NATO's tool of subjugation
Time-Life book "The Balkans" says that Turks rulled Balkans by atrocity. In order to subdue the Christian population the Turks practiced "slaughter of the leaders" ("secha knezheva" in Serbo-Croatian). NATO conqueror of the Balkans will follow that model.
One important NATO tool for subjugation and humiliation of the conquered Serbian lands is the "war crime" tribunal purposely located at the Hague to give it an image of an "international" institution. In reality, the Hague "tribunal" is bloody cyrcus designed to exonerate the culprits (the NATO/Islam fundamentalist alliance) and to punish the victim (bombed and cleansed Serbs of Yugoslavia). Every high ranking Serbian politician, every high ranking Serbian officer and every Serb of importance was declared a war criminal - a clear copy of the Ottoman "slaughter of the leaders" method of subjugation.
According to secret lists NATO/Gestapo hunts and assassinates some Serbs - usually those who have strong personality. Some of these people are ambushed and murdered right on the street, or in front of their houses, in full view of their family and children. Dragan Gagovic, for example, was murdered in his private car, on the highway. The car was filled with children.
Other Serbs, who Gestapo considers old or weak, are kidnapped and tortured, then if they do not cooperate murdered right in the Hague dungeon, at Scheveningen, a building that the original Gestapo used to torture and murder Dutch resistance fighters during WWII. The tephlon court, which went through countless scandals unscatched, was even able to finish off one of the original Gestapo jobs. As a small Serbian child, Doctor Kovacevic survived infamous concentration camp Jasenovac, only to end his life in the newest New World Order concentration camp at the Hague.
None of the Bosnian Muslim generals (obviously not to mention NATO generals or politicians) was declared a war criminal. While the Serbian generals rot in the dungeon, the Bosnian Muslim generals are invited to the anti-Serb fiesta as honorary guests. They are treated with utmost, sometimes ridiculous politeness and all they say as witnesses is said out of their own free will.
Here presented quotes all come from the Hague web site. Whenever, in Western "democracies," there is a need to lie to the public, an investigative commission is formed. The commission (or here "international tribunal") then has a task to dump so much "information," so everyone is overwhelmed with it - and the facts are lost. Here, we (only) abbreviated the text. The titles are also ours. Look for the pointers to the original text sitting on the "UN" site at the bottom of this page.
General Krstic was on one of those Kafkaesque, secret, "sealed indictments," Serb-hunt lists. He learned about the fact only when he was snatched from his car, on December 3, 1998. It was an American SFOR [NATO] troops operation. General Krstic was arrested together with his driver(!!!) and brought, by special flight to the Hague dungeons. At the time general Krstic was cooperating with the NATO occupation force. He sat on the Joint Military Commission, a body formed by the NATO conquerors. He was even helping clean low-tech mines round Bosnia so NATO can exercise its high-tech superiority.
NATO paid court had high hopes that the general, who is an amputee (does not have one leg) would succumb to the torture and participate in NATO dungeon schemes geared to put the entire blame of the civil wars in Bosnia to the highest Bosnian Serb leadership: President Karadzic and general Mladic.
The hearings in question was held on April 5 and 6, 2001, two and half years after general Krstic's kidnap.
in a closed session here, you know.
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The Hague Proceedings, starting on page 9439:
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Before anything else is said, in view of your past military responsibilities and your current political responsibilities, I should like to ask you whether it is appropriate for me to address you as General, Deputy, or Mr. Minister, or simply as Mr. Halilovic? What do you prefer?
WITNESS SEFER HALILOVIC: Whatever you find easiest, Your Honour.
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Perhaps "General Halilovic" is the best. Fine, then...
First of all, thank you for coming... I don't doubt that in view of responsibilities, you are a very busy man... The hearing is, in principle, held in public, and we would like to keep it public as much as possible. However, if you should feel it necessary, you can ask the Chamber to make a ruling to go into private session, or even into closed session, which in practice means that during the duration of the private session, the public will not hear your statements, nor any -- and the transcript of your testimony will not be made public...
General Sefer Halilovic: ...[T]he position I held in the [Muslim] army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is, until 8th of June, 1993, I was Chief of Staff of the Main Staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and member of the presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that period, I was actively in command of the army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I took part in the negotiations on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa in April and May 1993. From the 8th of June, 1993, the position of the command of the Main Staff was introduced in the [Muslim] army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I held that position until November the 1st, 1993.
time for Western Christians to save Muslim state
The same, pages 9445, 9446:
Muslim General, Sefer Halilovic: I took part in the negotiations on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa in April and May 1993. And for the situation to be clearer to you, ... at the same time as the [Serbs attacked Muslims in Drina river region] ... the Bosnian Croats [attacked Muslims] on upper Vakuf and the valley of the river Neretva and certain regions of Central Bosnia.
The attack was -- they were coordinated by the Serbs and Croats.
I would like to remind you of this and then go on to the demilitarisation agreement...
The negotiations took place on the 18th of April at the Sarajevo airport, but before that, it was announced from [NATO/French Legion] General Morillon as the commander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the 30th of March, 1993, I received a letter which announced that UNPROFOR [i.e. NATO] units were going to be deployed within the ... Srebrenica enclave, ... and there was initiative for this already in February, and this was given by [Muslim] President Izetbegovic as a sign of [NATO's] goodwill.
The first agreement was signed on the 17th of April, 1993, at the Sarajevo airport. I and General Mladic signed it in the presence of General Wahlgren as the UNPROFOR representative.
twisting the semantics of the agreement
to its OPPOSITE...
The same, pp 9446, 9448:
Muslim General, Sefer Halilovic: I did, ... succeed in coming by one particular document, which was compiled by my deputy, General Jovan Divjak, and which was addressed to the command of the [Muslim] 2nd Corps [in charge of Eastern Bosnia] and the command of Naser Oric in Srebrenica. The document was compiled on the 20th of April, 1993, which testifies to the fact that it was after the agreement of the 17th of April , after the signing of the agreement. Negotiations continued, but at a lower level, not at the level of commanders...
General Divjak goes on to explain that in Srebrenica there should be no armed persons, soldiers, or reserve policemen, and states that they should be pulled out of the town [only!!!] and that the defence lines should be strengthened [!!!]. He takes note that we have the absolute support of General Morillon and General Wahlgren [to warp the meaning that way], and in one particular sentence he says, and I quote: "Mladic has signed an agreement of that kind, and it is his problem that he doesn't know what it means."
Wow! You are General Mladic. When you signed an agreement with your already defeated opponent that they should disarm in Srebrenica and form a UN protected "safe zone" - you obviously meant that they should disarm in buildings, in kitchens and bedrooms. Obviously they should arm themselves outside of the houses - in the yards and fields!? Can you believe that?
The same, pp 9448, 9449:
Muslim General, Sefer Halilovic: [NATO] General Morillon insisted that the weapons be surrendered to him, or rather, to UNPROFOR, and we ourselves asked that the area of the urban -- the urban area [only!] of Srebrenica be demilitarised and that the units be pulled out of the urban area, because Srebrenica and Zepa had already been proclaimed safe areas.
On the 8th of May, sometime after midnight - more exactly, around 2.00 a.m. - an [additional] agreement was signed on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa, and in the spirit of the negotiations and in the spirit of the agreement that we signed, I informed the command of the 1st and 2nd Corps and, of course, the command of the defence of Srebrenica.
The agreement envisaged the withdrawal of the infantry units [both Serb and Muslim] one and a half kilometres away from the confrontation line, line of contact, which the forces of the Bosnian Serbs never did.
The whole Srebrenica enclave, still in Muslim hands, according to Western media was one and half kilometer wide and four kilometers long. In other words, according to this Muslim general's admission, even this way, the Muslims were to completely withdraw armed forces from Srebrenica.
get ready to launch an attack.
The same, pp 9466, 9468:
Defense council of General Krstic, Mr. Petrusic: In that conversation that [high Muslim official Rusmir Mahmut Cehajic and] you had, Mr. Oric [Srebrenica Muslim war criminal] states, I quote, "At any time of day and night from the very beginning of the war up until June 1993, until the arrival of [Muslim General] Delic, I had contact with commander Sefer through radio line, radio communication. He was the only person who knew exactly what was happening. And when the order on demilitarisation of the town itself was issued, the commander [General Halilovic] explained to me that we should hand over only non-functional and faulty weaponry, the ones that we could not hide, heavy weapons, which is what I did. We remained deployed along the lines and the weapons were still with us." Is that correct, General?
General Sefer Halilovic: The agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa envisaged the demilitarisation of the urban areas of those two towns and the pull-out of all personnel from the area. After I returned from the airport [from the point of negotiations] on the 9th of May, I issued an order specifying that not a single piece of weaponry and equipment should be handed over because we had some very bad experience to that effect, that is, with very slow and inefficient decisions by the International Community [one of NATO's nicknames]. So yes, you're quite correct.
Mr. Petrusic: Is it true that Mr. Oric stated on that occasion that all of the weaponry which had been handed over was not usable and was faulty, and that all other weapons, the ones that were functional, were still kept?
General Sefer Halilovic: According to the agreement on the demilitarisation of the urban area of Srebrenica and Zepa, we were not obliged to surrender anything.
But it is true that I had ordered, if they had to surrender something, that they should surrender what was faulty.
Mr. Petrusic: General, in your book "Failed Strategy" published in 1998, you also say, I quote, "I returned to headquarters and issued an order to Srebrenica and Zepa that not a single functional piece of weaponry should be handed over or a single usable bullet. After that, I went to see [Islam fundamentalist leader of Bosnian Muslims, Alija] Izetbegovic and was given congratulations for success."
General, you're talking about the urban area; however, clearly your order did not apply to the urban area regarding the surrender of equipment and weaponry.
General Sefer Halilovic: You must distinguish between the safe area and the demilitarised zone. According to the agreement, the demilitarised zone covers the urban area of Srebrenica and Zepa and what can be seen from the town itself, and within that zone, no armed personnel or military equipment were permitted.
Therefore, my order was to pull out from that area, pursuant to the agreement, all armed personnel and military equipment and, of course, to preserve and retain those weapons that we could use should we *launch an attack*, if that should prove necessary.
Now that we clear that semantic difficulty in understanding that demilitarization zone should be the one where you retain your weaponry and "safe zone" is a place from which it is safe to launch an attack (all of which is sanctioned by NATO allies pretending to be neutral) it is now time to find ways how to arm the demilitarized zone. You need arms and ammunition for all those attacks.
Of course, if Serbs were to attack this "demilitarized zone" it would be a war crime. It would be no less than genocide!
to arm disarmed zone
Arming of "demilitarized zone" Srebrenica was a task of another Bosnian Muslim general. Here is his testimony at the same stage on April 5 and 6, 2001. General Enver Hadzihasanovic was first JNA ("Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija" = Yugoslav People's Army) general. Yugoslav Communist generals were privileged people. They had large, lavish flats for free and hefty salaries to match it all. The only thing they had to do is to give their word of honor, usually done in a lavish ceremony, to protect "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslav Federation." After receiving such benefits, these two generals betrayed the country of their birth, multiethnic Yugoslavia, sided with foreign invader (NATO) and did their best to dismantle, partition and hand over to foreign troops, the country they pledged to defend.
But, at least, General Hadzihasanovic wanted to keep old JNA standards when it came to arming Muslim secessionists. He would do his best to keep demilitarized Srebrenica armed in accordance to these standards. He did not know better. This is what he learned in JNA.
in demilitarized Srebrenica.
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The Hague Proceedings, starting on page 9505:
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] So, General Hadzihasanovic, let me say for the record, that is, let me ask you for the record to spell out your name.
WITNESS HADZIHASANOVIC: My name is Enver Hadzihasanovic, and I'm a retired army General... I am a General of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, retired, a retired General.
Judge Rodrigues: [Interpretation] Before we proceed with your testimony, properly speaking, let me first of all thank you on behalf of the Chamber for having responded to the summons we issued for you, and for having accepted to place yourself at our disposal by appearing before the Chamber in this case. Thank you very much for the very detailed letter that you addressed to the Chamber with a number of attachments. ...General, please proceed.
General Enver Hadzihasanovic: Just to confirm, the documents that I'm going to comment on are the product of the original documents. They are taken from the original documents that went to Srebrenica. According to those documents, the 28th Division in Srebrenica should have had, in total, 5.685 men. That is the total, and it is shown here at the bottom of this column. In actual fact, in Srebrenica it had 5.803 men, and the percentage was 102 per cent, which can be seen down here.
On this part of the diagram, you see the structure and organisation of the 28th Division itself in Srebrenica, without the brigade from Zepa. The request by the General Staff of the army was that each unit should have 110-per-cent manpower, a strength of 110 per cent.
Here you see that the percentage is 102, but including the Zepa Brigade, which had more men, then the percentage would be 108 per cent, was within allowed limits.
in accordance to
Yugoslav Fedreal Army standards
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The Hague Proceedings, page 9520:
JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] This will be document C-3. Perhaps, General, instead of analysing the details on the basis of the table, you could perhaps give us an idea of a more general nature....
General Enver Hadzihasanovic: Yes.... [Y]ou can use this table because these indices and this data was taken from the standards that were applicable in the former JNA [Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija = Yugoslav People's Army, the Federal Arm force of ex-Yugoslavia], and they emerge from the standards for the resources and equipment that I am talking about.
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The Hague Proceedings, starting on page 9515:
General Enver Hadzihasanovic: Document C-2 relates to what was necessary, according to the requests made by the division, what they should have had, and the actual state of affairs, that is to say, what the division in Srebrenica actually disposed of, actually had in its possession.
We enumerate the basic types of weaponry which it should have had, so that pistols, for example, in the case of pistols, the division in Srebrenica should have had 1.184 -- no. No. It doesn't seem to be right. I apologise. It's difficult for me to follow on the monitor... what they actually had was 62. Automatic rifles, they should have had 4.109 of them; in actual fact, they had 1.947, or 46 per cent. Sniper rifles, they should have had 128, and in actual fact they only had 13. Submachine-gun, they should have had 326; they actually had 27. Machine-guns, they should have had 90 -- no, 83; in actual fact, they had 15. Mortars, 60-millimetre ones, they should have had 98; in actual fact, they only had 12. 82-millimetre mortars, 36; they had 5. 120-millimetre mortar, they should have had 36; they had none, in actual fact. Hand grenades, hand launchers, 16 they should have had, but they just had 9. Hand-held rocket launchers, that was. Recoilless guns, 82 millimetres, they should have had 36; they had 4. Hand-held rocket launchers of the Zolja type, they should have had 478; they had 68. Anti-armour Osa-type launchers, they should have had 143; they had none. Rocket launchers, hand-held armoured, 9-K-11, they should have had 18; they had none. A light launcher of the Fagot type, 9-K-11-F, they should have had 15 of those; they just had 1. Anti-missile rockets, they should have had 15; they didn't have 1. Anti-aircraft guns of the 20-millimetre type, one barrel, they should have had 20. In actual fact, they only had 4. Along with this column, we have the percentages which you can look at.
So that was the actual situation in Srebrenica as to what it should have been on the basis of these documents.
Let us repeat it to you. "Safe heaven" Srebrenica after being "demilitarized" had 5,803 armed Muslims equipped like this:
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The same, pp 9518 - 9523:
General Enver Hadzihasanovic: [I]n Srebrenica, the overall situation was highly complex and extremely difficult, both with respect to the army and the people... [T]here was every indication that in Srebrenica, the worst things could be expected, that people could just leave without thinking,[!] to leave a situation that was untenable for them. And we tried to organise the army [in Srebrenica] and to tell the people that we, ourselves, wanted to take steps to calm the situation down until a final, better solution was -- had been come up with.
And so at the request of the division and according to our own assessments, we wanted to help the situation in the army by sending them more resources and to enable that particular division,... to ensure its combat readiness...
We knew that we weren't -- would not be able to furnish the division with what it needed quickly because we were not able to get the materiel and resources to them. Our first attempt was to introduce the communication devices, and we decided to do that on the ground, on land, with a certain number of men that we had at our disposal. But that didn't prove successful. The people that we dispatched, that we sent, were sent into a risky situation. They risked being captured and ultimately liquidated if captured. So it was a high-risk situation for the men.
And then we decided to do this with the modest means we had at our disposal and the number of helicopters we had at our disposal, the few helicopters we had. In our estimations, this would be a difficult task and would require a lot of time... And we sent ten helicopters. The structure of the helicopters included some weapons and some ammunition, but they were also carrying clothing and sanitary material. They also transported a certain number of doctors and brought out some seriously wounded people and people that were supposed to go on for further [obviously military] education.
It was probably a signal to the army of Republika Srpska that something was afoot and that they could expect some combat operations...
I have documents here which indicate how much time we would have needed and how many tons of cargo would have been necessary for the division to receive basic resources, that is to say, ammunition for their rifles, one combat kit for mortars and for the anti-armoured devices, and for everything that they were lacking, in fact. ...
For the men to have just one meal a day, a cold ration, dry ration, which each soldier has to carry with him when he is on an assignment, we would have to have sent, to supply only that one dry ration, which was two kilograms, an extra 11.6 tons would have had to be transported to ensure two kilograms per man per day.
When we're talking about clothing...
When we saw how many flights a helicopter would have had to make, this was an enormous number, and I show this on my next diagram.
[But] we achieved our objective. The situation in Srebrenica was calmed down, the people believed in the [Muslim] army more,... we had achieved one of our goals completely, that is to say, the soldiers [in Srebrenica] formed formational structures, they were established, and we started to supply them with the materiel they needed in addition to what they already had.
They needed time to arm to the teeth the "demilitarized zone" - right in front of Serbian noses. As we will see, at some point the time run out on Bill Clinton. In August 1995, he needed at least 5,000 Muslim martyrs so he can use it as a pretext for ethnic cleansing of Serbs far and wide. He needed this "Balkan thing" over with well before his upcoming re-elections in 1996.
Back to General Halilovic, how does he feel about all this hellicoptering around? Is it again, as it was during four centuries of Turkish rule by atrocity, that it is not only OK, but actually advisable to lie to the infidels?
signed with infadels.
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The same, pages 9468, 9469:
Council Petrusic to General Halilovic: General, you are familiar with the decision of the United Nations which had a no-fly zone envisaged.
Muslim General, Sefer Halilovic: Yes, yes, certainly. Flights were prohibited for military purposes, but... It was medical material that was transported more [sic!] than combat equipment.
Council Petrusic: General,... I'm talking to you about aircraft of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or aircraft of the civilian authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina without the approval of the United Nations. Was that a violation of the resolution?
General Halilovic: Partially yes, because we were transported -- transporting food and medicaments mostly, but partially, yes.
Council Petrusic: Is it a violation if ammunition were transported by means of those aircraft and helicopters? Will you answer that question, please, with a yes or no.
General Halilovic: In view of the fact that we were under an embargo and our hands were tied, I think not. Morally, no; legally, one could discuss it.
Council Petrusic: Naser Oric, General, says in this newspaper [Muslim controlled] Oslobodenje, an interview that you attended as did Mr. Mahmut Cehajic, that [Muslim General] Sefer sent six helicopters with ammunition. Is that correct, General?
General Halilovic: It is not correct. It is correct that I sent eight helicopters with ammunition, and if I could have, I would have sent 180.
Council Petrusic: General, you were violating the provisions of the United Nations resolution.
General Halilovic: The legal norms of the United Nations also guarantee the right to defence.
It is the same, once and again - if you inhabit "higher moral ground" (here provided by lying Western media, a party to the conflict) - then you are allowed to do whatever you please. Signed, UN agreements mean nothing. If you have an ally with so many airplane carriers and nuclear submarines - you are always right!
Go complain to my boss.
Thursday, 5 April 2001
The same, pages 9464, 9465:
Council Petrusic to General Halilovic: General, as a high-ranking officer of the former JNA and the BH [Bosnian Muslim] army, do you think that any conduct of terrorist activities in spring of that year, that is, terrorist activities from the enclave, from the protected area and into the Serbian-held territory, against Serbian-held positions, was something that could trigger offensive action by the VRS [Bosnian Serb Army] towards the area of the enclave, towards the safe area?
Muslim General, Sefer Halilovic: If there had indeed been terrorist activities from the enclave, I consider it to be a mistake...
Council Petrusic: General, you are one of the signatories of the agreement on demilitarisation. I should like to know -- and of course, you are also familiar with the rights and duties which during that period of time you yourself and, later on, those who succeeded you on your functions, members of the BH army, had to respect. Does that agreement envisage any sanctions for either of the parties in case of non-compliance with the agreement?
General Halilovic: While I was still a member of the BH army, the agreement was complied with in its entirety.
Council Petrusic: General, do you have any knowledge whether in the spring and summer of 1995 the said agreement was honoured and complied with?
General Halilovic: Under the assumption that one single terrorist activity had been conducted, then one was supposed to request that the Security Council of the United Nations to withdraw the agreement concerning the safe area.
The original page for the above quotes can be found at "UN" web site at this address.
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Last revised: October 13, 2004