Alexander Solzhenitsyn once referred to [Stalin's] Cheka as "the
only punitive organ in human history that combined in one set of
hands investigation, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, trial, and
execution of the verdict." He was probably mistaken about "human
history" but his anger was just. What he chronicled was indefinite
imprisonment without trial; investigations and indictments politically
motivated, initiated and controlled; arbitrary evidence gathering; trial
by media and assumption of guilt.
Precisely these techniques, honed by the totalitarian
scum of our century, have become the hallmark of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTFY), based in The Hague.
After the decline of higher cynicism in
the name of human progress, we now witness the ascent of higher
cynicism in the name of Human Rights. It is the New World Order's
posthumous tribute to [the founder of KGB] Felix Dzerzhinsky.
ICTFY was established by the Security Council of the United
Nations in 1993 on the basis of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
(Resolution 827), with the "jurisdiction" for crimes committed after
January 1, 1991. Why only "the former Yugoslavia," and why only the
past five years? The strict answer is that the US did not want to put its
generals on trial for killing Vietnamese civilians, and did not want the
embarrassment of charging the Croat mass murderers who have
been untouched since 1945.
But the U.S. Ambassador at the United Nations, Madeleine
Albright, supplies a more attractive, less honest answer. Speaking at
the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum on April 12, 1994, she declared
that "there is no more appropriate a place to discuss the War Crimes
Tribunal for former Yugoslavia." In other words, the enormity of
recent crimes in the Balkans supposedly sets them apart from all other
wretched spots on our planet, and makes them comparable only to the
Ultimate Horror of Auschwitz, Babi Yar and Belsen.
According to Rudolph J. Rummel in the Journal of Peace
Research (1994), in the five decades since the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials, there have been well over one hundred million fatalities due to war,
genocide, democide, politicide, and mass murder. Pol Pot's Khmer
Rouge killed two million of their compatriots - one third of Cambodia's
population - in only four years (1975-78). This was but an offshoot of
Mao's less known, more grandiose attempt at social engineering after
1949, which physically destroyed some thirty five million men, women
and children. The Indonesian Army and its affiliates killed half a million
people in 1965-66. The precise number of victims of India's partition is
unknown, but exceeds one million. This figure was easily exceeded by
Pakistan's brief and savage democide in today's Bangladesh in 1971.
Dictatorships in Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, Romania, Ethiopia,
Iraq, North Korea, and Uganda have contributed their own hecatombs
to the total. Even that old darling of western liberals, Marshal Tito,
after being brought to Belgrade by the Red Army in October 1944,
dispatched hundreds of thousands of Yugoslav citizens; the victims
were not only the Volksdeutsche of Vojvodina who did not survive
deportations in 1945-47, but any real, potential, or imagined enemies
of the regime.
While democracies murder relatively few of their own citizens
(which is scant comfort to a child burned at Waco, or to Randy
Weaver), they are less restrained in killing foreign civilians in declared
or undeclared wars. Dresden and Hiroshima have set the scene for
indiscriminate bombings of Vietnamese and Iraqi cities. We know that
the general strategic bombing policy of the Allies in 1942-45 was to
terrorize urban centers. However, it may be years before we are told of
the estimate for civilian deaths, in Hanoi in 1972, in Baghdad in 1991,
or in the Bosnian Serb Republic in 1995; and there will be no trials of
culprits.
Compared to the horrors of Afro-Asian postcolonial killing
fields, the war in the Balkans can be seen for what it is: a medium-
sized local conflict. Before any facile comparisons of Yugoslavia to the
Holocaust are accepted at face value, it is legitimate to ask how many
have actually died. For President Clinton, addressing the nation on
November 27 1995, the easy answer was 250,000 - and that in Bosnia
alone. For his Defense Secretary, William Perry, two sets of figures
seem to be equally valid. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on June 7, 1995, he said that in 1992 "there were, by our
best estimate, about 130,000 civilian casualties..." But four months
later, on October 18, he told the House International Relations
Committee that "more than 200,000 people" were killed.
Was that figure based on anything but repetition? Counting
bodies may be poor form ("even one death is one too many"), but it
has to be done if we are not to abet the further exploitation of
lies and distortions for political purposes. According
to the only serious study published on the subject so far, by George
Kenney ("All Told, How Many People Have Died in Bosnia," New York
Times Magazine, April 23, 1995), former acting chief of the Yugoslav
desk at the State Department, "Bosnia isn't the Holocaust or Rwanda;
it's Lebanon." Kenney insists that the number of fatalities in Bosnia's
war is between 25,000 and 60,000 on ALL sides.
The "Bosnian Holocaust" story was fabricated by the Muslim
side as part of a wide-ranging and effective PR campaign. In
December 1992, the Izetbegovic authorities first claimed that there
were 128,444 dead on the "Bosnian" side (induding Croats and "Serbs
loyal to the Bosnian Government"). According to Kenney, this figure
was cooked by adding together the 17,466 confirmed dead until that
time, and the 111,000 that the Muslims had already claimed as
missing. He stresses that, at first, such high numbers were not
accepted:
But on June 28, 1993 -- as near as I can pin it down -- the Bosnian Deputy Minister of Information, Senada Kreso, told journalists that 200,000 had died. Knowing her from her service as my translator and guide around Sarajevo, I believe that this was an outburst of naive zeal. Nevertheless, the major newspapers and wire services quickly began using these numbers, unsourced and unsupported... An inert press simply never bothered to learn the origins of the numbers it reported.
Ever since, Bosnian-Muslim propagandists have peddled the
story of the "Bosnian Holocaust" without being seriously challenged. In
fact, after an initial bout of heavy fighting, from 1993 to mid-1995 there
was a period of relative calm on most fronts in Bosnia,
interrupted by brief outbursts in isolated localities (Gorazde, Bihac).
Stories of mass murder and grand-scale atrocities are yet to be
substantiated with anything better than aerial photos of freshly plowed
fields. The Red Cross has been able to confirm under 20,000 deaths on
all sides. Analysts at the CIA and the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research put fatalities in the tens of thousands. This is
close to the view of British military intelligence experts: a year ago
they estimated fatalities to be 50,000 to 60,000. Even if the as yet
unknown number of Serbs killed by NATO air power and the
combined Croat-Muslim offensive last September are included, the
war in Bosnia is unlikely to have resulted in more than 70,000
deaths. Including Croatia/Krajina, the Yugoslav wars of 1991-95 have
killed up to, but not more than, 100,000 people.
So why the war crimes tribunal? Mrs Albright's answer is that
"the U.S. Government does not believe that because some war crimes
may go unpunished, all must." Needless to say, any determination of
which ones should be punished - if left to the U.S. Government -
becomes not a legal, but a political decision. Susan Woodward of the
Brookings Institution says that the Tribunal was pushed largely by the
United States for political reasons: "The accusations [of the Serbs] became a
servant of American policy toward the conflict itself, which required a
conspiracy of silence about parties which were not considered
aggressors." The Muslims and Croats could thus get away with
murder, literally and figuratively. The Serbs were to be pilloried, and
the "Tribunal" was needed to give due legitimacy - and legality - to
that decision.
The U.N. Genocide Convention could not, in any case, provide
the basis for the Tribunal. It is an international treaty, approved by the
General Assembly and ratified by member-states, which does not
endow the U.N. with radical new powers. In fact, the Security Council
acted illegally in setting up the Tribunal; it had no authority to
do so.
(Boutros-Ghali himself declared that "in asking the Secretary-
General to consdier this project, the Security Council has given itself
an entirely new mandate.")
The formal basis invoked for the Tribunal, Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter, deals with "threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression," and to meet them it authorizes the
U.N. to deploy the armed forces of its member-states in
peacekeeping operations. It would take a very flexible legal mind
indeed, to interpret this as carte blanche to investigate
people, indict them, try them, find them guilty and keep them in prison.
Invocation of Article 29 in the resolution establishing the
Tribunal gives the game away: the Security Council may establish
such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance
of its functions. This amounts to an admission that the
Tribunal is not an independent court of law but a "subsidiary organ"
of its political masters. But while the Tribunal remains fundamentally
subordinate to the Security Council, its statute provides it with
primacy over national courts, including the authority to demand the
surrender of the accused. This is in clear violation of the U.N. Charter,
which insists that the U.N. may not usurp the sovereign rights of
states.
A dangerous precedent has been created, and it would be
short-sighted for the American public to overlook it. ICTFY may yet prove
to be a step towards the globalist dream of a permanent International
Criminal Tribunal. But the sponsors of ICTFY - shortsightedly, perhaps -
do not envisage "international peace-keepers" patrolling America's
racially or ethnically troubled areas; they do not contemplate Somalese
or Saudi judges, sitting on such a Tribunal, demanding extradition of
Americans accused of "hate-crimes" against, say, the Nation
of Islam.
The Albrights of this world have a different scenario in mind.
They do not seek to delegitimise war crimes per se, but to enhance
their power to decide what is a war crime on the basis of current
political calculations. Applied in practice, it means that when Bosnian
Muslims are shelled, driven from their homes, or murdered, they are
seething with indignation. When Serbs are driven from their homes in
the Krajina or in Sarajevo in their hundreds of thousands, or are
discovered with their throats cut, they pretend not to see. When Serbs
take Srebrenica, it is "genocide." When Serbs are cleansed from Knin,
Drvar, Grahovo or Petrovac, there is but silence, or an exultant cry
that they had it coming.
To the Albrightesque mind there is no danger of the U.S.
having to accept the jurisdiction of an International Criminal Tribunal
created by the resolution of the U.N. Security Council, without
congressional consent, without presidential signature, with primacy
over the Constitution and over American courts. Such indignities are
reserved for a Serbia, or a Rwanda. The intent is not to submit, but to
control; the goal is not a new global superstate but a front for deja-vu
politics. As C. Douglas Lummis wrote in the Nation ("Time to
Watch the Watchers," September 26, 1994):
We can be confident that only the borders of middling and small countries will show a "new legal permeability." These are the same countries whose borders were always "permeable" throughout the age of colonialism and European colonial imperialism: the countries of the Third World and Eastern Europe... As inspiration for a grass-roots movement, human rights is a vital and precious weapon against the state, the corporation and other organized power. When it raises armies and jailers, however, the time has come to start watching the watchers.
The populist, universalist rhetoric, used by the U.S. foreign
policy establishment to justify The Hague Tribunal, has been deployed
adnauseam to misrepresent "Bosnia" in general. Similar rhetoric
may be found in Europe's leftist-leaning press (The Guardian, Le Monde)
and among a small core of professional "intellectuals" (the most
contemptible of whom are France's trio of laptop-bombardiers: Henri-
Levy, Fienkelkraut and Glucksman). But among the political class of
Paris, London, or Rome, Clinton's and Albright's approach is basically
a heresy, a deviation from the European norm, as it has been ever since
a misreading of Montesquieu and the revolutionary ardor of a Tom
Paine divided America's culture from its European roots.
Lofty rhetoric apart, America's policy in the Balkans has never
been about the Balkans. President Wilson, while advocating the creation
of Yugoslavia, did not know, or care, that the unification of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes in 1918 was at least a half-century overdue: had it
happened at the time of Bismarck's and Mazzini's unification projects,
it could have worked. By the time of Versailles the process of separate
cultural development and creation of separate national identities among
the South Slavs had been completed.
With similar historical inattention, America's present leaders
are deliberately ignoring the traumatic legacy of the massacre which
Croat and Bosnian Muslim quislings systematically perpetrated
against Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies in 1941-45. What has happened in
Croatia and Bosnia in 1991-95 cannot be understood without taking
account of the Ustase "policy of racial purification that went even
beyond Nazi practices" (Encyclopaedia Britannica). The murder of
hundreds of thousands of Serbs during Pavelic's reign of terror is a
contemporary political fact of life par excellence, just as the
Holocaust is for the Jews.
But what happened in Washington?
There are no intrinsic reasons for the anti-Serb policy of the Administration.
The Serbs had lived in one state since 1918, when "Yugoslavia" came
into being. When the breakaway republics tried in 1991-92 to force over
two million of them to become minorities, literally overnight, they reacted,
and often overreacted. The issue was not that of aggression versus
collective security; instead, the principle of territorial integrity of the
former republics (Croatia, Bosnia) fatally clashed with the principle of
self-determination of the people (the Serbs). There could have been
no objection to the striving of Croats and Bosnian Muslims to create
their own states. But equally there could have been no justification for
forcing over two million Serbs west of the Drina river to be incorporated
into those states.
This begs the fundamental question of the Bosnian war: If
the collapse of Yugoslavia was due to the allegedly insurmountable
contradictions between its ethnic groups, is not Bosnia even less a
viable state? Are not the divergent interests among its ethnic groups
even more strongly pronounced? The American advocates of a
"multiethnic" Bosnia have never satisfactorily explained the paradox
that their pleas are also the arguments for the reintegration of
Yugoslavia, while their objections to such reintegration are also the
arguments against Bosnia's viability.
What, then, is the motive for the United States to disregard
all such questions - reasonable in themselves - and to insist on forcing
the Serbs to submit to the rule of their enemies, or accept mass exodus,
such as the cleansing of the Krajina last August, or Sarajevo today?
The motives of this anti-Serb stance in Washington are not
rooted in the concern for the Muslims of Bosnia as such, or indeed any
higher moral principle. United States policy has no basis in the law of
nations, or in the notions of truth or justice. It is the end-result of the
interaction of pressure groups within the American power structure.
United States foreign policy in general, and "Bosnian" policy in particular,
reflects those groups' concern for their particular interests and global
policy objectives.
A Washington insider put it bluntly in the early days of the conflict:
The simple facts are these: we are getting incredible pressure from the Saudis and others to help the Muslim cause in Bosnia. They remind us that the Islamic world provides us with all the oil we want at relatively low prices, that Islamic states have billions of petrodollars to invest in "friendly states" and offer a potential market of over one billion people for the goods and services of "friendly countries"; and finally, that the peace process between Israel and the Islamic world would go better if Israel's main friend was also a friend to Islamic countries. When you weigh these facts against what eight million Serbs can do for America's interests, its clear what direction our policy is going to take.
There are two key strategic goals of American foreign policy
today. One is that the United States retain its role as the perceived leader
of the "international community." The other is that America remain the
foremost economic power in the world. Thus the war in the Balkans
evolved from a Yugoslav disaster and a European inconvenience into a
major test of "U.S. leadership." This was made possible by a bogus
consensus which passed for Europe's Balkan policy. This consensus,
amplified in the media, limited the scope for meningful debate.
"Europe" was thus unable to resist the new thrust of Bosnian policy
coming from Washington.
While Europe resorted to the lowest common denominator in
lieu of coherent policy, a virulently anti-Serb, agenda-driven form of
Realpolitik dominated America's Bosnian policy. Instead of the
neo-Wilsonian "moralist" approach - however misguided - egotistic
unilateralism had grown rampant in Washington. Globalist
phraseology should not mislead us.The intent is no longer to achieve a
consensus; it is to force others to acquiesce to the American position.
Just as Germany sought to paint its Maastricht Diktation Croatia's
recognition in December 1991 as an expression of the "European
consensus," after 1993 Washington's fait accomplis - the
Hague Tribunal included - were straightfacedly labeled by the
administration "the will of the international community."
Just as the EU has lived with the consequences of its
acquiescence to Herr Genscher's fist-banging in Maastricht, NATO
has felt the brunt of the new American agenda in foreign policy. Most
NATO partners were resentful but helpless when the United States
resorted to covert action - with the support of Turkey and Germany -
to smuggle arms into Croatia and Bosnia in violation of U.N.
resolutions. America's refusal to support pre-1994 attempts to end the
war (the EU Lisbon formula in 1992, the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg
plans in 1993), and its unilateral actions to directly aid the
Muslim and Croat cause have frustrated the Europeans, but they were
helpless.
The rest is history. Predictably, catching "war criminals" in
Bosnia has now become another American obsession, a media-fed
crusade that may yet make a durable peace impossible. The American-led
operation was initially presented as a limited effort to implement
the Dayton peace accord by creating a "zone of separation" between
the factions and enforcing a cease fire. But a fully fledged political
campaign is under way in Washington to turn IFOR into an
international gendarmerie, obliged to assist the Hague Tribunal in
apprehending accused war criminals.
At the root of the problem is a deeply flawed model of the new
Balkan order, designed in Washington and Bonn, which seeks to
satisfy the aspirations of virtually all ethnic groups in former
Yugoslavia - except those "eight million Serbs." This is a disastrous
strategy for all concerned. Even if forced into submission now, the
Serb nation shall have no stake in the ensuing order of things. This will
cause imbalance and strife for years, or decades. It will entangle the
United States in a Balkan quagmire, and guarantee a new war as soon
as Clinton's and Albright's successors lose interest in underwriting the
ill-gotten gains of America's new Balkan clients.
The little known details of the way the Hague Tribunal
operates go beyond the issues of legality and politics; they constitute a
moral debacle of the highest order. Here are some of the facts. First,
in October 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution
780, establishing a five-member commission of experts to investigate
war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law in
the former Yugoslavia. DePaul University law professor Mammoud
Cherif Bassiouni was chosen to serve on the Commission and to serve
as its "rapporteur", to gather and analyze the evidence of war crimes.
Bassiouni subsequently became the chairman of the Commission, and
its work provided the initial impetus to the advocates of The Hague
Tribunal. The "War Crimes Project" at DePaul was the first data base
to the Tribunal's prosecutor.
Professor Bassiouni is a devout Muslim. He has never sought
to conceal his core values and prejudices in his books and articles,
which include the following: "The Palestinians' Right of Self-
Determination," "Introduction to Islam," "The Islamic Criminal Justice
System," "Jewish-Arab Relations," "Criminal Procedure (Islamic Law),"
and "The Palestinian Intifada: a Record of Israeli Repression."
Obviously, entrusting Professor Bassiouni with collecting
evidence in a conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims was
tantamount to putting Count Dracula in charge of a blood bank. It was
a gesture of contempt for the Serbs and appeasement of oil-rich
friends. As expected, he had consistently refused to accept evidence of
Croat and Muslim crimes against the Serbs, while his staff have not
hesitated to include third-hand hearsay and anonymous submissions
from Muslim and Croat sources.
Bassiouni initiated and legitimized a selective approach to
evidence gathering which has become habitual at The Hague, and
which prompted David Binder of The New York Times to declare the
entire War Crimes Tribunal unfair:
Independent Serbian efforts to collect war crimes data and not only data involving Serbs, but other nationalities has been ignored. A large volume of data has been simply brushed aside... I think it is a farce frankly, and it's made more of a farce by their naming political leaders as potential war criminals... If you're going to start listing potential war criminals, you might add [German] Chancellor Kohl and, then Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, to the list of potential war criminals for what they did in pushing the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and thereby, spreading and deepening the conflict in the Balkans.
Bassiouni's "Final Report" unambiguously blamed the Serbs
for aggression, premeditated ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, and all the
rest. It was widely circulated in five languages under the U.N. cover.
The outside world perceived it as an official U.N. document based on
facts. It was an exercise in disinformation worthy of Goebbels. Few
copies of the 3,000 page Annex were circulated, with primary evidence
on which the findings were based. This Annex simply listed thousands
of anti-Serb submissions, without attempting to evaluate their veracity.
Bassiouni's magnum opus would have been laughed out of any
real court, in the United States or anywhere else in the Western world -
just as he himself would have been disqualified from serving on an
American jury in any dispute involving a Muslim and a non-Muslim.
Second, he who pays the piper calls the tune. As Brecht put it,
"You want justice, but do you want to pay for it, hm? When you go to a
butcher you know you have to pay, but you people go to a judge as if
you were off to a funeral supper."
In the first months of its existence, The Hague Tribunal
received 93.4% of its funding from two Islamic countries, Pakistan and
Malaysia. Mirabile dictu: both have been given the right to
appoint judges to the panel. Both countries have also been among
the staunchest supporters of the Muslim side in Bosnia ever
since the beginning of the war, supplying it with weapons in
violation of U.N. resolutions. The British journalist Nora Beloff says
that such composition of The Hague Tribunal precludes it from
meeting Western standards for an independent judiciary:
It was formed on the model of the Nurenberg Tribunal, with the Serbs cast in advance for the role played at Nurenberg by the Nazis... Selected governments, representing different races and religions, were free to name their own judges. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, knowing that the Americans were primarily interested in incriminating the Serbs (and so commanding the "moral high ground"), was careful to exclude countries representing the Orthodox Christian tradition. These might have been sympathetic to the Serbs. Most of the judges came from countries where it is normal to decide the verdict in advance of the trial.
The panel also includes a Nigerian (where they execute poets
for their writings), a Chinese (where nobody has been prosecuted for
Tienanmen, let alone the horrors of the Mao era), and an Egyptian
Muslim. With guardians like these, the New World justice needs no
transgressors.
Third, the Bosnian Muslim government has stage-managed
three well publicized explosions in Sarajevo, in May 1992, February
1994, and August 1995. A total of 121 civilians were killed by these
blasts. The first incident (the "breadque massacre") facilitated the
imposition of punitive sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The
second - the infamous Markale Market incident - led to the imposition
of a heavy weapons exclusion zone around Sarajevo. The third [at the same market place]
provided the pretext for massive air raids against the Bosnian Serb Republic.
While each of these incidents was blamed on the Serbs,
Western intelligence analysts and ballistic experts know the truth.
The facts of each case have been extensively reported in Europe and
Canada (The Independent, The Toronto Star, The Times) and in some
American periodicals (The Nation and Chronicles). They have not been
reported by major American networks, wire agencies, or daily
newspapers. It would be highly embarrassing to the administration if
they were, since each of those incidents provides ample grounds to
take Izetbegovic & Co. on the
first plane to The Hague. It is also stiriking
that Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic have been accused of all manner
of nastiness, but the inquisitors at The Hague have shirked from
attributing even one of these highly publicized massacres to the
Bosnian Serb leadership.
Fourth, the indictments of the Tribunal are uninhibitedly selective.
A total of 46 Serbs have been accused of war crimes against Croats and
Muslims, and seven Croats are indicted for crimes against Muslims.
In the meantime, the Serbs have come to constitute the largest refugee
population outside sub-Saharan Africa, and there are thousands of well
documented cases of atrocities against Serb civilians by Croat and
Muslim military and civilian authorities.
The Tribunal's bias has been exposed in the indictment
against Milan Martic, leader of the Krajina Serbs, for having ordered
the bombing of Zagreb - which cost five lives. In their attacks against
Western Slavonia in May and the Krajina in August 1995, Tudjman's
troops had ethnically cleansed 250,000 Serbs and killed between
12,000 and 15,000 Serb civillians. Asked to explain the discrepancy
between what happened in the Krajina and the indictment against
Martic alone, Minna Schrag, formerly of the ICTY prosecutor's
office, admitted that the decision was political:
We at the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor recognized that the ICTY could not prosecute every violation of international law that occured in the former Yugoslavia... As for why some things are prosecuted and others are not, that is a question that I think arises in every prosecutor's office. It involves decisions about how to allocate scarce resources, priorities, purpose. And on a larger scale, why the international community decided to set up an ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but not for several other places where there appear to have been serious violations of international law, is also, I suppose, explained by practical politics and many other factors.
The model for the Hague Tribunal is not Nuremberg 1946,
but Moscow 1938. It is a deeply flawed institution, created for dishonest
political ends. It is also an obscene travesty of justice, as understood
and practiced in the civilized world. Ted Galen Carpenter lucidly
summarized the gut feeling of many Americans in a recent column:
The Yugoslav war crimes trials have begun amid declarations of the international community's determination to bring perpetrators of atrocities to justice. Unfortunately, the proceedings themselves are an atrocity.... The tribunal, like the Western governments that pressed for its creation, is blind to the reality that there are Serb victims in the Yugoslav war. The world does not need another example of moral posturing and double standards masquerading as a search for justice. It would be an act of mercy to end this farce as soon as possible.
The farce of Bosnian Serb General Djukic's arrest by the
Muslims last February, his transfer to The Hague by IFOR, and his
indictment by the Tribunal only after his refusal to testify against
Mladic and Karadzic, is worthy of the judicial proceedings in a Banana
Republic. Such seedy episodes should not be allowed to continue under
the honorable Roman name of a "Tribunal." They are consistent only
with the brave new world in which the United Nations is generating
criminal law in chilly disregard of the dictum that people can be
obligated to obey only those laws to which they have consented.
The Hague sends a clear message to the Serbs, that in
today's world there can be crime without punishment, and punishment
without crime, depending on the arbitrary will of "the international
community" embodied in Messrs. Clinton, Perry, Albright, and
Christopher. To the rest of the world the message is equally clear:
keep quiet, toe the line, eat your McDonald's, listen to your Madonna,
watch your Terminator, forget your history and culture and that
Eurocentric trash about dignity and the hierarchy of values... and
you'll be all right. For those who refuse to play along, there will be other
"Tribunals" globally, and Prozessen locally. The bell, it does not
toll just for the Serbs; it tolls for thee...