The fate of Kosovo, Serbia's troubled province
has in recent years received a good deal of attention in the world press,
usually in connection with the actions of Serbia's president, Slobodan
Milosevic. A somewhat obscure communist until he became head of the Serbian
Communist Party in 1986, Milosevic went to Kosovo in April 1987 to assess
personally the charges of the persecution of Serbs by the Kosovo Albanians,
at which time he uttered the words heard round the world -- "No one
will ever beat you again." Athough spoken in a limited contest, these
words were frequently interpreted in the West as signifying the ascent
of rampant Serbian na tionalism.
The
cradle of the Serbian nation and the site of its historic Christian monuments,
Kosovo at the time of its capture by the Ottoman Turks in 1389 was ethnically
almost entirely Serbian. At the time
of its liberation in the Balkan wars of 1912, however, Kosovo's population
was nearly 40 percent Albanian. By the and of World War II, it was close
to 30 perecent, by 1987 it was between 75 and 80, and at present it is
around 90 percent.
With
the inauguration of communist rule at the end of World War II, Kosovo was
made an autonomous province within the republic of Serbia and was governed
by the Kosovo Communist Party, part and parcel of the Yugoslav Communist
Party. Although Milosevic
must have had at least a general awareness of what had transpired in Kosovo
during the years of dictator Tito's rule as well as after his death in
1980, it is not clear what prompted him to go to Kosovo. Be that as it
may, the critical question is: Why did Milosevic, a disciplined communist
who was nurtured in Tito's party, and who followed other Serbian communists
in being a ruthless critic of Serbian nationalism, decide to change Communist
Party policy with respect to Kosovo? This question cannot be answered without
first reviewing that policy and its consequences in Kosovo. And we
should note that two years elapsed between his visit and his action to
change the constitutional status of Kosovo.
When word got out that Milosevic was coming
to Kosovo over 15,000 resident Serbs came out to meet him, but only some
300 preselected ones could be accommodated because of the size of the building
where the meeting was to be held. Many more were determined to get in but
were forced back: some were beaten by the police, which resulted in considerable
commotion. At one point, Milosevic asked what the disturbance was about,
and when informed, he ordered that more people be let in. And when told
about beatings, he delivered his now well-known words.
The meeting lasted
13 hours and 78 people spoke. The vast majority, apart from decrying their
presecution by the Albanians, openly attacked the communist regime. Reports
on the meeting were printed in the party press in Belgrade. A few sentences
will suffice to give a taste of the proceedings:
Serbian
man: "I know why
Germany was divided after the war, but why was Serbia divided?"
Serbian man: "
... heads will roll, because it is
impossible to endure and to permit the beating of our children and women."
Serbian man: "Serbs
want to live together with the Albanians ... but here counterrevolution
is being financed by the federation."
Serbian woman: "Either
there will be some order in Kosovo, or by God we will take up arms again
if need be."
Serbian woman: "Since
the establishment of Pristina University there has been a process of ethinc
separation of Kosovo and the process of cultural purity."
Serbian
man: "How is it
that Yugoslavia protests one-language signs in Austria but agrees to them
in Kosovo?"
[All signs in the province
being in - Albanian only! Albanian is not a Slav language and more than
90% of ex-Yugoslavia's population can not understand a word of it. ].
Serbian man: "How
is it that according to the 1974 constitution Serbo-Croatian is also an
official language in Kosovo, while in the constitution of the province
it is not obligatory?"
Another man asked about the erection of
a monument to the Albanian Prizren League, which he characterized as a
fascist organization that sought to tear Yugoslavia apart. He also asked
why the program of the Albanian nationalist group, Balli Combetar, was
being carried out in Kosovo. Others condemned Serbian communists in Kosovo
who "served with the Albanians" in putting their personal interests
ahead of the national insterest. The complaints that Milosevic heard were
more personal and specific than what he may have heard while sitting in
Belgrade, but they certainly could not have come as a surprise. He must
have been aware of past efforts by other Yugoslav leaders to deal with
the Kosovo problem.
During
his struggle to seize power during World War II, the communist leader of
the guerrilla movement, Josip Broz Tito, promised the Kosovo Albanians
much in return for their assistance. The Albanians insist that he promised
them the right of sell-determination, including the right to be annexed
to Albania, but Tito and his comrades denied that claim. In any case, in
1946 he made the Kosovo-Metohija area (now simply Kosovo) an autonomous
province within the republic of Serbia. That autonomy was considerably
augmented in 1963, 1969, and especially in 1974. Tito and his communist
comrades proceeded on the assumption, erroneous as it turned out, that
if given broad autonomy -- perhaps more extensive
than that granted to a minority in any
other European state -- the Kosovo Albanians would be loyal citizens of
Yugoslavia.
Following
the adoption of Yugoslavia's 1974 constitution, the Kosovo Albanians became,
in effect, a law unto themselves. It is as if part of an American state,
say New York City, gained such power that it could ignore New York state
authorities, which could not intervene to stop the city from violating
the state's laws and constitution or change any laws affecting the city
without its consent.
Why, it might be asked, did the Serbs object
to such power for Kosovo? For the same reason that a comparable situation
would not be acceptable to the state of New York. More precisely, the
Kosovo Albanians abused their enlarged autonomy to force the Serbian minority
to leave Kosovo. Their attempt
at "ethnic cleansing was initially made easier by Tito's explicit
order forbidding the return of Serbs who had fled the area during World
War II to escape Albanian and Bulgarian persecution. Moreover, Tito, who
had promised the Kosovo Albanians much in the hope that they would help
him seize power, wittingly or unwittingly encouraged large-scale immigration
from Albania as a way of changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo.
The
Kosovo Albanian persecution of Serbs included the desecration of historic
Orthodox Christian monasteries, churelses, and cemeteries; the burning
of barns and haystacks; the theft or mutilation of cattle and other livestock;
the destruction of Serbian houses; pressure to force Serbs into selling
their properties; as well as rape and other physical assaults.
Prior to Tito's death in 1960, there was
no public mention of these actions. These were unpublicised protests, locally
as well as to high Communist Party circles, which were to no avail. Even
the official protest to Tito by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1969 brought
only a statement declaring that he had ordered governmental authorities
to apply the law. Following the demonstrations in 1981 by the Kosovo
Albanians, demanding the status of a separate republic -- which they had
in all but name --
and even the right to be annexed to Albania, the problem reached
high party authorities more than once. And this
was several years before Milosevic came on the scene.
For example, the Bar Association of Serbia,
in letters to the presidents of the Serbian and Yugoslav parliaments on
July 1, 1985, called attention to the violation of the constitution and
the laws in Kosovo. [Texts of letters and replies and speaches referred
herein can be found in the autobiography of Veljko Guberina, onetime president
of the Serbian Bar Association.) The letter to the president of the Serbian
parliament, Dusan Ckrebic, demanded answers to nine specific questions,
including: "How many families who were forced to sell their properties
under duress have returned to their land?" "What has happened
to the lost court papers and was anyone held responsible?" The letter
concluded with the statement that "only one nullification of an agreement
made under duress to purchase property and the return of that family to
their land would contribute more than all the appeals and assurances concerning
the settlement of the situation in Kosovo."
Ckrebic answered on July 29, claiming that
a lot was being done but admitting that it was not enough. He added that
"of special concern was the failure to achieve constitutional principles
concerning the equality of nations and nationalities" whose consequences
have led to Serbs leaving Kosovo, which he said was "the most difficult
problem." He also said that the activities of Albanian irredentists
and other enemies in Kosovo cannot be neutralized by governmental agencies
alone. It is necessary, he argued, "to create a broad front of working
people and citizens, belonging to all nations and nationalities against
irredentist forces."
The letter to Miodrag Trifunovic, president
of the Federal Council of the parliament of Yugoslavia, complained that
serious crimes were being treated as misdemeanors in Kosovo, that not one
sale of property under duress had been nullified, and that the emigration
of Serbs and Montenegrins continued. Trifunovic's answer on July 18 cited
specific acts of parliament was asking the Constitutional Court to concern
itself with these matters. He added that parliament would look into the
execution of docisions by the Federal Council concerning the emigration
of Serbs under pressure.
On July 6, 1985, a letter on behalf of the
League of Republic and Province bar associations was sent to the president
of the Federal Council of the Yugoslav parliament. Letters of similar content
were sent to all other federal bodies. The
letters spoke of violations of constitutional and legal rights, specifically
of non-Albanian citizens. Failure to nullify real estate sales that had
been made under duress, the damaging of cultural-historical monuments and
cemeteries, and policies that forced Serbs, Turks, Gypsies, and others
to leave Kosovo.
The president of the Serbian Bar Association,
Veljko Guberina, said in speeches in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia in 1988
that the violations of the rights of Serbs in Kosovo reminded him of the
"dark days of the occupation when fascism ruled over the expanse of
our country," In one speech he concluded, "Emigratiois continues
and oppresion has increased, as if the enemies of this country desired
to demonstrate that they are afraid of no one and that they are stronger
than the regular governmental authorities, or to show publicly that those
authorities are with them." The lawless seemed to be protected by
"persons in the presidency of the Communist Party."
Guberina quoted from remarks
by onetime minister of defense and close ally of Tito, General Nikola Ljubicic,
to a joint meeting of the presidency of Serbia and the Party Central Committee
of Serbia (September 5, 1988): "Some things which are happening are
so drastic that I simply ask myself how can we tolerate that in a legal
state." Ljubicic then proceeded to tell (with name of place and family)
of an Albanian who moved into a Serbian house and moved the old lady out.
When the son went to settle the matter, he found her sitting on a stump
outside. He had to resort to legal action over a period of two to three
years, and he won. But when an officer came to carry out the court order,
the Albanian said that he had a machine gun and warned: "Whoever approaches
will be mowed down!" The militiaman had to return with his task unaccomplished.
"What kind of state are we?"
asked Ljubicic.
In another speech, Guberina said that Serbia's
crippled constitution does not permit Serbia to exercise its governmental
authority on the territory of the provinces, and that federal bodies which
have that authority are quiet, while open enemies of Yugoslavia escalate
their evil deeds. It is clear, he said, that "the Serbian people has
again found itself in a situation, as in 1941, to be or not to be!"
Concern about developments in Kosovo was
also on the agnda of the Yugoslav Communist Party leadership, at a time
when all Yugoslav ethnic groups were represented and before Slobolan Milosevic
because the principal actor. In June 1987, for example, the Central Committee
and the Presidency of the Party (officially the League of Yugoslav Communists)
took the position that "the most difficult part of the problem of
Koso vo and the whole of Yugoslav society is to be found in that the policy
of the [League] is not being implemented." Moreover, "the pressure
on the Serb and Montenegrins must be stopped with all the means of our
socialist self-management system." (Belgrade newspaper Politika, June
11, 1987.)
A month earlier, at
an "ideological" plenum of the Central Committee, one member,
Dusan Dragosavac, asserted: "If we cannot quickly overcome genocide
. . . then I see as the only way out of an urgent convoking of an extraordinary
Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists and the calling of free elections
with multiple candidates, so that men can come to the top who can bring
an end to genocide." (Communist Party organ Borba, May 23,
1987.)
Some Yugoslav newspapers openly used the
term "genocide" as early as May 1987, along with expressions
of surprise that six years after the 1981 Kosovo Albanian demonstrations
there still had not been a single resignation in Kosovo or at the top in
Yugoslavia that might suggest a feeling of responsibility. Instead, the
authorities "continrue with the same announcements in which they avoid
naming criminals."
It was clear that the situation, instead
of improving was becoming worse. In the summer of 1987, a scandal -- some
referred to it as "administrative genocide" came to light when
Serbian Orthodox Church authorities in Pec discovered at the local cadastral
office that many of their churches had legally disapeared. Someone had
simply listed them as mosques. The ancient Serbian Patriarchate at Pec
was listed as an ordinary "religious object." One church had
been transforomed into a cemetery. The pearl of medieval Serbian culture,
the monastery Gracanica, was listed as general public property. The equally
well-known 650-year-old Decani monastery was liset as an 'ordinary building."
In some areas, Serbian Orthodox churches had become pasture lands, in others,
prosperty of the state forestry enterprise. As might be expected, these
actions against Serbian history and culture evoked bitterness among the
Serbs, particularly 55 when no individual culprits were named.
Ironically,
the Kosovo Serbs could not appeal to the minority rights provisions of
Tito's 1974 constitution. By definition, all ethnic groups that had their
own republics were classified as nations, while others were categorized
as nationalities, meaning minorities. Hence, Albanians, Hungarians, and
other minorities could call upon the minority rights provisions of the
constitution, but those provisions could not be invoked to protect the
rights of Serbs, Croats, and others who might be living in republics other
than their own.
In the spring of 1989,
two years after his 1987 visit to Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic tackled the
Kosovo problem. He did so by engineering an amendment to the Serbian constitution,
limiting Kosovo'c autonomy. The police, the courts, and defense come under
direct Serbian control. Though in all other spheres local autonomy was
not curtailed, the Kosovo Albanians insisted nevertheless that "their
autonomy" had been taken away, and they promptly refused to participate
in any govermental activities. They refused to operate schools or
health facilities and established their own schools and clinics in private
homes. And they went on strike in government operated economic ebtermprises.
Their refusal to cooperate in any way led the Serbian government to establish
a strong police and military presence. This in turn enabled the Kosovo
Albanians to push their claim that they were forced to live under dictatorial
rule. This was also the pissitioss taken by foreign supporters of the Albanians,
such as United States Senator Robert Dole. The result has been a stalemate,
one example of which was the issuing of diplomas stamped "Republic
of Kosova" or the "Independent Republic of Kosova," which
Serbian authorities refuse to recognize.
Some of Milosevic's critics have accused
him of Great Serbian nationalism, and cite the so-called Memorandum of
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences as his political platform, arguing
that Kosovo was merely a pretext. They seem to have overlooked the fact
-- if they ever knew it -- that Milosevic, along with other Serbian communists,
criticized the memorandum. This is not the place for a detailed examinanation
of the document, but a few things need to be said about it. In the first
place, it was a draft of an internal academy document. Second, its main
authors, Antonije Isakovic and Dobrica Cosic, had such a solid party past
that they could not be put in the camp of counterrevolutionaries of enemies
of Yugoslavia. Third, the authors asserted that Yugoslavia could not come
out of the critical crisis in which it found itself without fundamental
changes in the economic and political system.
The memorandum analyzed the many shortcomings
of the economic system, (e.g., ruinous competition among and between the
republics, unprofitable enterprises, waste and general inefficiency). It
also pointed to the unworkability and paralysis of the political system,
which required unanimity among the republics on virtual all questiisns.
The authors saw that under the system Tito bequeathed to his heirs, Serbia
had fallen behind in many ways. They also realized that the 1974 constitution
effectively denied Serbia the power to do anything about the advantages
that had been conferred on other republics. It was obvious to them that
the two most advanced republics, Slovenia and Croatia, would not agree
to any changes that would adversely affect them. Consequently, the authors
argued in favor of democratization of the political system. It was understandable,
therefore, that Milolevic's critics could, after the fact, point to things
in the memorandum that seemed to have guided him, ignoring the fact that
he had joined the party press in condemning the memorandum.
Milosevic's
critics in Slovenia and Croatia avowed that his assertion of control in
Kosovo signaled that Serbia was out to dominate Yugoslavia. His critics
in the West have attempted to explain the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia
on the grounds that they did not want to live in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia.
This constitutes a grave failure to understand Titoist Yugoslavia, because
at no time prior to the secessions
could it be said that Yugoslavia was Serb-dominated. In fact, the most
that can be said is that the Slovenes and Croats feared that at some time
in the future Yugoslavia might
be dominated by Serbs.
While many Slovenes and Croats saw Milosevic's
assertion of control as an internal Serbian matter, their communist leaders,
fully aware that Serbia would seek the redress of other grievances, viewed
it as the begining of a process that would be detrimental to the achievements
of their republics. Therefore, proceeding on the well-known principle that
the best defense is a good offense, they charged that Serbia's action in
Kosovo was proof that Serbia wanted to control Yugoslavia. They did not
even want to hear Serb asguments in defense of their action in Kosovo.
For example, when a group of Serbs living in Slovenia attempted a peaceful
demonstration, Slovene authorities used force to disband it.
While the international community's concern
about Kosovo is understandable, failure to grasp the essence of the issues
can lead to disastrous policies. The media have not helped. Commentators
often speak of historical animosities. Historical perspective requires
a reminder: prior to the Ottoman conquest of Kosovo, relations between
Serbs and Albanians were good. That was when most of the Albanians were
Christians. It was only after they became Turkish surrogates, and especially
when large numbers of them accepted Islam, that hostilities developed.
This was mainly in the 18th century, but largescale persecutions of Serbs
came in the 19th century. These persecutions are well documented in the
reports of British, French, and Russian consuls who were stationed in the
Kosovo area. After Kosovo was liberated by the Serbs in the Balkan wars
(1912), Serbian policy was clearly
stated: there would be no retribution against Kosovo Albanians for past
actions. And the most that can be said about the policies
of interwar Yugoslavia is that Kosovo was treated with benign neglect,
which was more detrimental to its Serb inhabitants than to the Albanian
ones.
It seems to me that Milosevic was transfomed
not by a desire to establish or solidify a dictatorship -- even if that
could have been a motivated by the compelling nature of events. As pointed
out abore, he was slow in taking up the cause of the Kosovo Serbs. Although
he presumably recognised the seriousness of their plight after his visit
to Kosovo in April 1987, he waited a full two years before taking concrete
steps to change the situation. One thing is absolutely clear: prior to
his action, Yugoslav communist authorities
had utterly failed to solve the Kosovo problem.
Some communist, in their blazing hatred
for Milosevic, have proclaimed in shrill tones that, as an extreme nationalist,
he is the main threat to peace and security in the Balkans. An apt response
might be to say of nationalists what Aldous Huxley once said of propagandists
: "A propagandist canalizes an already existing stream, in a land
where there is no water he digs in vain." One does not have to be
a defender of Milosevic to observe that he does not function in a vacuum.
When in 1981 I asked Milovan Djilas, onetime
Tito comrade and at that time Yugoslavia's best-known dissident, what the
solution was to the Kosovo question, he said: "There is no solution."
Just a few months prior to our conversation the Kosovo Albanians had staged
demonstations demanding the status of a republic and even the right to
be annexed to Albania. From that year until
Milosevic took action in 1989, the government of Yugoslavia (not that of
Serbia!) had tried unsuccessfully to deal with the Kosovo problem.
Since Milosevic`s action, the
attitude of the two sides can best be summirized in one sentence: the Serbian
government has said that it is willing to discuss any and all questions
with the Kosovo Albanians except secession, while the latter has said that
it wants to discuss nothing short of secession. This would
suggest an unqualified deadlock. However, two possible solutions have been
advanced. One is a partition of Kosovo, letting one part join Albania.
The Serbs would want to retain as many of their historic religious monuments
as possible, as well as the mining complex of Trepca. By and large, this
solution would not be acceptable to most Serbs, who look upon Kosovo as
a holy place. But some Serbian intellectuals, including a former president
of Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic, support the idea. Albanians hard-liners would
accept such an outcome only if they could get most of the terrtory. The
one aspect of this proposal that would have some appeal in Serbia is an
agreement that all Albanians on the Serbian side of the boundary line would
have to leave. The principal reason why this would he popular with many
Serbs is that the large number of Albanians who have settled in Serbia
proper, well beyond Kosovo, are seen as a critical future problem, especially
given the Albanians' extraordinary
high birthrate. Moving them as part of a settlement would be
far easier now then later.
The second suggestion is for the Kosovo
Albanians to accept autonomy without the attributes of statehood. The Serbs
have indicated that is what they wanted all along. To the Albanian hard-liners,
this has would constitute capitulation. Recently, however, there has been
some movement in this direction among the more moderate elements. At least
two former Kosovo Albanian leaders have spoken out in favor of participating
in elections and working in other ways toward viable arrangements that
would let Kosovo Albanians manage their own affairs while remaining loyal
citizens of the country in which they live. The second alternative seems
to hold the best prospect for a peaceful resolution of this critical problem.