
Appendix II
Intelligence and the war in Bosnia 1992 –
1995: The role of the intelligence and security services
Chapter 4
Secret arms supplies and
other covert actions
4. Military assistance to the Bosnian
Serbs
The clandestine arms supplies to the ABiH
were not the only thing to stir up feelings: so too did the supplies to the
Bosnian Serbs. According to some sources, Russian intelligence services even had
a secret arms agreement with the Bosnian Serbs. Throughout the entire war, accusations were made that Serbia
supplied arms and ammunition on a large scale to the VRS. For example, an
article in the New York Times
asserted that hundreds of Serbian helicopter flights had been recorded over
northeast Bosnia. An anonymous UNPROFOR officer stated: 'We have not seen
anything on this scale before and doubt that the Bosnian Serbs could organize
this number of helicopter flights without the active involvement of the Yugoslav
Army.' To Annan's irritation, this article, 'which runs counter to every
element of analysis provided to us by yourselves', led directly to a request
from the non-aligned countries for a debate in the Security Council. Annan
requested Akashi to report all messages about helicopter flights directly.
Akashi had already informed Annan that cross border flights were probably not
involved, and that the number of flights observed from the ground was
exaggerated.
It was evident that the border between
Serbia and Srpska was used regularly for the clandestine supply of arms and oil.
A special organ was even created for its supervision: the ICFY Monitoring
Mission, a product of the Yugoslavia Conference, which was established on 17
September 1994. The Finnish General Tauno Nieminen was the head of the mission
from 13 January to 14 December 1995. He maintained regular contact with
UNPROFOR, but worked mainly for the ICFY. There were divergent opinions on the
Serbian supplies to the VRS. In a comprehensive report, the Bosnian government
complained about the Serbian support to the VRS. From August 1994 to July 1995,
Serbia and Montenegro are alleged to have supplied to the Bosnian Serbs a total
of 512 tanks, 506 APCs, 120 howitzers, 130 other artillery pieces, 6 MIG 29s,
SU-25 and SU-27 aircraft and more than 20 helicopters. These were formidable
quantities, enough to equip an entire army. For this reason alone, these Bosnian
quantities were implausible. According to Nieminen, these data were incorrect,
and the checks at this border were watertight. He pointed out that the checking
was not random, but that every car was inspected and completely investigated.
Observers were even authorized to have cars or trucks dismantled.
According to staff of a European
intelligence service, the sanctions did not work on the Drina, however. For
example, the observers had instructions to withdraw immediately in the event of
danger. The Serbs usually fired a series of salvos in the air as darkness fell
to frighten the observers, who then withdrew rapidly. On the basis of reliable
intelligence data, this service came to the conclusion that military equipment
was often transferred at night from Serbia to Srpska, usually consisting of 2
tanks (T-54), 2 APCs, 2 trucks with artillery, 2 buses with soldiers of the
Yugoslav army and 2 trucks with fuel.
This
was the normal pattern of Serbian support to the VRS; they also considered the
sanction committee to be a political mission. It was confirmed from the side of
the VRS that much fuel had been supplied from Bulgaria and Romania to Serbia,
which was forwarded in transit to the VRS. Train wagons crossed the border, and
fuel also arrived on the Danube. The observers were repeatedly put on the spot
by a skipper who would say that he was going to sail on, or otherwise dump the
oil in the Danube. However, General Nieminen persisted
in claiming to the NIOD that reports of deliveries of tanks, APCs and trucks
over the Drina had no basis in truth. If Milosevic supported the VRS on a large
scale, then the question remains as to how this happened. Milosevic ran enormous
political risks in doing so. What is clear is that support was provided from
Serbia in the form of soldiers, technical recommendations, integrated air
defence and financial assistance, but therefore not in the form of large-scale
military equipment.
A senior White House adviser confirmed
this. He had never seen convincing evidence that arms had been delivered to the
Bosnian Serbs via the Drina. The road via Croatia, however, was open for this
purpose. He called the embargo 'fairly effective' but admitted that there were
leaks. According to this source, intelligence on the violations was all Sigint,
but it was not permitted to share this information with foreign intelligence
services. What particularly stung the senior official was that Washington had
failed in bringing about a financial embargo, because central banks in the EU,
such as the Bank of England and the Bundesbank did not cooperate. The
Security Council resolutions did not take this into account, and the banks hid
behind national legislation. The particular culprit here was the Austrian
central bank. According to this official, no progress was booked on this point
against 'Serbia Incorporated'. Milosevic was able to launder his money via
Cyprus. Money was also laundered in Moscow, which was made easier by the state
of the Russian banking system. Otherwise, according to this official, the war
could have finished earlier, because then Milosevic would no longer have been
able to pay the VRS officers.
According to Sarajevo, in addition to
arms and ammunition, other items were supplied to the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian
government claimed that 8700 tons of fuel were supplied. According to Nieminen, Serbia supplied the oil mainly via the
Krajina, and there was a back door via Croatia because of the relationship
between Tudjman and Milosevic. The problem was that the mandate of his mission
did not extend to Croatia. What was supplied from this region via the Krajina to
the VRS therefore fell outside his field of view.
There were rumours about pipelines
across the Drina that provided the Bosnian Serbs with oil, but Nieminen stated
that he knew for certain that they had never existed. His mission had foot and
vehicle patrols in operation 24 hours a day along the banks of the Drina: they
would at least have seen their tracks or trucks. The same applied to all the
claims about pontoon bridges. In an official report, the Bosnian government
actually claimed that 25 secret military pontoon bridges were being used. Half
of them were between Bijeljina and Zvornik. In one of the weekly overviews, Nieminen did report on such a
Serbian pontoon bridge. According to the Yugoslav Army liaison officer, it was
built in this sector to deal with refugees in case of a possible ABiH
offensive. Sometimes oil would be taken across in small boats or with a number
of barrels at once. Trucks also drove to and fro with full diesel tanks between
Serbia and Srpska.
The question then remains as to how the
Yugoslav Army, the Vojska Jugoslavija
(VJ), supported the VRS. According to an European intelligence service, the VJ
was active in East-Bosnia. This service gathered intelligence that proved that
many parents in Serbia were complaining that their sons had to go to Bosnia. The
obituaries in Serbian newspapers were scrutinized, only to reveal that soldiers
had perished in Bosnia. Conscripts were sent over the border in groups by bus.
They consisted mostly of approximately fifty soldiers without equipment, who had
probably exercised in Serbia. Furthermore, Serbian staff officers worked in
Pale, VRS officers were trained in Serbia and the VRS were paid their salaries
via Belgrade. Much logistics support was also given to the VRS. Repairs and
spare parts were provided by the VJ, and the VRS equipment was kept up-to-date
by Serbia. The transportation of tanks and APCs was coordinated by the
VJ.
According to Nieminen, it must not be
forgotten that before the arrival of the observers, Milosevic had had all the
time he needed to supply as much as possible. His opposite number in Serbia, Kertis, was the greatest smuggler,
according to sources within Western intelligence services. He was instructed by Milosevic to keep Nieminen's mission happy.
Whatever Kertis said happened, the objective of which was 'to keep us happy so
that nobody would blame Milosevic', according to Nieminen. Violating the embargo actually meant that the sanctions against
Serbia would be intensified again.
The mission of Nieminen would run into
trouble in late May 1995. There were air strikes on Pale on 25 May 1995 and
hostages were taken in reprisal. On 29 May, the American embassy reported that
information had been obtained about a direct threat to the American observers.
This resulted in all US and ten Canadian observers immediately being withdrawn.
The majority of the observers came from MPRI and the others were from the State
Department. According to an intelligence officer, after much urging Nieminen,
who in the first instance disagreed with the withdrawal, was finally shown
reliable intelligence that proved that they actually were in danger. The CIA was
said to have shown the Finnish General reports that made clear that the US
service had a source or sources close to Mladic or Karadzic. They also showed
him intercepted message traffic. In Pale the decision had already been made to
take American observers hostage and to abduct them over the Serbian border to
Srpska; after that the Finnish General agreed with the withdrawal of the
observers.
The original plan was that the mission
would comprise 250 observers. This was never achieved, however, and the maximum
staffing was 210, from September to October 1994. Nieminen's mission had total
freedom of movement along the border with Serbia. The ICFY mission did not
occupy all border crossings; many of them were not monitored or were monitored
by hired-in Serbian personnel. The mission itself was said to have admitted that
71 potential border crossings on the Drina were not under their control. The
Bosnian government then concluded that the mission was not in a position to
exercise effective control. This would have required 1760 static observers, 310
mobile observers, 100 interpreters and 80 administrative staff. Furthermore,
according to the Bosnian government, the mission would have to have 2
helicopters, 214 vehicles and a radar detection system for tracking low flying
aircraft.
In May 1995 the number declined
sharply; when the American and Canadian observers had been withdrawn, Nieminen
had 151 observers left. Of the 18 Border Control Points, four were closed. There
were then observers from 18 countries: mainly from the EU, Norway, Russia, and
Czechoslovakia. They were professional customs personnel, who operated in every
sector. Other countries sent additional personnel, and in July 1995 the
mission again had 185 observers who manned 19 border crossings 24 hours a day.
It appears from their comprehensive reports that smuggling attempts were
occasionally made over the border between Serbia and Srpska via the
Drina, but no large smuggling operations were recorded. Three days before
the attack on Srebrenica observers even noted that on two occasions buses with
men of compulsory service age were held up at the border by Serbian militias,
and were not allowed to enter the Republika Srpska.
Nieminen constantly complained about
the lack of cooperation of the US intelligence community. They regularly took
aerial photographs above the Republika Srpska, but when Nieminen asked for them,
he was not given them. A White House adviser confirmed that this intelligence
was not shared, and was kept for the Americans themselves. Nieminen only received intelligence piecemeal, sometimes in the form
of intercepts, but the question was whether it was always reliable. The Bosnian
services also intercepted communication traffic, which showed evidence of
Serbian involvement. The intermediary concerned was Mirko Krajisnik, the brother of the
chairman of the Bosnian-Serb parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik. The intercepts
revealed that the Serbian Minister of the Interior and head of the Domestic
Security service, Jovica Stanisic, were involved in clandestine supplies of arms
and fuel.
The French and British intelligence
services did give information to Nieminen 'to balance US intelligence reports',
and the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)
contributed observers only in the autumn of 1995, who had an anti-Serbian
attitude, however. Nieminen also had to take disinformation into account; the
German embassy in Belgrade occasionally produced reports of suspect reliability.
For instance, the embassy reported on 16 March 1995, probably on the authority
of the BND, that a temporary bridge had been built over the Drina between Serbia
and Srpska at Jagostica, which was used to transport equipment to the VRS. Four
border crossings were also mentioned across which goods were smuggled to the
VRS. The messages immediately raised doubts; the bridge would actually have been
in the Zepa pocket and the smuggling of military goods destined for the VRS via
a Muslim area was unlikely. The British Army sent an SAS patrol to inspect the
alleged bridge. The surroundings turned out to resemble a Norwegian fjord, with
a steep rock wall more than 200 metres high. The German information was
therefore incorrect, and the account of the smuggling via four border posts also
proved to be incorrect because all posts were monitored 24 hours a day by UN
observers. The information of the Bosnian Muslims was likewise not always to be
trusted. Sometimes Nieminen received intercepts, but account was always taken of
the possibility of disinformation. In that period, as mentioned, many Bosnian
reports were sent to the UN of large quantities of tanks and trucks that crossed
the Drina.
The American observers in his team were
often frustrated by the response from Washington, which only complained there
that their reports were incorrect. Contradictory reports came from Washington,
but they also often appeared to contain incorrect information. Although one of
Nieminen's closest colleagues was a State Department official, the Americans
remained reluctant to share their intelligence openly. Therefore the mission was constantly confronted with disinformation
about sundry tanks that crossed the Drina. A member of the mission gave as an
example the attack on Zepa, in which American and German services claimed that
tanks had been moved across the Drina. It turned out later that the two services
used different aerial photographs, where the German photo was not of the Drina
but of a completely different river.
The relationship with the US services
improved later. The mission then received intelligence from the CIA on trucks
that were moving to and fro between Serbia and Srpska. This service was able to
say precisely which trucks were involved, the nature of the cargo, and the time
and the place that they would cross. However, it was only in the autumn of 1995
that the mission received this intelligence rapidly and in good time; by which time American ground forces had arrived.
A 'very hot potato' were the helicopter
flights from Serbia to Srpska. The following mysterious episode may serve as an
illustration. On 7 February 1995, Nieminen was phoned by UN negotiator
Stoltenberg. Fifteen to twenty helicopter flights were said to have passed the
border, and to have landed somewhere near Srebrenica. These helicopters came
from Serbia. The US intelligence community had probably informed Stoltenberg of
this. Nieminen then drafted a special report for the Security Council. On
8 February came the Serbian denial that there had been any flights; on 22
February, Nieminen had a talk with Milosevic on the helicopter flights, which he
also denied. On 2 March, UNPROFOR reported again that between 21 and 27 February
nineteen helicopters had flown from Serbia to Bosnia. Nieminen demanded
immediate clarification, but the VJ claimed that it knew nothing. A new report was made on 27 March: this time it involved 27
helicopters, which flew at an extremely high altitude from Serbia to VRS
territory. On the way back, the helicopters probably deliberately flew very low,
so as to avoid the radar systems; Nieminen was told that the AWACS had problems
tracking helicopters.
Nieminen had earlier ordered a
large-scale investigation. On 28 March 1995, Lieutenant Colonel R. Gudmundsson
presented his findings to Nieminen. Between October 1994 and March 1995,
observers from the Belgrade airfield, Surcin, had recorded a total of 73 cross
border helicopter flights. Radar tracks from various radar posts confirm this.
All posts were linked with the two most important air traffic control centres:
one in Zagreb and one in Belgrade. Four radars were available in Surcin, but
they did not have a wide range. They were too far from the border between Bosnia
and Serbia to be able to track low flying aircraft.
The radar tracks came exclusively from
a radar post that was situated approximately 90 kilometres from the border with
Bosnia. The 79 violations were distributed as follows: there were 6 violations
of the No Fly Zone in Bosnia. This also included ABiH flights. There were 13 violations involving flights from Serbia to Bosnia.
The remaining 60 violations were helicopter flights from Bosnia to Serbia. In
March 1995, in other words shortly after the Black Flights to Tuzla, a total of
30 violations were observed. These included 26 helicopter flights from Bosnia to
Serbia and 4 violations of the No Fly Zone in Bosnia. The track headings were
mainly in the direction of Belgrade.
Gudmundsson also had an opinion on what
the helicopters were transporting from Bosnia to Belgrade as opposed to the
other way around. According to him, the helicopters were transporting valuable
goods on their return journey, and flying back unobserved from Serbia was no
great problem, because look-out posts on the airfields and at the borders could
be used to check if UNPROFOR or ICFY mission observers were in the vicinity.
Gudmundsson observed further that these flights sometimes took place after one
or two days of heavy fighting in Bosnia. They were apparently not medical
flights, because they were permissible, and these flights were
unannounced.
Gudmundsson determined that in two cases a NATO
jet fighter had been close to a helicopter, but that no action was taken.
Neither were the helicopters ever intercepted, but the question was whether an
AWACS was able to detect these low and slow flying helicopters; according to
Gudmundsson it was possible, but 'the findings are normally filtered out by the
computer system'. He had noticed something else remarkable: not a single
violation was seen simultaneously by both the Belgrade airfield Surcin and by
UNPROFOR or ICFY. This could mean that only helicopter flights at high altitude
were seen by Surcin, but if that was the case, the Serbian air defence alarm
would have sounded after observation, which never happened. This could indicate
that the air defence was aware of the origin of these helicopters; perhaps the
helicopters were equipped with a transponder that operated on a certain military
frequency, to simplify coordination with the Serbian anti-aircraft
defence.
Gudmundsson concluded that if a
helicopter had been 'seen', it would also have to return, so that the total
number of violations would have to be doubled. All in all, the air border
between Serbia and Bosnia was not closed, and if the aircraft flew back from
Serbia to Bosnia they would be able to transport important cargo. 'The amount of
suspected helicopters turning back to Bosnia have capacity of carrying
substantial operational, logistic and personnel support to local authorities or
commanders. On 30 March, Owen was briefed on Gudmundsson's findings. It remained
unclear who carried out the flights, with what goal, and what the helicopters
had transported. An attached map did indicate that there were many fights near
Srebrenica. Serbia responded with irritation to the conclusions of this
report.
On 11 April, Nieminen had another talk
with Milosevic, the basis for which was an UNPROFOR report with evidence that
between 2 and 7 April 1995, 25 helicopters had flown from Serbia to Bosnia. He
showed Milosevic all the reports and demanded that this stop. If not, then he
and his mission would finally depart. After this, the flights from Serbia to
Bosnia did not stop completely, but they did become less numerous.
Western intelligence services on the
support of the VJ to the VRS
The reports of Serbian supplies continued.
According to a Canadian UNPROFOR worker, many heavy trucks arrived in the area,
which was controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, through border crossings with
Serbia. At the same time, British intelligence services also investigated
the supplies to the VRS. In March 1995, the British military intelligence
service determined that this was taking place, and by the VJ using helicopters,
according to various intelligence reports. British diplomats in Belgrade were
not completely convinced, however; they disagreed with this analysis by Joint
Headquarters in Salisbury of 8 March. It stated that 'the VRS are clearly being
resupplied across the Drina by helicopters'. According to British diplomats,
this claim completely contradicted the ICFY report of one week earlier. They
wondered why, if intelligence existed, it was not made available to the ICFY.
British diplomats suspected that this was 'repeddling of others' unsupported
intelligence reports'.
The BND and Netherlands MIS likewise
reported on violations of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro by Romania
and Greece. The Greek covert support to Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs during the
war in Bosnia is extremely well documented by the Greek journalist, Takis
Michas. Russian and Ukrainian oil supplies to Serbia took place across the
Danube. Hungarian cargo vessels, officially in transit to Romania, were also
said to have actually been unloaded in Serbia, and the oil forwarded to the
Republika Srpska. These services also reported that Greece violated the embargo
by drawing large quantities of electricity from Bosnia each day. Otherwise, this
ran properly via Serbia to Greece, and the Greek state energy company paid $
20,000 a month to Belgrade for using the electric power lines. Furthermore,
according to these services, the arms embargo was evaded on a large scale via
Macedonia. Greek banks on Cyprus were also used and via these banks more than
770 million Euros was spent by Serbia to buy arms from Russia and Israel. The
Greek Central Bank would later refuse to cooperate with the Chief Prosecutor of
the Yugoslavia Tribunal in The Hague, Carla Del Ponte. The trial at the Tribunal in The Hague against Serbia's retired
President, Milan Milutinovic, might perhaps bring more evidence to light as
regards the Greek involvement. He apparently played a pivotal role in the
alliance between Greece and Serbia during the Balkan conflict.
Much fuel was also brought in by train from Skopje. The
British press accused Akashi of failure in this regard: 'Akashi just wanted to
push this into a black hole so we could forget about it', according to an
anonymous official. This reproach of Akashi is unjustified: UNPROFOR had no
mandate to monitor violations of the arms embargo or to enforce the...
