized the operation. Woolsey was willing to have the CIA to carry out such a
secret operation; his service had relevant experience. Woolsey stated, however,
with great certainty: 'The CIA did not move weapons to Bosnia. We were perfectly
willing to do that. We had enough experience in this field, but the policy level
did not want the CIA to do that.' Woolsey's offer was therefore rejected, also because Lake (again)
feared leaks and Christopher was afraid here too of angry reactions from London
and Paris which could lead to UNPROFOR's departure. NATO Secretary-General Claes
had warned Clinton of this. Lake also considered this a covert operation; another reason for it
not to be allowed to go ahead was that Congress would have to be
informed. The strategy via third party countries was then opted for. This
indeed seems to be the course that was followed.
Turkey flies to Tuzla
There are other indications that the CIA
was not involved in the Black Flights to Tuzla. Like the attitude of the CIA
station chief in Zagreb, who gave a negative recommendation regarding
Galbraith's plans for the Croatian pipeline and the later negative
recommendations of the CIA on the clandestine supply of arms to the Croats and
Muslims as Holbrooke had wanted. Much points in the direction that this was an operation by a third
party country, with the assent of parts of the US government. Another indication
that US services were not directly involved, was Holbrooke's evidence to Senate:
'US intelligence agencies were not involved.' This is correct if it refers to an
operation that was sanctioned 'remotely'. Leighton Smith's promise to Janvier
and Akashi that he would resign if it were to appear that uniformed military
personnel were involved in the Black Flights, is also consistent with this
picture. A prominent White House adviser confirmed that the United States did
not wish to violate the arms embargo. It would undermine the authority of
Security Council resolutions, however much the Americans were uncomfortable with
this embargo. If the Americans themselves were to violate the embargo, then the
imposition of an embargo elsewhere would be made impossible.
Washington definitely did play a role
in the background, however. The attempts at a cover-up after the first
observations of the flights to Tuzla point to this involvement. Why otherwise
would the Norwegian key person be physically threatened, would several witnesses
not be heard, the reported facts be distorted, journalists put under pressure,
and attempts made to hold back De Lapresle's report? The fact that the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNPROFOR ultimately agreed and let the
matter rest, probably has more to do with the wish no longer to disturb the
relations between Washington and the UN and NATO; after all, the 'lift and
strike' debate had already caused a considerable deterioration in transatlantic
relations.
A number of countries are candidates
for having supplied directly to Bosnia. Pakistan delivered equipment, as did the
Sultan of Brunei, who paid for anti-tank missiles from Malaysia. In January 1993
already, a Pakistani vessel with ten containers of arms, which were destined for
the ABiH, was intercepted in the Adriatic Sea. Pakistan definitely defied the United Nations ban on supply of arms
to the Bosnian Muslims and sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles were air
lifted by the Pakistani intelligence agency, ISI, to help Bosnians fight the
Serbs, an ex-ISI Chief has officially admitted in a written petition submitted
before a court in Lahore. The document was submitted by Lt. General (Retd) Javed
Nasir, who was head of the ISI from March 1992 to May 1993, in a case he filed
against the owner and editors of the largest newspaper and TV group of Pakistan,
in an anti Terrorism Court. It remains unclear how the missiles were transported to Bosnia and
who did it.
Furthermore, tons of diplomatic post
regularly arrived by air in Sarajevo from Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. Doubts
were raised about the diplomatic immunity of the content of the load. A foundation that was affiliated to the Saudi royal family also
provided millions of dollars in arms assistance. Moreover, Malaysia attempted to sidestep the embargo via merchant
shipping and the Malaysian UNPROFOR soldiers that were stationed in
Bosnia. All of these were direct supplies to Bosnia, because the Bosnian
government was dissatisfied with the Croatian authorities’ practice of skimming
the arms supplies, or because the government did not want to become entirely
dependent on Zagreb. This could be avoided by direct flights from certain
countries.
In addition to Iran (via Croatia),
Turkey proved to be the most important supplier of arms to the ABiH. Turkey had
been closely involved in the secret arms supplies to Bosnia for some time. As
early as 1992 Iran had opened a smuggling route to Bosnia with the assistance of
Turkey; this was two years before the Clinton administration gave 'permission'
for creating the Croatian pipeline. Bosnian government officials acknowledged
that in 1993 a Turkish pipeline also existed, through which the above-mentioned
arms from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei and Pakistan were smuggled. Other
consignments came from Belgium, Hungary, Uganda and Argentina. In Argentina a
scandal erupted because President Menem had issued a decree for the delivery of
8000 FN-Fals (automatic rifles), 155 mm guns, 2000 pistols, 211,000 hand
grenades, 3000 rockets, 30,000 grenades, 3000 landmines and millions of rounds
of ammunition to Bolivia. This country stated, however, that it had ordered
nothing and the Argentine parliament discovered that the arms and ammunition
were destined for Croatia and elsewhere.
At the beginning of 1993, the name of
Turkey was again dropped as direct supplier. The Bosnian Vice-President Ganic had an interview in mid February
with the Turkish President Özal, but denied that he had promised him an aircraft
full of arms. Ganic did admit to receiving arms in a different manner. During a visit to Sarajevo of the later Prime Minister of Turkey,
Tansu Ciller, and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, both ladies
publicly called for a lifting of the arms embargo. In the summer and autumn of 1994, the CIA reported that spy
satellites had taken photos of Iranian aircraft on Turkish airfields. Two days
later, satellite photos were taken of the same aircraft in Zagreb or at other
airports in Croatia, where the arms were unloaded.
According to O'Shea, Turkey's
involvement was clear. Specially modified C-130s from American bases in the
United Kingdom and Germany would pick up their cargo on remote runways in the
Turkish part of Cyprus. The cargo, which consisted of arms and ammunition, would
have been delivered there by Iranian and Turkish aircraft. The aircraft would
fly to Croatia via the Adriatic, and then on to Bosnia. If the Hercules, with
its modest range, could not achieve its objective in one hop, it could always
make a stopover on the Croatian island of Brac, close to the coast near Split.
The population there indeed often observed C-130 aircraft that operated from
this airfield. From this island the CIA also operated its UAVs flying over
Bosnia. The Croatian Minister of Defence, Susak, claimed that most of the
aircraft that landed there came from Turkey and not Iran. Also quite some military goods were delivered to the Pula airport on
the Istrian peninsula.
The Turkish government therefore
provided full cooperation to the Croatian pipeline. There was more: the Turks
also flew directly to Tuzla with C-130s. This allegedly happened after the Chief
of Staff of the ABiH 2nd Corps was sent to Ankara as an additional military
attaché. UNPROFOR officers assumed that Turkish aircraft flew in from Cyprus,
with American military authorities acting as intermediary. French military officials likewise asserted that Turkey was
responsible for the flights. NATO officers stated in a British daily newspaper
that if the American intelligence services used a cover, 'Turkey would be the
obvious choice'. The Turkish air force had C-130s that could reach Tuzla. This
was otherwise also true of the Iranian and Pakistani air forces, which were also
mentioned as possible third-party countries for supplies via Turkey to
Tuzla.
The UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)
was also aware of the American secret arms supplies to the ABiH. According to a
British intelligence official, the DIS never made an issue of them, so as not to
further damage the sensitive relationship with the US services. An internal DIS
analysis concluded that the arms were delivered via 'a different network', and
that the entire operation was probably led by the NSC. It was stressed that the
CIA and DIA were not involved in the Black Flights to Tuzla. Incidentally, the
DIS received a direct order from the British government not to investigate this
affair. This was not permitted for the simple reason that the matter was too
sensitive in the framework of American-British relations. The DIS also obtained
intelligence on the secret supplies to the ABiH from the German military
intelligence service and the Bundesnachrichtendienst, because some of
the flights departed from Frankfurt. However, no American-German alliance
existed in the matter of clandestine support to the ABiH.
Cengic had set up the entire operation.
The Cengic family owned numerous companies in Turkey, and during the war Cengic
worked in Ankara as a military attaché, and would reach an agreement there with
the Turkish government on secret arms supplies. They were to take place in Tuzla
with the involvement of the Special Branch of the Turkish General Staff. This
unit had also been responsible for covert operations in the past. The Pentagon had likewise identified Cengic as the main link between
the supplies from Islamic countries, such as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Even the Dutch national security service BVD observed that Turkish
aircraft repeatedly dropped arms over areas that were under ABiH control. The
service described the Turkish action as a 'solo performance'. MIS/Navy reports also mention the involvement of Turkish aircraft;
it was observed that Turkey was in a position to fly with C-130s to Tuzla
directly or via third party countries. The conclusion must be that the United States 'turned a blind eye'
to the Croatian pipeline, but in the case of the Black Flights to Tuzla Air
Base, they deliberately closed their 'eyes' (of the AWAC aircraft) for the
direct Turkish flights. US aircraft did not themselves fly to Tuzla, because
their discovery would have seriously embarrassed the US government and put
transatlantic relations under even greater pressure. Supplies via a third party
country were a simpler solution for the United States.
